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ABSTRACT
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency is arguably one of the longest civil
conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Triggered off by shifts in the regional balance of power in
Uganda, it emerges at the tail end of a series of rebellions that gripped the Acholi subregion of Northern Uganda following guerrillas of the National Resistance Movement
(NRM) seizing state power in 1986. Up until this point in the post-colonial era, the political
and military structures of the state were controlled by Ugandans hailing from the Northern
part of the country. For the first time in the country’s history, the NRM takeover handed
control of the state to Southern Ugandans. Over the course of 25 years, the armed conflict
has spread from its original theatre in Northern Uganda to Eastern Uganda, Southern
Sudan, North Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Eastern Central
African Republic (CAR).
The LRA rebellion unsettles the theories of guerrilla warfare in a number of ways: LRA’s
military strategy is based on conducting excessive attacks on the population that should
otherwise have been rendering popular support to its activities; the group is predominantly
populated with abductees who are not ideologically committed to its armed struggle; LRA
has not only lacked a coherent ideology but also (for the better part of its life cycle) a
political wing to articulate it; the group has failed to systematically graduate from the
guerrilla to the conventional warfare phase of its insurgent campaign. And yet for all its
apparent skewed approach to armed conflict, the group has managed to stay in operation for
more than two decades.

This qualitative study attempts to unlock the logic behind the above discrepancies. The
central question in this thesis is whether the theories of guerrilla warfare are useful in
explaining the activities of LRA. In order to address this question, a theoretical blueprint
for insurgency was developed. This was in turn tested on the insurgent attributes of LRA.
The process of gathering data for this study was undertaken at two levels: First, an
extensive review of literature on the principles of insurgency, the life cycle and
organization of the LRA rebellion was undertaken. Second, interviews were conducted in
10

Kampala, the capital city of Uganda and Gulu, the original theatre of the LRA rebellion. In
Kampala, interviewees included lecturers, journalists, military officers and politicians with
in-depth knowledge on the group. In Gulu, Northern Uganda, ex-combatants of LRA
furnished this study with an insider account of the group’s modus operandi.

It can be asserted that the theories of guerrilla warfare are helpful in providing a benchmark
for understanding the insurgent activities of LRA. With respect to ideology, propaganda,
motivation, training and bases, the group conforms to the principles of insurgency. In terms
of popular support, recruitment, funding and external support, strategy and tactics, weapons
and weapons acquisition, LRA is partially at odds with the principles of insurgency. To this
end, ethnicity has not been an enduring basis for popular support as it has been undermined
by LRA attacks on the Acholi population; In the post-formative phase, LRA has forcefully
recruited members who are not ideologically committed to its campaign;

The group has not depended on popular support-driven funding; Despite its longevity, the
military strategy of the group has not followed a systematic evolutionary trajectory; And
there was no evidence to prove that LRA acquires some of its arms through theft. The
evolution of the group’s organizational structures is also at marked variance with the
theories of guerrilla warfare. LRA neither separates its military from its non-military wings
nor subordinates its military wing to a non-military one. While largely conforming to the
tenets of insurgency, overall, the LRA case is useful in pinpointing the logic that might
sustain a rebel group whose modus operandi is partially at odds with the theories of
guerrilla warfare.

This thesis concludes with an assessment of recent developments in the LRA insurgent
campaign and the dynamics underpinning the regional initiative aimed at ending it. Finally,
there is a brief discussion on whether this transnational conflict is coming to an end and if it
is, the challenges inherent in the transition from the phase of insurgency to that of postinsurgency.

11

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.1: ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA
1.1.1: INTRODUCTION.
In the post-colonial era, the use of violence has emerged as the principle means by which
political actors contest domestic political dispensations in most African states. Up until the
return to civilian-led governance in 1999, regime change in the Federal Republic of Nigeria
was mainly achieved through military coups. 1 In Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad, the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), 2 Congo, Rwanda

3

and the Central African Republic (CAR),

Non State Armed Groups (NSAGs) contesting the authority of seating governments have
adopted guerrilla warfare as a strategy. In Somalia, rebel groups have relied on the
conventional military capability of neighbouring countries to seize state power. 4

The evolution of regime change strategy in Africa has largely been underpinned by rational
calculations. NSAGs on the domestic political scene have adopted approaches
commensurate with their start up insurrectional capacities. Where the balance in military
capabilities has been tilted in favour of the state military apparatus, sub-national groups
have opted to employ irregular warfare.
This strategy has allowed them to build and conserve their insurrectional capabilities while
selectively engaging stronger state military apparatuses. In cases where cracks have
emerged within the political and military establishments of the state, sub-national groups
have opted to engineer military coups d’etat. This approach has attempted to turn the
military capability of the state against itself. Where some neighbouring countries have
demonstrated the capability and propensity to support external subversive activity, some
rebel organizations have relied on the conventional armies of these states to change
governments.

12

The post-colonial political development of Uganda throws up a classical case in the
evolution of insurrectional strategy in Africa. Over the years, insurgent groups have
constituted the country into a laboratory for testing the efficacy of contending regime
change strategies. In 1971, 5 1980 and 1985,

6

military coups facilitated regime change in

Uganda. In 1979, the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF), Tanzania’s national army,
backed the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) rebels in invading Uganda and
deposing President Idi Amin.

7

Between 1981 and 1986, guerrillas of the National

Resistance Movement (NRM) waged an agrarian insurgent campaign that resulted in the
collapse of the second Milton Obote regime.

In more recent times, guerrilla organizations have employed terrorism to contest the
authority of the Ugandan state. Between 1996 and 2002, the Allied Democratic Front
(ADF) conducted an Islamist terrorist campaign in Western Uganda and Kampala, the
Ugandan capital. 8 Since 1987, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has violently challenged
the National Resistance Movement government. Originally situating the thrust of its
activities in the Acholi sub-region of Northern Uganda, LRA has since graduated into a
transnational non-state armed group. At different stages of its life cycle, the group has
expanded its theatre of insurgent activity into the Lango region of Northern Uganda, the
Teso region of Eastern Uganda,
Eastern CAR.

12

9

Southern Sudan,

10

North Eastern DRC

11

and South

Led by Joseph Kony, a mystic figure ostensibly commanding spiritual

powers, LRA aims to unseat the NRM government and replace it with one based on the Ten
Commandments of the Christian faith.

The LRA insurgency unsettles conventional analysis of conflict in a number of ways:
Among other discrepancies, LRA has excessively based its campaign on mounting attacks
on the population on which it should otherwise have relied for popular support;

13

For the

better part of its life cycle, the group has relied on a conscripted fighting force which is not
ideologically committed to its armed struggle;
wing and lacked a coherent ideology.

15

14

It has largely operated without a political

Yet for all its apparent skewed approach to

conflict, the group has managed to operate for 25 years. This thesis attempts to unlock the
logic underpinning the organization of the LRA rebellion. First, it sets the background to
13

the conflict in Northern Uganda. Second, it unveils a theoretical framework for studying the
LRA case. Third, the attributes of the group are tested against the theoretical framework in
order to generate a better understanding of the rationale behind its activities.

1.1.2: COLONIAL ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA.
Conflict in Uganda is rooted in its colonial past. In seeking to consolidate colonial rule in
the country, the British authorities created multiple polarities. Paul Jackson asserts that the
British government generated an economic divide in Uganda by constituting the South into
a hub for agricultural and industrial development whilst turning the North into a reservoir
for cheap labour. Consequently, by the time Uganda secured political independence from
Britain, the North was lagging behind the South in economic development terms.

16

This

colonial arrangement would have implications for the stability of the country. First, the
North would potentially agitate for a redistribution of the national wealth. Second, in the
event of a future outbreak of conflict in Uganda, British colonial policy had furnished the
South with a start up resource edge over the North.

In assembling the Ugandan colonial state, British authorities also generated a labour market
divide that constituted the security services into a domain dominated by the North while
turning the civil service into one predominantly populated by Ugandans hailing from the
South.

17

Kristen E Cheney pinpoints some disparities in the constitution of the King’s

African Rifles (KAR), the British colonial army in Uganda: While the Acholi and Langi
from Northern Uganda constituted only 6% of the Ugandan population, they made up 61%
of KAR.

18

As a result, Colonel Walter Ochora, Resident District Commissioner (RDC)

Gulu notes that “The Acholi saw the army as an industry.” 19 Jeroen Adam et al observe
that this professional calling caused the evolution of an Acholi “military ethnocracy.”

20

In evaluating the implications of British labour market policy in Uganda, Cheney points out
that “Northerners were thus economically disadvantaged but controlled the instruments of
violence.”

21

In the event a conflict unfolded, British colonial policy had equipped the

North with a start up compensatory military edge over the South.

14

In designing the above colonial strategy, Britain was guided by a strategic calculation: With
the South initially emerging as the bedrock for anti-colonial activity, the imperial
government thought it prudent vesting the instruments of coercion in the hands of the
hitherto less politically agitative Northern region. In case the South spearheaded an uprising
against the colonial authorities, the British would potentially draw on support from the
North to crush it.

It is worth noting that British colonial policy in Uganda was not solely premised on the
creation and sustenance of a North-South regional divide. Alongside this strategy, London
cultivated

highly

divisive

Catholic—Protestant22

and

Buganda—rest-of-Uganda23

polarities in the country.

In building the Ugandan colonial state, British authorities worked in close partnership with
a number of non-state actors. While the explorers of the Royal Geographical Society (RGS)
furnished the British colonial office with information on the geographical characteristics of
territories in Uganda, missionaries assembled a pool of Christian converts who aligned
themselves with churches mainly originating from Europe. When in 1888, Protestants and
Catholics clashed over control of the kingdom of Buganda, the British colonial authorities
sided with the Protestants. The subsequent defeat and marginalization of the Catholics
introduced a religious dimension to the politics of Uganda. In 1954, the Catholic-dominated
Democratic Party (DP) emerged to redress the under representation of Catholics within the
political structures of the Ugandan polity. 24

1.1.3: POST-COLONIAL ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA
While expanding and consolidating the Ugandan colonial state, Britain heavily relied on the
support of the highly organized and centralized kingdom of Buganda. To reciprocate
Buganda’s support, Britain bequeathed the newly independent Ugandan state a postcolonial constitutional arrangement that guaranteed the region a special federalist status. In
the immediate post-independence era, Buganda’s attempt to maintain her special position
within Uganda precipitated a clash between Milton Obote, the Prime Minister of Uganda
and Kabaka (King) Muteesa II of Buganda who was doubling as Non Executive President
15

of Uganda. Consequently, Obote, a politician hailing from the Lango sub-region of
Northern Uganda capitalized on the North’s dominant position in the Ugandan army to
depose Muteesa II and declare Uganda a republic in 1967. 25

The Catholic—Protestant and Buganda—rest-of-Uganda polarities were significant. In
case the labour market polarities ceased to be useful, the British would potentially exploit
the religious and federalist polarities to divide Ugandans. Equally significant, Uganda’s
immediate post-independence leadership inherited the above array of polarities that it
would potentially use to maintain a stranglehold on state power. However, with the army
having played an instrumental role in settling the Buganda—rest-of-Uganda question,
control of the military emerged as the key element in the evolving battle for the control of
the Ugandan political dispensation.

In this discourse, the termination of the second post-colonial administration is significant in
two ways: First, the military coup that Idi Amin staged against Obote (in 1971) introduced
a sub-regional polarity within an already existing North-South regional divide. The coup
was precipitated by underlying concerns over the constitution of the Ugandan military.
While Obote was intent on staffing the Uganda Army (UA) with Acholis and Langis from
the North, Amin, the Army Commander at that time, favoured recruiting soldiers from the
North West.

26

Second, the disintegration of the first Obote regime constituted the state

military apparatus into a prospective theatre for insurrections in Uganda. In future,
subnational groups were potentially more likely to favour military coups as a regime
change strategy.

The end of the Amin regime (in 1979) showcased the underlying underdevelopment of the
insurrectional landscape in Uganda at that time. Ugandan exiles in Tanzania needed the
outright support of the Tanzanian army to depose Amin.27 Between 1971 and 1977,
attempts at assassinating Amin 28 and conducting insurgent activity inside the country were
foiled by Ugandan security forces. In a sense, the capacity for rebel groups to
independently change government in Uganda remained largely ineffective.

16

However, the collapse of the Amin regime laid the foundation for a reconfiguration of the
insurrectional landscape in Uganda. The role of the Northern dominated Uganda National
Liberation Army (the post-Amin national army) in intervening and sustaining the second
Obote administration precipitated a push for the reversal of the imbalance in military
capabilities favouring the North. In 1980, Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) party
defeated DP in highly disputed general elections. 29 The significance of the 1980 polls was
two fold: First, the poor performance of UPC in the South underscored the endurance of the
North-South divide in the politics of Uganda. Second, the intervention of UNLA on
Obote’s side underlined the critical role of ethnicity in shaping the allegiance of the
Ugandan military. Being a Northern dominated military institution, UNLA backed Obote
because he hailed from the North. In this connection, the South then needed its own
military organization and capability to wrest the reigns of state power from the North.

Consequently, Yoweri Museveni, a political and military leader from South Western
Uganda whose Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) party had emerged second runners up in
the 1980 polls, formed the National Resistance Movement (NRM) armed group and
launched a five year guerrilla campaign against the second Obote regime. 30

At this juncture, it is worth observing that the NRM insurgency (1981-1986) was perhaps
the single most critical development that transformed the insurrectional landscape in
Uganda. For the first time in the post-colonial history of the country, a rebel group
managed to wage a popular protracted armed struggle against a seating government, inside
the country without significant external support. In future, some subnational groups would
potentially be tempted to adopt this approach as a means of changing government in the
country.

Second, the NRM insurgency radically changed the territorial and ethnic bases for the
development of the insurrectional landscape in Uganda. NRM’s ascent to state power in
1986 tilted the regional balance of power in favour of the South. For the first time in the
post-colonial history of the country, the South controlled the instruments of coercion.
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In

this connection, the future germination of conflict in Uganda was going to depend on the
17

manner in which the South dispensed its newly acquired military power and how the North
reacted to the loss of its position of influence.
Significantly, the North’s response to changes on the Ugandan geo-political landscape
would potentially facilitate a shift in the theatre of insurrection from the South to the North.
However, there was a challenge with the North evolving as a new arena for the
development of the insurrectional landscape in Uganda: In July 1985, Gen Tito Okello
Lutwa, the Ugandan Army Commander hailing from Acholi had overthrown President
Obote from Lango.
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Consequently, rivalry between the Acholi and Langi ethnic groups

was introduced in the Northern camp. Thus, the North faced a Herculean task in seeking to
marshal ethnic unity to prosecute an armed struggle against the South.

Third, the nature of combatant-non-combatant relations in Ugandan guerrilla wars was
shaped by the manner in which the NRM insurgency and the UNLA-led counterinsurgency
campaign were conducted in the Luwero Triangle. NRM guerrillas strived to link UNLA
troops to atrocities committed in the theatre of the insurgency. The propaganda strategy of
the rebels was aided by the bareknuckled strategy adopted by the government forces.
Tomas Ofcansky observes that “In January, 1983, Obote launched Operation Bonanza in
this area during which UNLA troops destroyed small towns, villages and farms and killed
and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians.” 33

Given the fact that the Acholi (Northerners) were the predominant ethnic group in the army
and the Baganda (Southerners) suffered the brunt of counterinsurgency operations, the war
in Luwero appeared to be a regional conflict.
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In the event of future changes in the

regional balance of power, relations between the North and South would significantly be
affected by events in Luwero. If the South seized power, then it would potentially seek to
exact revenge against the North for the atrocities allegedly committed by UNLA.

1.2: EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCY IN NORTHERN UGANDA.
The collapse of the Northern hegemony in 1986 presented opportunities and constraints for
the future development of the insurrectional landscape in Uganda. In terms of opportunities,
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shifts in the regional balance of power constituted the North into fertile ground for the
evolution of a new theatre for armed rebellion. However, the collapsing Northern
establishment faced an uphill task in seeking to adapt the remnants of its conventionally
constituted political and military institutions to the challenges that come with conducting
irregular conflict.

1.2.1: THE UGANDA PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC ARMY REBELLION (19861988).
The onset of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) rebellion in 1986 unveiled
Northern Uganda as a new theatre for armed insurrection. This insurgency was significant
in the following ways:

First, it defined the ideological basis for armed conflict in Northern Uganda. Led by
Brigadier Justin Odong Latek, a senior UNLA military officer from Acholi, UPDA
advanced grievances that highlighted the enduring centrality of the North-South divide to
the evolution of conflict in Uganda. The group decried the bareknuckled tactics NRM used
in consolidating its authority in Northern Uganda. In August 1986, the 35th Battalion of the
National Resistance Army (NRA), the armed wing of NRM killed 40 civilians in
Namakora, Kitgum district, the birth place of Gen Lutwa. 35

According to Charles Mwanguhya Mpagi, Political Editor of The Daily Monitor
newspaper, these tactics reinforced speculation that in the wake of the disintegration of the
Northern hegemony, the South was intent on avenging atrocities committed by the
Northern dominated UNLA in the Luwero Triangle.

36

In this connection, UPDA adduced

the need for the ethnic survival of the Acholi in particular and people of Northern Uganda
in general as a legitimate reason for contesting the authority of NRM.

Second, the collapse of the UPDA rebellion exposed the pitfalls of using conventional
military tactics in asymmetric duels. In August, 1987, the then conventionally attuned
UPDA forces suffered military defeat at the Battle of Kilak Corner. 37 Consequently, on 3rd
June, 1988, a faction of the rebel group concluded the Pece Peace Accord with the NRM
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government.
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In order to avoid the fate that had militarily befallen UPDA, rebel groups

emerging in future had to adopt an unconventional approach to armed conflict.

1.2.2: THE HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT (HSM) I REBELLION (1986-1988)
Whereas UPDA laid the foundation for insurrection in Northern Uganda, the Holy Spirit
Movement I (HSM I) not only re-defined the ideological basis for the conflict but also
revolutionized the military strategy underpinning it. Led by Alice Auma also known as
Lakwena, HSM I partially traced the roots of conflict in this part of the country back to
contradictions within the Acholi social cosmos.
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Lakwena argued that the prevalence of

witchcraft in the Acholi sub-region had generated a social crisis.
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In order to redress this

problem, she asserted that there was a need to cleanse Acholi society of its sins. 41

In this respect, it can be argued that HSM I introduced auto-criticism to the body of
grievances advanced by insurgent groups in Northern Uganda. The group percieved the
misdeeds of Acholis as much a basis for conflict in this part of the country as those of nonAcholis. 42 This ideological re-orientation potentially watered down the North-South divide
as the principle cause of armed conflict in the North. With auto-criticism gaining
ideological prominence over the regional divide, in future, insurgent groups in this part of
the country were more likely to constitute Acholi society into a canvass for the violent
resolution of the Northern political question.

It is also worth observing that the disintegration of HSM I exposed the shortcomings of a
faith-based military strategy. Prior to militarily engaging government forces, Holy Spirit
Mobile Force (HSMF) fighters were sprinkled with ‘holy water’ and shea butter oil to
insulate them against bullets.
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Although this battlefield preparatory strategy yielded a

fearless rebel force, the adoption of bold combat tactics (like open charging) unduly
exposed HSM fighters to enemy gunfire. In 1986, at the Battle of Magamaga in Jinja,
Eastern Uganda, Lakwena’s fearlessly charging and hymn-singing forces were decisively
defeated by NRA. 44
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1.2.3: THE HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT (HSM) II REBELLION (1988-1989)
Although the collapse of HSM I called into question the effectiveness of a faith-based
military strategy, insurgent groups in Northern Uganda did not drop this approach
altogether. In the aftermath of the Battle of Magamaga, Severino Lukoya Kiberu,
Lakwena’s father, established the Holy Spirit Movement II (HSM II) rebel group which did
not significantly differ from HSM I in terms of organization. 45

While largely maintaining the HSM I faith-based combat approach, Lukoya made some
doctrinal adjustments that aimed at enhancing esprit de corps. Acknowledging the appeal of
the spiritual model of HSM I, he aimed to enhance morale within HSM II by opening up
access to the pool of spirits in his organization. Unlike in HSM I where spiritual powers
were only vested in the leader of the organization, Lukoya democratized the spiritual
landscape in HSM II by permitting any of his fighters to take up roles as spirit mediums.
Although doctrinally ground breaking, his strategy presented with one cardinal
shortcoming: Whichever HSM II fighter chose to become a spirit medium increasingly put
himself directly in the line of fire. 46 As a result, fewer members of the group were willing
to embrace this career.

Organizationally fragile, under military pressure from government forces and engaged in a
bitter turf war with LRA

47

(an emerging force on the Northern Uganda conflict circuit),

HSM II imploded. Lukoya was captured and tortured by LRA, rescued from LRA captivity
and jailed by government forces before being released in 1992. 48

1.3: EVOLUTION OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA) INSURGENCY
(1987-TO DATE)
In the aftermath of the disintegration of HSM II, LRA emerged as the most critical security
threat to the authority of the NRM government. However, LRA’s contribution to the long
term development of the insurrectional landscape in Northern Uganda was largely going to
depend on whether it would rectify the strategic and tactical errors that had caused the
demise of UPDA, HSM I and HSM II. In the event LRA surmounted this challenge, then it
would have created a blueprint for a durable rebellion in the country.
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1.3.1: EMERGENCE (1987-1990)
At this juncture, it is worth noting that in order to precipitate an effective doctrinal
redirection of the conflict in Northern Uganda, LRA had not only to drop or modify
existing insurgent warfare models but also neutralize the groups that would potentially have
re-popularized these strategies. In this direction, the emergence of LRA heavily depended
on the simultaneous disintegration of UPDA, HSM I and HSM II. 49

In seeking to facilitate the demise of the then evolving Holy Spirit Movement, Joseph
Kony, the leader of LRA pursued a two-pronged approach: Like Lakwena and Lukoya, he
sought to position himself as the only authentic practitioner of spiritual warfare. This
strategy would potentially eliminate all his competitors. Brigadier Michael Acellam, a
former LRA commander reveals that in 1987, Kony presented himself to his followers as
“Mani Polo, a soldier from heaven.” 50 However, the authenticity of Kony’s claims largely
depended on the status of his competitors. If Lukoya still commanded his spiritual
credentials, then Kony’s position was in jeopardy. According to Peter Eichstaedt, Kony
neutralized the doctrinal threat posed by HSM II by capturing Lukoya “…reportedly tying
his uncle to a tree and beat(ing) him severely with a cane pole, shouting that he would not
tolerate any more Lakwenas.” 51

Whereas the Holy Spirit Movement presented a fundamental doctrinal challenge to the
emergence of LRA, the continued existence of UPDA threw up a legitimacy crisis for
Kony. Most pioneering members of the UPDA officer corps were Acholis who had
previously served in UNLA. In this sense, UPDA boasted not only ethnic ties to the Acholi
population but also military experience needed to fight NRA. Although Kony had mainly
recruited among Acholis (which put LRA at a level of parity with UPDA in terms of ethnic
connections with the Acholi people), he lacked the requisite military expertise to match that
of UPDA. Thus, in order to shore up its legitimacy, LRA needed to undermine the position
of UPDA.

In seeking to address this challenge, LRA adopted a two-pronged approach: It attacked
UPDA. Describing the intensity of the turf war between the two groups, Billie
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O’Kadamerie observes that “(Kony) attacked UPDA with surprising ferocity that even
surpassed NRA’s offensive then.” 52 By 1988, the viciousness of the clashes between LRA
and UPDA had pushed UPDA to conclude a peace agreement with the NRM government.
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This would relieve UPDA of the burden of having to engage two enemies—NRA and

LRA.

However, acknowledging the wealth of military experience accumulated by the pioneering
officer corps of UPDA, Kony sought to incorporate some of the high ranking officers of
this group into the structures of his emerging organization. To this end, former UPDA
commanders, Brig Justin Odong Latek, Lt Col Basilio Opwonya, Lt Col Dr James Kweya,
Lt Col Terensio Okullo, Lt Col Athocon, Lt Col Mazoldi Lubangakene, Col Joseph
Obonyo, Maj Kenneth Banya, Major Stephen Moyi, Maj Benjamin Apia and Lt Col
Kaggwa assumed leadership positions in LRA.54

1.3.2: COUNTERING THE EMERGENCE OF LRA: OPERATION NORTH (19911992)
Thus far, this discussion has addressed the role played by different non-state armed groups
in shaping the development of the insurrectional landscape in Northern Uganda. It is worth
observing that the development of insurrectional landscapes ultimately depends on the
confrontational interaction between insurgents and counterinsurgents. While insurgent
activity cultivates the foundation for asymmetric duels, counterinsurgent activity seeks to
dismantle these conflict settings. In this connection, the evolution of Northern Uganda as a
theatre for insurrection not only hinged on the insurgent activities of UPDA, HSM I, HSM
II and LRA but also on counterinsurgency campaigns mounted by the Ugandan state
military apparatus.
Operation North 55 presented the Ugandan state with the first comprehensive opportunity to
influence the development of the insurrectional landscape in Northern Uganda. This
counterinsurgency campaign not only set the geographical parameters of the emerging
conflict but also defined the future shape of the battle for the hearts and minds of the Acholi
people.
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According to Lt Gen Ivan Koreta, Deputy Chief of Defence Forces of UPDF, Operation
North aimed at cordoning off an area covering Karuma, Lake Kyoga and the Eastern bank
of River Nile—in essence, large parts of the Acholi and Lango sub-regions of Northern
Uganda.
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In this connection, it can be argued that ideological differences among the

different rebel groups affected neither the ethnic basis nor the geographical setting of the
armed conflict. Like UPDA, HSM I and HSM II, the theatre of the LRA rebellion was in
Northern Uganda
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and the grievances underpinning this rebellion related to the North-

South regional divide.

Operation North was also instrumental in shaping combatant-civilian relations in the
conflict in Northern Uganda. In order to deny LRA popular support, the Ugandan state
relocated large sections of the Acholi population in protected camps.
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With civilians

restricted to designated areas, Koreta argues that the Ugandan military then had a better
opportunity to “…chase legitimate targets.”
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As part of the counterinsurgency campaign,

Betty Bigombe, Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office Resident in Northern
Uganda, spearheaded the creation of civil defence groups known as the Arrow Boys. In
reacting to this strategy, LRA designated Acholi civilians government collaborators and
started attacking them. 60 At this stage in the campaign, the population was at crossroads: It
had to choose between supporting a rebel group that was fighting to liberate it (while
attacking it) and a government that had dispossessed it of its political power (but was
protecting it against rebel attacks).

1.3.3: THE BIGOMBE PEACE INITIATIVE (1993)
Although by 1992, Operation North had significantly weakened LRA’s capacity to wage
war inside Uganda, 61 the NRM government opted to change its counterinsurgency strategy.
In 1993, Bigombe initiated peace talks with LRA geared towards realizing a negotiated
settlement to the conflict in Northern Uganda. 62 This peace process was significant in two
ways:

First, it underscored the centrality of the battle for hearts and minds to the execution of
asymmetric duels in Uganda. Although by 1992, LRA had relocated to the Otto hills,
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Lubangatek and Jabulein in Southern Sudan after incurring heavy losses at the hands of
NRA,
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the establishment of protected villages in Northern Uganda had severed relations

between the Acholi population and the NRM government. Apart from uprooting it from its
natural habitat, the above policy
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did not effectively insulate the Acholi people against

LRA attacks. Thus, the 1993 peace process did not only present the NRM Government with
the opportunity of peacefully ending the LRA insurgency but also that of repairing its
relations with the Acholi population

Second, the collapse of the Bigombe initiative underlined the critical role of peace
processes in facilitating transitions between different phases of insurgencies in Uganda. The
1993 peace process ended because of a break down in trust between the negotiating parties
over suspicions that LRA was using the negotiations period to regroup.
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The activities of

LRA during the 1993 peace process mirrored insurgent practice in previous conflict eras. In
1985, guerrillas of NRM used the Nairobi peace negotiations to prepare for a final military
onslaught on Kampala, the Ugandan capital. 66

1.3.4: SECURING EXTERNAL SUPPORT (1994)
The role of Tanzania in deposing President Idi Amin introduced an external support
dimension to civil conflicts in Uganda. Although Ugandan exiles had formed the UNLF
rebel group to fight Amin, the bulk of the force that toppled him was marshalled by the
Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF).
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The commencement of Sudanese support for

LRA was significant. In the long term, it would show the extent to which proxy conflicts in
the Great Lakes Region of Africa had changed since the collapse of the Amin regime. 68
Sudan’s involvement in the conflict in Uganda underlined the connection between foreign
policy and domestic politics. According to Angelo Izama of the Daily Monitor newspaper,
Sudan backed LRA and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) in retaliation for suspected
Ugandan support for the Sudanese rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA). 69 However, Lt Col Felix Kulayigye, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF)
and Ministry of Defence Spokesman contests the notion that Uganda’s foreign policy
fuelled the conflict in the North. He contends that by the time Uganda started extending
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support to SPLA, the rebel group was already receiving military aid from Ethiopia.
According to Kulayigye, Sudan backed LRA because it was uneasy about the emergence of
what it perceived as a progressive regime in Uganda. 70

In discussing the Uganda-Sudan proxy war, the nature of the LRA-Government of Sudan
(GoS) alliance generates conflicting perspectives. Whereas Izama asserts that Sudanese
support for LRA was contingent on the rebel group operating along what was known as the
Southern flank,
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Ray Apiire, former Chaplain of LRA downplays the influence the

Khartoum establishment commanded over Kony’s forces. Despite Sudan pursuing Islamist
foreign policy objectives, Apiire reveals that it did not force Islam down the throat of LRA.
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1.3.5: LOSS OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT (1999-2002)
The nature of relations between LRA and the GoS would subsequently shape the next phase
in the evolution of the insurgency in Northern Uganda. Given the loose control that
Khartoum had over LRA, the conclusion of the Nairobi Peace Accord in 1999 (that
normalized Uganda-Sudan relations)
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and the commencement of the UPDF-led

counterinsurgency Operation Iron Fist in Southern Sudan in 2002
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did not rein in Kony’s

fighting group. Capitalizing on the measure of autonomy it enjoyed in its relations with the
GoS, LRA was able to disengage from the alliance and embark on the next phase in its
campaign.

Under pressure from UPDF counterinsurgency units in Southern Sudan, LRA split up into
two forces: In 2003, the first flooded back into Uganda causing terror in Acholiland, Lango
and the Teso sub-region of Eastern Uganda.
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In 2005, the second, commanded by Maj

Gen Vincent Otti, Kony’s deputy, relocated to Garamba forest in North Eastern DRC.
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The relocation to Garamba showed that the group could establish a sanctuary in a
neighbouring country without the consent of its government. Unlike in Sudan, in the DRC,
LRA relatively improved prospects for holding on to its base. It was not only difficult for
the GoDRC to access this part of the country (due to rough terrain) but also in light of the
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fact that LRA had set up base in the country illegally, it had not entered into a formal
alliance with the DRC that would have constrained it.

The incursions into Eastern Uganda offer insights into the strategic calculations of the
group in the wake of the official withdrawal of Sudanese support for its activities. The
International Crisis Group identifies three objectives underpinning LRA’s Eastern
Campaign in 2003: To disrupt the Eastern trade route that passes through the Eastern town
of Mbale; “giving the insurgency a national character” and “replenishing logistics.” 77 The
defeat of LRA forces in this part of the country exposed the futility of following
insurrectional routes used by other rebel groups to ease transnational counterinsurgency
pressure. In 2003, Eastern Uganda emerged as a perennial stumbling block to the
southward exportation of insurrections originating from Northern Uganda. Like HSM I
forces which were mowed down by NRA machine gunfire at Magamaga in Eastern
Uganda,
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LRA suffered perhaps one of its worst defeats in Teso, Eastern Uganda.

Brigadier Tabuleh, one of the group’s top commanders was killed during clashes with
government forces and civil defence groups in the sub-region. Although a setback, the
Eastern debacle presented LRA and future rebel groups with the opportunity of reassessing
and identifying alternative insurrectional routes.

1.3.6: THE JUBA PEACE PROCESS (2005-2008)
Just like the 1993 peace talks, the Juba peace process showcased the critical role of
diplomacy in facilitating transition between different phases of insurgencies in Uganda.
Mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan,
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the Juba peace process (perhaps the

best opportunity to peacefully end the conflict in Northern Uganda) was held hostage by
two sticking issues: Whereas LRA premised the conclusion of a Final Peace Agreement
(FPA) on the Government of Uganda (GoU) influencing the revocation of International
Criminal Court (ICC) indictments targeting its leadership 80 (which the GoU tried to do but
failed), the Ugandan state insisted that meaningful peace in Northern Uganda was
unattainable as long as LRA used the negotiations to regroup.
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The sticking issues in the

negotiations furnished the two sides with the excuses and space to pursue the military
option. The Juba peace process accorded the GoU the opportunity to ‘exhaust’ all
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diplomatic channels before dealing with the LRA problem militarily. Having taken a
beating during Operation Iron Fist, LRA needed a cessation of hostilities to reorganize its
forces.

With both sides becoming increasingly belligerent, the Juba peace process turned out to be
a pause in hostilities. On 14th December, 2008, the armies of Uganda, DRC and Southern
Sudan with logistical support by the United States launched Operation Lightening Thunder
that targeted LRA bases deep in North Eastern DRC.
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Although this campaign

significantly crippled the group’s capacity to wage war, it exported LRA terror to hitherto
unaffected territories in the Central African Republic.

1. 4: RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.4.1: PROBLEM STATEMENT
The background to this study unveils shifts in the development of the insurrectional
landscape in Uganda. In the pre-LRA era, groups contesting the authority of the state
mainly targeted the capability of the national army. By staging coups, they aimed at turning
the capability of the state military apparatus against itself; By relying on the support of
conventional armies of neighbouring states, these groups aimed to raise their military
capabilities to the same level as those of the governments whose authority they were
contesting; By adopting insurgency as a strategy, they aimed to selectively engage
government forces. In all the above cases, insurrections in Uganda were duels between
combatants.

In the LRA era, insurrectional culture has radically changed. Non military infrastructure has
evolved into a target for the violent resolution of political disputes in the country. Rebel
groups in Uganda now target civilians, homes, gardens and schools with the aim of
indirectly undercutting the confrontational edge commanded by the state military apparatus.
This shift potentially upsets existing paradigms underpinning the organization and
execution of irregular conflict. For example, LRA’s sustained attacks on civilians
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undermine its capacity to marshal popular support needed for prosecuting its insurgent
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campaign. Despite receiving substantial military support from the Government of Sudan
(GoS),
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LRA’s apparent failure to systematically graduate from the guerrilla to the

conventional warfare phase of its campaign runs contrary to existing theories of guerrilla
warfare.

The apparent discrepancy between the modus operandi of LRA and the principles of
insurgency points to an emerging gap in knowledge on irregular conflict in Africa. In order
to bridge it, this thesis compares and contrasts the activities of LRA with a theoretical
model of guerrilla warfare. Any conformities and disconformities emerging in this case
study will contribute towards a better understanding of asymmetric warfare in the modern
era.

1.4.2: BROAD/PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION
Are existing theories of guerrilla warfare useful in explaining the insurgent activities of
LRA?

1.4.3: SPECIFIC/SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. How does LRA reconcile the need for popular support with its sustained attacks on
civilians?
2. Why has LRA not systematically graduated from the guerrilla to the conventional
warfare phase of its insurgent campaign?

1.4.4: HYPOTHESES
The hypotheses in this study were generated from an in-depth discussion of the principles
of guerrilla warfare (Chapters 2 and 3).
IDEOLOGY
LRA will have adopted an ideology that is either an original synthesis of its ideals or an
adaptation of existing ideologies in order to articulate political contradictions in the
Ugandan polity and justify its recourse to violence to resolve these contradictions
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PROPAGANDA
1. LRA will have used a communicational campaign espousing the idea of an
independent existence for its targeted audience, pin-pointing political contradictions
within the Ugandan polity and rationalizing its recourse to violence.
2. LRA will have used overt propaganda techniques in territories where it commands
greater control over the population and covert ones where it has less control.
MOTIVATION & ESPRIT DE CORPS
LRA fighters will have been motivated by idealistic and social considerations
POPULAR SUPPORT
LRA will have enjoyed popular support because it can easily access civilians, its
membership is ethnically connected with the population in Northern Uganda and
civilians in this part of the country believe that LRA will unseat the National Resistance
Movement government.
RECRUITMENT
LRA will have selectively recruited its members from civic groups and constituencies
that are either conscious and/or targets of marginalization perpetrated by the National
Resistance Movement government.
TRAINING
LRA will either have designed or adopted a training model commensurate with its
military strategy and tactics and one that imparts both combat and non combat skills.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
LRA will have evolved as a politico-military organization characterized by a structural
separation of functions, with its armed wing subordinated to its political wing.
GUERRILLA BASES
1. LRA will have located its bases in topographically inaccessible areas in order to
limit attacks on them.
2. The LRA insurgency will have been located in an area with a history of armed
insurrection and susceptibility to weak central government control.
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FUNDING AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT
LRA will have relied on popular support and criminal activity domestically and
exploited existing geo-political contradictions regionally to mobilize resources for
prosecuting a relatively cheap insurgent campaign.
GUERRILLA STRATEGY
1. LRA will have prosecuted an unpredictable, protracted insurgent campaign and
selectively targeted loop-holes in the capability of the state military apparatus while
adapting to its own condition of relative military weakness.
2. LRA will have selectively attacked civilians to expose the Ugandan state as
incapable of protecting its citizens. In turn, this will have pushed the government to
adopt a heavy handed approach to tracking down the rebels.
GUERRILLA TACTICS
1. LRA will have attacked weak points in the military capability of the Ugandan state
and avoided outright confrontation with government forces.
2. LRA will have used terrain intelligence to marshal mobility, conduct deceptive
movements in its theatres of insurgent activity and mount ambushes against the
enemy.
WEAPONS & WEAPONS ACQUISITION
LRA will have used a wide range of weapons according to availability and will have
purchased and stolen its arms and ammunition from a variety of domestic and foreign
sources.

1.4.5: SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study tests twelve variables underpinning the organization of the LRA insurgency
against a theoretical model of guerrilla warfare developed in Chapters 2 and 3.

1.4.6: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This study will enhance our understanding of LRA and add to what is already known about
guerrilla warfare and conflict in Africa.
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1.4.7: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Within the domain of research, there are two diametrically opposing paradigms: On one
hand, the positivist school of thought is premised on the assumption that objective truth
exists and employing the tools for systematic, value-free investigation, it can be unlocked.
On the other, the post-positivist or interpretivist school of thought contends that ‘truth’ is a
subjective construction. It is a product of a value-laden investigative process. 85

The emergence of divergent research paradigms has yielded competing methods for
knowledge production. Whereas the positivist approach seeks objective truth through
statistical quantification, the post-positivist approach seeks subjective truth through holistic
interpretation.
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This thesis has adopted a post-positivist/interpretivist approach because

the process of studying the activities of LRA is not value-free. This research is significantly
informed by multiple theoretical perspectives.
1.4.7.1: Developing a Theoretical Framework
In seeking to construct a pool of values to shape this investigative process, a critical review
of some of the theoretical perspectives underpinning the organization of insurgency was
done. Emphasis was placed on the following variables: organizational structure, the
evolution of strategy and tactics, mode of recruitment, induction and training, resource
mobilization strategy, weapons acquisition and use, motivation, propaganda, ideology and
popular support. In this direction, the research objective was to assemble a benchmark on
the basis of which the insurgent credentials of LRA would be tested.

1.4.7.2: Selecting LRA
In the field of Terrorism Studies, Africa is one of the more understudied regions in the
world. An attempt was made to extend the frontiers of this field by conducting an extensive
study on one terrorist campaign in the region. In 2009, I conducted an extensive review of
literature on seven terrorist campaigns in Africa: The LRA and Allied Democratic Front
(ADF) insurgencies in Uganda; the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) insurgency in Sierra
Leone; the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) insurgency in Algeria; the
Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR) insurgency in Rwanda; Al Ittihad Al Islammiyya (AIAI)
and Al Shabaab insurgencies in Somalia. In all these cases, the objective was to unlock the
32

logic behind insurgent activity. To this end, an attempt was made to establish the
relationship between the life cycle of each group and the organization of its insurgent
activities.

Although conforming to some of the attributes of insurgent groups in Africa, LRA
exhibited certain tendencies that put it at odds with the theories of guerrilla warfare. It does
not seek to control territory and resources; The group’s organizational structures do not
reflect its ambition to capture and dispense political power;
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Despite strengthening its

military capability over the years, LRA does not seem to have systematically graduated
from the guerrilla to the conventional warfare stage of its insurgent campaign.

1.4.7.3: Generating Field Research Questions
The extensive review of literature yielded gaps in existing knowledge on LRA. These
missing links were used to formulate open-ended field research questions.

1.4.7.4: Research Design
The choice of a research design was dictated by two factors: The need to adopt a
framework consistent with the interpretivist paradigm and the need to conduct an in-depth
study of a single case. In seeking to accommodate the above research considerations, a
single case study design was adopted. With this approach, it was possible to study multiple
features of LRA in-depth, spread over multiple periods of time. 88

1.4.7.5: Gaining Access to the Field Research Settings
Given the interpretivist dimension to the study, a non-random sampling technique was
selected.
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To this end, snowball sampling was used to contact key persons who in turn

identified potential interviewees. The sampling frame for this study was partitioned into
five categories: Ex-combatants, Ugandan military, Media, Academic and Political. For each
category, one principal snowball contact was used to identify potential interviewees.
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1.4.7.6: Data Collection, Sorting and Analysis
Interviews were conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the Human Research Ethics
Committee of the University of Wollongong. Given the post-positivist dimension to this
study, qualitative research instruments were used. Unstructured interview schedules with
open-ended questions were used to elicit responses from interviewees. These research tools
allowed interviewees to elaborate their responses. In order to allow for research
triangulation, secondary sources were used as a counterweight to the interviews. 90

The thematic codes

91

for this study were derived from the different variables of the

theoretical framework. In this connection, all generated data was grouped under: strategy,
tactics, organizational structure, funding, recruitment, induction, training, weapons and
weapons acquisition, external support among other categories. In order to answer the
questions in this study, the organization of the LRA insurgency was compared and
contrasted with a theoretical model for guerrilla warfare.
1.4.7.7: Challenges encountered in conducting the study.
Interviewing ex-combatants is an enormous challenge. While most of the ex-LRA
combatants were willing to share their insurgent experiences, I had to tread a fine line
between generating as much data as I could and guarding against pushing the interviewees
to a point where probing brought back traumatizing memories of their careers. Most of the
LRA commanders I interviewed were brutally conscripted into Kony’s guerrilla army at a
very tender age.

I was able to overcome the above challenge. Prior to embarking on my field research, my
principle supervisor (with vast experience in conducting terrorism and counter-terrorism
research) taught me the fundamental techniques for interviewing insurgents. Other
challenges related to harmonizing the time-boundedness of my field research with the need
to generate enough data. In light of the busy work schedules of some of the interviewees, I
had to cancel and reschedule some of the interviews.
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20 interviews were successfully conducted in Kampala, the Ugandan capital and Gulu, the
original theatre of the LRA insurgency. The next chapter is a critical review of the theories
of guerrilla warfare.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL REVIEW I
2.1: DEFINING AND OPERATIONALIZING GUERRILLA WARFARE
Human history is replete with peaceful and violent contestations of domestic political
dispensations. Typically, the violent dimension to domestic politics or civil strife pits
seating governments commanding conventional military apparatuses against opposing Non
State Armed Groups (NSAGs). In such duels, states initially command a conventional
military edge over these rebel organizations. Seeking to reverse this imbalance in military
capabilities, the NSAGs adopt strategies and tactics commensurate with their initial
condition of relative military weakness.92

Over the course of time, guerrilla warfare has emerged as a widely favoured strategy for the
reversal of imbalances in military capabilities inherent in asymmetric duels. Guerrilla
warfare is based on the execution of “guerra” which in Spanish translates as “small war.”93
Given the start up resources at the disposal of the state military establishment, NSAGs can
only take part in serialized duels. This approach allows them to gradually weaken the
strength of the state military establishment while patiently building their own.

But the serialization of confrontational contact with government forces makes it difficult
for guerrillas to seize state power. In order to occupy territory, buttress the population and
control key government installations, they would need to establish a fixed presence which
would potentially attract a conventional military response from government forces. This
state of affairs would end up negating the essence behind adopting guerrilla warfare as a
strategy. However, Che Guevara contends that guerrilla warfare is merely “a phase that
does not offer in itself opportunities to arrive at complete victory.” He argues that “…as its
steady growth acquires the characteristics of a regular army…,” guerrilla warfare ultimately
provides a mechanism for a head-on confrontation with the enemy.
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In this respect, Che

Guevara appreciates the limitations of guerrilla warfare and the inherent need to adopt a
different strategy at the penultimate stage of an insurgent campaign in order to facilitate the
seizure of state power.
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The climax to an asymmetric duel (capturing the reigns of power) underlines the
connection between war and politics. In defining the nexus between the two variables, Mao
Tse Tung argues that “war is politics with bloodshed” and conversely “politics is war
without bloodshed.”
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In similar vein, Carl von Clausewitz defines war as the

“continuation of politics by other means.” 96 The Maoist and Clausewitzist dicta suggest
that armed confrontation is a violent extension of politics. Deriving from this position, T E
Lawrence asserts that guerrilla warfare emerges as a means for furthering a political
movement through the use of unorthodox tactics. 97

Situating guerrilla warfare within the domain of politics, Robert Asprey asserts that
traditionally, this mode of conducting armed conflict “…is a weapon of protest employed to
rectify real or imagined wrongs levied on a people either by a foreign invader or by the
ruling government.” 98 However, he observes that guerrilla warfare strategists have had to
choose between using this military strategy singly and using it in conjunction with others.
In addressing this dilemma, Mao concurs with Che Guevara in asserting that “Guerrilla
operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step
in the total war.”
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The limitations of guerrilla warfare would suggest that in order to

capture state power, NSAGs should transit from using guerrilla warfare to conventional
warfare. This approach would allow them to defend their battlefield gains. The views of
Mao and Che Guevara posit a trajectory in the evolution of armed conflict replete with
phases preceding and succeeding guerrilla warfare. To this end, Frank Kitson (citing the
works of Sun Tzu) observes that “…conventional war should only be used if the enemy
cannot be overthrown by the activities of spies and agents sowing dissension and nurturing
subversion.” 100

Guerrilla warfare then emerges as a viable option only in situations where the phases
preceding it have been exhausted. The drive to exhaust each phase in the evolution of
insurrection underscores the need to attain the objectives of armed conflict with minimal
costs incurred.
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In pursuing a cost-sensitive military strategy, Huntington observes that NSAGs seek to
reverse the imbalance in military capabilities favouring the state military apparatus by
assuming “…the tactical offensive in selected forms, times and places.” 101 In this regard,
an NSAG can gain the strategic initiative by selectively choosing when, where and how to
engage the state military apparatus.

One of the avenues for minimizing the cost of conducting asymmetric conflicts is the
location of a theatre of an insurgency in agrarian settings. Essentially, guerrilla war theatres
are situated in rural parts of the country, preferably detached from effective government
control.
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The inaccessibility of these sanctuaries allows guerrillas the time and space to

organize insurgent activities undeterred by the state military apparatus. It is then ironic that
in certain situations, urban settings have been constituted into guerrilla war theatres. Cities,
towns and trading centres constitute the more highly developed and better policed parts of
any polity. Under normal circumstances, the state military apparatus would find it easier
disrupting the activities of insurgents in urban than it would in rural settings. Yet for all its
apparent shortcomings, urban guerrilla warfare has been given both scholarly and practical
consideration.

In seeking to understand the essence behind asymmetric duels in urban settings, Carlos
Marighella defines the urban guerrilla as “….a person who uses other than conventional
means for fighting against the military dictatorship. As a political revolutionary and also a
convinced patriot, he is struggling to set his country free and is thus a friend of its people
and their liberty. His battlefield consists of the major cities of our country.”
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Like the

rural-based insurgent, the urban guerrilla employs unorthodox methods to contest the
authority of a seating government. What separates the two types of insurgents is the nature
of the theatre they operate in. The urban guerrilla operates in a more developed theatre than
the agrarian insurgent. But as already noted, the urban environment unduly exposes urban
guerrillas to attack by government forces. Why then would they adopt this rather risky
strategy?
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Marighella observes that “The primary task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear
down, to demoralize the military regime and its repressive forces, and also to attack and
destroy the wealth and property of the foreign managers and the Brazilian upper class.” 104
In this respect, the function of urban guerrilla warfare is to speed up the armed struggle. It
takes the conflict to the door step of the enemy and eases counterinsurgency pressure that
the state might be mounting on rural-based insurgent groups. In this connection, the
government would have to split up its forces to deal with the rural and urban security
threats. This approach would potentially not yield the desired counterinsurgency effect.

It is important to note that the targeting of civilians and non-military infrastructure (as part
of urban guerrilla warfare) 105 raises a critical question about the essence of warfare: Should
NSAGs attack populations which are naturally supposed to render popular support to their
activities? According to Walter Laqueur, “Terror is used as a deliberate strategy to
demoralize the government by disrupting its control, to demonstrate one’s own strength and
to frighten collaborators.” 106 Rex Hudson asserts that in order to psychologically wrongfoot governments in asymmetric duels, rebel groups attack civilians. 107

It is plausible to make two deductions from the postulations of Laqueur and Hudson: In
rebellions, guerrilla groups can either target military, non military or military and nonmilitary infrastructure. By hinging their campaigns on striking at non military
infrastructure, insurgent organizations indirectly demonstrate a measure of incapacity in
taking on the state military establishment. Non military infrastructure then emerges as a
canvass on which they can disorientate the state in situations where a similar feat would be
unattainable on a battlefield.

The adoption of terrorism as a strategy redefines the essence of asymmetric warfare. Alex
Schmid and Albert Jongman observe that “…the direct targets of (terrorist) violence are not
the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target
population and serve as message generators.”
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Terrorists emerge as strategists who

employ psychological warfare to upset the social contract between the citizen and the state.
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Mindful of the state’s duty to protect its citizens, they target civilians in order to undermine
confidence in their government and provoke the state into using ruthless counterinsurgency
measures.

From the above discussion, it can be asserted that guerrilla warfare is a means by which
rebel groups gradually reverse an imbalance in military capabilities favouring the state
military establishment. Essentially, this strategy allows them to selectively engage
government forces while conserving their resources and building their own military
capability. In its classical form, guerrilla warfare is a military contest between combatants.
However, in practice, most insurgent groups also attack civilians as part of their wider
campaigns.

2.2: CONSTRUCTING AN INSURGENT IDENTITY
In seeking to initiate and sustain an insurgency, a guerrilla organization has to grapple with
two principle challenges: First, it has to design an identity that is appealing to the
population in order to attract and retain its membership. To this end, an insurgent group
needs an ideology to explain its grievances and propaganda techniques to influence the
emotions of the population. The realization of popular support not only pushes civilians to
enlist but also motivates them to stay in an insurgent organization. In the long run, the
organizational image that a guerrilla group cultivates and projects in its interaction with the
population constitutes its insurgent identity.

Second, it needs to undertake certain tasks to prepare and confront the enemy. In this
connection, a rebel group needs to assemble its organizational structures, set up its bases,
secure weapons and other forms of external support, design its military strategy and tactics
and train its fighters. The second set of tasks allows it to operationalize its insurgent
activities in its confrontational interaction with government forces. In seeking to understand
the evolution of an insurgent identity, this chapter assesses the significance of ideology,
propaganda, popular support, recruitment and motivation in guerrilla warfare.
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2.2.1: IDEOLOGY
Christopher Harmon notes that “For an organization to grow and become a serious
movement, it must elaborate its views. These views may be limited to the desire for certain
changes…More often, guerrilla groups have ‘unlimited war’ objectives and a desire to take
power themselves. They elaborate their view of the world, either by wholesale adaptation
from ideological predecessors or by an original synthesis of their own.”
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Harmon

emphasizes that an insurgent group needs an explanatory framework in order to market
itself among civilians. In this sense, the manner in which it packages its ideals influences
the population into choosing to embrace or reject its agenda.

Ideology then emerges as highly indispensable to the execution of guerrilla warfare. But at
this stage, while acknowledging its significance, the actual place of ideology in an
insurgency is not clear. For example, thus far, the extent to which ideology shapes the
overall course of a guerrilla war remains unaddressed. Charles Maechling Junior observes
that “There is no secret about the ingredients of guerrilla warfare. At the purely tactical
level, it so closely resembles its parent, irregular or partisan warfare that to the uninstructed
there seems to be no distinction between them. It is the injection of ideology into guerrilla
operations that transforms partisan warfare
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into revolutionary warfare.”
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In this

regard, ideology presents insurgents with a conceptual mechanism for articulating political
contradictions in a given polity and justifying the recourse to violence.

While Maechling underscores the inherent connection between ideology and the use of
violence by insurgent groups, he does not categorically state whether in the interaction
between these two variables, ideology becomes part and parcel of guerrilla strategy. In
seeking to demarcate the parameters of ideology, Peter Paret argues that ideology can
actually be used as an operational weapon in psychological warfare: “First, to demoralize
the enemy, that is, to destroy his faith in his own side; second, to exdoctrinate him, if I may
coin a word—to eradicate the doctrines in which he has been taught to believe by his side;
and third, if possible to indoctrinate him with positive doctrines which we wish him to
possess.” 112 In this respect, ideology is an effective tool in insurgencies only if it assumes
both indoctrinational and counter indoctrinational dimensions.
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The duality in the nature of ideology then accords insurgents and counterinsurgents the
opportunity of using it as a tool for ‘purifying’ the enemy. In discussing the connection
between ideology and psychological warfare, Michael McClintock observes that for French
counterinsurgency strategists, “Enemy ideology was a disease or an infestation; the cure
was to be found in re-education camps, where prisoners were to be ‘disinfected’ by being
educated clearly and objectively in the French ideology.” 113

Since ideology plays a quasi purificational role in asymmetric duels, the manner in which
insurgents and counterinsurgents apply it raises a critical question: To what extent is a
coercive approach used in indoctrination in asymmetric conflicts? Insurgents use persuasive
and coercive tactics to advance their respective ideological positions. In seeking to
persuade the population to support its cause, an insurgent group articulates its ideology in
simple language that is widely understandable and addresses the immediate concerns of the
population. However, it makes very little mention of its long term objective.
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The

purificational dimension to ideology points to the uncertainty underpinning the evolution of
insurgent-civilian relations. From the perspective of the rebels and depending on how they
package their ideology, civilians may embrace or resist an insurgency.

In this context, an insurgent group may not rule out applying coercive techniques to market
its ideals. McClintock argues that “A people can be converted from one faith to the other if
given a choice between conversion and extermination, stubborn individuals being rooted
out. To effect the initial conversion, participation in the public ceremonies and formal
language of the new faith must be required. Sustained counterintelligence must remain on
the alert against backsliders, but formal acceptance will become genuine acceptance if all
public media or expression are denied the vanquished faith.” 115 In this respect, there are
rewards and sanctions inherent in the enemy adopting or rejecting the ideology of an
insurgent organization.

It can be asserted that ideology plays a dual role in guerrilla warfare. It not only acts as a
medium through which insurgents and counterinsurgents articulate their respective ideals
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and cultivate popular support but it also rationalizes and manages the violence directed
towards settling an asymmetric conflict.

2.2.2: POPULAR SUPPORT AND PROPAGANDA

2.2.2.1: POPULAR SUPPORT
In underscoring the critical importance of popular support in revolutionary struggles, Mao
asserts that “the populace is for revolutionaries what water is for fish.” 116 The very survival
of an insurgent movement is heavily dependent on the support it draws from civilians. In an
insurgency, a population acts as a source of recruits, food and intelligence for a guerrilla
organization. Without popular support, Fairburn argues that an insurgent group would be
isolated.
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Stressing the strategic importance of cordial insurgent-civilian relations,

Museveni (who between 1981 and 1985 successfully spearheaded the National Resistance
Movement’s five year guerrilla campaign in Uganda) notes that “The population is the one
that gives us food, shelter and intelligence information about the movements of the enemy
troops. We are educating our soldiers in practical and everyday examples that it is the
people that matter in this exercise.” 118

It does then appear that a population supports a guerrilla movement because the guerrilla
group has taken practical steps to foster cordial insurgent-civilian relations.
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In this

regard, civil-insurgent relations are reciprocal. However, while acknowledging this
assumption, Fairburn notes that the level of development of a society also plays an
important part in shaping the nature of ties between civilians and guerrillas. He advances a
hypothesis to the effect that “….the more primitive…(…the more traditional)….the society
afflicted by guerrilla war, the more difficult it is for a foreign overlord to detach local
people as puppets or even influence locals to the extent of getting them to supply
information against their blood fellows.” 120 In this direction, Fairburn suggests that ethnic
ties also play an important role in shaping civil-insurgent relations.

In Uganda, cordial insurgent-civilian relations are rooted in reciprocity and ethnicity. An
insurgent organization not only seeks to cultivate good ties with the population but also
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ensures that it operates among people sharing ethnic ties with it. In prosecuting urban
guerrilla campaigns in the 1980s, the Ganda dominated Uganda Freedom Movement
(UFM) not only operated in the Buganda region of Uganda,
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but also desisted from

mounting attacks on the Baganda people. In northern Uganda, the Acholi dominated
Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA)
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and Holy Spirit Movement (HSM)
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operated in the Acholi sub-region and strived to cultivate and maintain cordial relations
with the Acholi people. On the other hand, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) experienced
frosty relations with the population in its theatre of insurgent activity. Whereas the
membership of ADF was largely drawn from the Western, Central and Eastern parts of
Uganda, its Islamist connections
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in a largely Christian backyard may have limited the

evolution of cordial insurgent-civilian relations in its areas of operation. As a result, the
group adopted terrorism as a means of forcing civilians to cooperate with its fighters.

While acknowledging the critical role of reciprocity and ethnicity in the evolution of civilinsurgent relations, Fairburn contends that popular support may merely be the product of
terrorism or apoliticism.
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Either an insurgent organization intimidates civilians into

supporting it or by virtue of being apolitical, the population neither backs the rebels nor the
government.

The notion that guerrillas can use terrorism to tilt popular support in their favour raises an
intriguing question: Why would civilians succumb to the terror threats of the insurgents and
not those of the state? The relevance of this question springs from the assumption that
civilians are rational and are in a position to understand that the state commands better
means to dispense terror than the insurgents. In this case, the population would be expected
to yield to the state’s terror threats and not those of the insurgents.

In seeking to unlock the above paradox,
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Fairburn reasons that “It only requires the

existence of a small communist cell to remind a large village, if necessary through
exemplary acts of terrorism, that the parallel hierarchies still exist and one day will come
into their own again.” 127 It would then be plausible to assert that the population does not
yield to the side with the better capacity for dispensing violence. Rather, while
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acknowledging the state’s capacity to dispense terror in the short and long term, the
population is uncertain of its (the state’s) propensity to institute rewards in return for
popular support. On the other hand, while demonstrating the capacity to impose hardship
on civilians in the short term, insurgents promise to institute improvements in the welfare
of the population.

Thus far, emphasis has been placed upon the dynamics that would underpin the shifting
loyalties of populations in asymmetric conflict. However, it is imperative to note that in
order for either side to win the battle for hearts and minds, popular support needs to reach a
certain threshold.

Whereas garnering majority support would be the ideal objective of any party to an
asymmetric conflict, David Galula contends that a more realistic strategy would involve
securing the support of the critical minority and using this nucleus as a springboard for
tapping the support of the majority. In stipulating the laws of counterinsurgency, Galula
observes that the above strategy is ideal for situations where the population is swayed by
the winning side. 128

His postulations suggest that the population shifts its loyalty in an opportunistic manner.
What would be the roots of this behaviour? Like Galula, James Eliot Cross dispels the
notion that popular support in an insurgency amounts to “….the enthusiastic, voluntary
backing of the large majority of the population.” He argues that in developing countries, the
majority of the population hardly understands the issues surrounding conflicts and usually
prefers “…to be left alone.” 129

It would then appear that in conflict and non conflict situations, the population prioritizes
certain issues over higher politics. Cross asserts that the population expects its government
to “…provide the means for improving the standard of living; secondly, it should not force
changes and innovations at a pace or in forms which are not acceptable; and third, it should
provide military and economic protection for all concerned in this evolutionary process and
do it without heavy financial demands on the beneficiaries of its strength.” 130 Thus, while
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acknowledging the role of the state in improving the economic situation, the citizen prefers
limited interaction with the state.

The apolitical and apathetic behaviour of the population points to the relative insignificance
of majority support in guerrilla warfare. Cross asserts that “The active participation of a
small number of people and the general apathy of the majority often provides all the
popular support necessary to make a successful revolution.”
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The start up minority

becomes a nucleus around which an insurgent organization mobilizes the majority to
execute a guerrilla campaign.

Another important point relates to the calculations of the population in times of asymmetric
conflict: How actively or passively should it participate in an insurgency? Which side is
likely to succeed in the long run? Are the insurgents able to violently impose their will on
the population? While grappling with these critical questions and mindful of the dangers of
ending up on the losing side, Cross points out that the population tends to “…defer
judgement initially and then jump on the right band wagon at the appropriate time…” He
dispels the notion that popular support genuinely amounts to the population’s voluntary
support for the activities of an insurgent group. Cross asserts that “A better way of putting
it is usually that the guerrillas have free access to the population and are therefore in a
position to exert control.”
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While acknowledging that the population is likely to “…move with the prevailing winds,”
Timothy Lomperis argues that some actors within a given polity could “calculate that real
advantages can be had by actively joining one side or the other, whether for the opportunity
of command and influence with the insurgents or for riches and prestige with the incumbent
regime. Calculation at this level requires an active commitment to the side of choice…” At
a higher level where the ideology of an insurgent group appeals to some actors in a
population, he argues that a “…transcending of calculations, individual interests and
opportunity” yields a cadreship that is dedicated to the guerrilla organization’s cause.
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Thus, Lomperis’ three tiered working minority or “steel frame” for executing an insurgency
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consists of the following elements: The masses that move with the prevailing winds, the
opportunists and the idealists.

From the above discussion, it can be deduced that popular support in guerrilla warfare
could spring from different premises. It could be driven by reciprocity. In this case,
civilians would support guerrillas because they treat them well. Alternatively or in
combination with reciprocity, civilians would support a guerrilla group because they share
ethnic ties with its members. However, in most cases, popular support is a product of the
population’s calculations in an insurgency and the combatants’ propensity to violently
access civilians and civilian infrastructure. The population will either support a side that
appears to be winning an asymmetric duel or one that demonstrates the capacity to attack it.

2.2.2.2: PROPAGANDA
While it is important to cultivate esprit de corps within a guerrilla army, it is equally crucial
to generate the population’s interest in the armed struggle. Guerrillas depend on civilians
for recruits, food and intelligence. In modern conflicts, propaganda emerges as one of the
essential tools for maintaining this support. In this connection, T E Lawrence observes that
the printing press is perhaps “the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern
commander.”
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He suggests that modern conflict is inherently more psychological than

physical. In other words, military victories and losses are not always determined on the
battlefront. The selective dissemination of information could mask the actual outcome of a
military duel.

Given the significance of propaganda in asymmetric conflicts, how does an insurgent
organization or a state military apparatus use it? What dimensions does it assume? What
sections of the population does it target? In offering insights into the nature of
communicational warfare, Fairburn asserts that “Propaganda consists of the planned use of
any forms of public or mass-produced communication designed to affect the minds and
emotions of a given group for a specific purpose whether military, economic or political.”
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The use of propaganda as a tactic opens up a communicational war front between the
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insurgent and the counterinsurgent. In this case, the side with the most effective tools for
communication wins the support of civilians.

However, Fairburn hastens to point out that from a communist perspective, propaganda
constitutes the totality of political warfare. He defines political warfare as “all types of
agitation, propaganda, subversion, economic manipulation, rioting, terror, diversionary
diplomacy, guerrilla and para-military actions etc: everything, in sum, short of the
employment of the main formal armed forces.” 136 Given his proposition that propaganda
incorporates all forms of political warfare (of which propaganda itself is a constituent part),
then it can assume violent and non violent dimensions. From Fairburn’s definition,
propaganda has got a violent side to it in light of the fact that it incorporates “guerrilla and
paramilitary actions.” Both phenomena are coercive in nature.
However, the intriguing dimension to Fairburn’s definition is the notion that propaganda
should aim at psychologically wrong-footing the enemy without provoking them into
military confrontation. In this context, M Jules Monnerot asserts that “Totalitarian
diplomacy and propaganda frequently test the psychological resistance of the opponents
they tend to disintegrate by suddenly switching from war talk to peace talk, in the hope of
obtaining from “cowardly relief,” what they were unable to achieve through menaces.”
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Propaganda then plays an instrumental role in watering down the belligerence of an enemy.
This tool seeks to cunningly test the enemy’s propensity to walk the path of peace at a time
of war.

It is also worth observing that whereas the insurgent has to direct propaganda at the state
and its citizens, the population constitutes the most critical battleground in
communicational warfare. Unlike the state that is stoically committed to resisting the
insurgency, the population’s position on the insurgency usually takes time to emerge. It is
therefore incumbent upon a guerrilla group to devise an elaborate propaganda strategy that
seeks to swing popular support in its favour while the population is still undecided.
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In discussing the anti-colonial struggle in Africa, Kwame Nkrumah prescribes a four point
blueprint for “accelerating the political awakening” of the population: An effective
propaganda campaign has to espouse “the idea of an independent existence (anticolonialism, nationalism);” “the idea that ‘something is rotten’ (the awakening to neocolonialist exploitation);” “the idea that the situation can change (that is a conscious antineo-colonialist exploitation);” “the idea that victory can be achieved only by action (the
need to use force; the will to fight).”
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He basically suggests that an effective insurgent

communicational campaign should not only conscientize the population about political
contradictions within the body politic, but an effort should also be made to market armed
struggle as the more viable means for changing the status quo.
There is another important point to note about Nkrumah’s propaganda framework. As the
insurgency evolves, the population exhibits differing levels of commitment to the armed
struggle. Different sections of the population base would require different levels of
conscientization. He argues that a distinction should be made among: “a liberated territory
where the people’s power must be consolidated;” “a contested territory where the liberation
movement must be supported, where popular consensus must be achieved, and where the
enemy must be demoralised;” and “an enemy-held territory where it is essential: to analyse
and denounce enemy action; to show the breaks in his armour; to show why and how the
people’s forces must be organized and led to victory.”

The existence of liberated
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contested
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and unliberated areas would then demand

differentiation in the conscientization of the population and in the choice of propaganda
tactics. Whereas conferences, seminars and exhibitions would be ideal propaganda tools in
liberated areas, clandestine publications would be more suitable for contested and
unliberated areas.
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The guiding principle in the adoption of a set of propaganda tools

would then be: The greater an insurgent organization’s control over a territory, the more
overt the propaganda tools employed.

However, it is worth noting that the psychological basis of propaganda generates lingering
concerns about its long term efficacy. While in the short term, it might be possible to
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manipulate the dissemination of information in a way that masks the capability and
vulnerability of an insurgent organization, in the long term, it would be challenging to
ascertain the extent to which this psychological warfare would stave off a sustained
onslaught by an enemy determined to settle a given conflict on the battlefront.
While acknowledging that “In most recent guerrilla wars, political propaganda has been of
equal or greater importance than military operations,” Laqueur argues that “Elsewhere,
propaganda has played a subordinate role; this is especially true for guerrilla wars waged by
secessionist movements. These had the support of the people any way.” 143 He stresses that
“The apathy of the majority usually favours the guerrillas more than their enemies.”
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While this calculation seems to give insurgents a propaganda advantage over the state, it
raises an intriguing issue. Normally, the colossal resources at the disposal of a state should
allow it ample communicational leverage over a guerrilla organization. Where then are the
openings in the government’s propaganda machinery that the guerrilla organization exploits
to reverse this initial imbalance in communicational capabilities?
It would appear that the government’s control of the reigns of state power constitute it into
an ideal target for insurgent propaganda. In discussing the challenges of conducting
counterinsurgency campaigns, Hilsman points out that while a state has to strike a balance
between fighting an insurgent organization and reconstructing the country, a guerrilla
organization would only be preoccupied with fighting the state. 145 The dual accountability
of the state to its citizens implies that while the guerrillas can pinpoint its failings in the
area of governance, in situations where a guerrilla organization does not control territory
and little is known about its organizational activities, a state would be hard pressed to
expose the contradictions within the insurgent movement. Thus, in swing populations, the
duality in the state’s accountability to its citizens accords an insurgent movement an edge
over a seating government in terms of start-up propaganda capital.

Thus far, this discussion has focussed on the efficacy of non-armed propaganda. It is
important to note that insurgents may use violence to publicize their cause. Also known as
armed propaganda, the use of violence as a means of communication assumes critical
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relevance to the prosecution of the revolutionary struggle. In taking the fight to the doorstep
of the enemy, the insurgent would need to use communicational manipulation to convince
the population that the guerrilla organization is registering an upper hand in the conflict.
Laqueur points out that by opening up a front in the urban areas, “Urban guerrillas will get
far more publicity than rural because there are more newspapermen and cine cameras in
town.” 146

However, while acknowledging the importance of urban guerrilla warfare, Marighella
identifies a critical inhibition to the adoption of this strategy: The urban guerrilla shares the
terrain with the urban criminal and the counterrevolutionary. All these three actors attack
civilian targets. The challenge for the urban guerrilla is to distance their activities from
those of the urban criminal and counterrevolutionary. In this regard, Marighella advocates
the use of leaflets to make clarifications on the authors and intentions of the different urban
attacks. 147
Uganda’s conflict ridden history offers some useful insights into the nature of armed
propaganda. One of the most divisive debates on Uganda’s turbulent past relates to the
conduct of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in Luwero Triangle. Between
1981 and 1985, NRM managed to win popular support in Luwero by linking government
forces to atrocities committed in this part of the country. 148 However, high ranking officers
who served in the Obote administration have persistently argued that human rights
violations in Luwero were committed by NRA guerrillas disguised as government forces.
In the event this allegation holds true, then NRM demonstrated the capacity to effectively
employ armed propaganda tactics. Its fighters were able to covertly attack civilians whilst
successfully linking the atrocities to the enemy.

Whereas armed propaganda was beneficial to the anti-Obote movement in the rural areas,
in the urban areas, the situation was more fluid. It is worth noting that while NRM was
engaged in agrarian guerrilla warfare in the countryside, two guerrilla groups turned
Kampala, the Ugandan capital into an urban guerrilla war theatre. Between 1981 and 1985,
the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM)
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and the Federal Democratic Movement of
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Uganda (FEDEMU)
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mounted sustained urban guerrilla campaigns in the city.
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Whereas the activities of UFM and FEDEMU may have complimented those of NRM by
mounting pressure on the Obote regime, the prevailing insecurity in Kampala was a doubleedged sword that could as well have alienated the anti-Obote movement from the
population. It may have been difficult for civilians in Kampala to distinguish between
attacks mounted by UFM, FEDEMU, urban criminals and covert government operatives.
This scenario could have accorded the Obote administration the opportunity of alienating
the guerrillas from the population by linking the upsurge in insecurity in the Ugandan
capital to the activities of NRM’s allies—UFM and FEDEMU.

On the basis of the above discussion, it can be asserted that propaganda plays a crucial role
in determining the outcome of an asymmetric duel. Predominantly targeting a swing
population and depending on the extent of control exercised over contested territory,
insurgents and counterinsurgents either use overt or covert or both techniques to mask their
military capabilities and vulnerabilities.

2.2.3: MOTIVATION AND ESPRIT DE CORPS
This theoretical review has underscored the inextricable connection between politics and
armed conflict. Mao and Clausewitz maintain that armed conflict is a mechanism for
violently resolving political disputes that political actors have otherwise failed to resolve
diplomatically. However, in advancing the theories of guerrilla warfare, Mao and
Clausewitz operate at different wave lengths. Whereas Mao stresses the centrality of
ideology to guerrilla warfare,
asymmetric duels.
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Clausewitz merely emphasizes the combat aspect of

Maechling captures the contrasts between the Maoist and

Clausewitzist theoretical positions. He argues that it is the “injection of ideology into
guerrilla operations” 154 that transforms irregular warfare (as advanced by Clausewitz) into
revolutionary warfare (as advanced by Mao).

As already noted, an insurgent organization would strive to propagate an ideology that sells
its agenda to the population, attracts and retains recruits within its ranks. In this sense,
ideology plays enlistment and motivational roles. However, the motivational function of
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ideology throws up some challenges: Members of an insurgent organization would not only
need to interpret its ideology but also be in a position to draw inspiration from it to keep
fighting while the rebel group is militarily on the back-foot. Normally, it would be difficult
to fulfil this condition because not every member of a guerrilla group would demonstrate
the same propensity to understand the political contradictions underpinning a given
insurgency and exhibit the same levels of motivation during leaner times. In this
connection, cultivating and sustaining high levels of motivation in insurgent organizations
emerges as one of the more critical challenges in prosecuting guerrilla wars. 155

Given the above constraints, what would be the source of motivation in a guerrilla group?
Geoffrey Fairburn contends that “It is not true that the majority of those who take part in a
revolutionary insurgency are particularly ‘well motivated’ in the sense that they are
idealists who have made a personal commitment to a great cause. They are for the most part
involved rather than committed.”
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If this proposition were adopted, how would one

explain situations where fighters who are merely ‘involved’ and not ‘committed’
demonstrate the propensity to fight courageously?

Fairburn identifies six factors that delink commitment to a political cause from esprit de
corps in guerrilla warfare: “Involvement in a movement the leadership of which has, at a
time of its own choosing, put them beyond the law;” guerrillas derive pride from serving in
their respective units; the perceived inevitability of victory; the negative repercussions of
desertion; a sense of belonging to the new community created by the insurgents; and
detachment from mainstream society.
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His views suggest that a fighter’s selfish

evaluation of their position in an insurgency is paramount in boosting their morale.
Operating outside the jurisdiction of the state implies that a fighter can get away with
illegal conduct; Prospects for upward movement within the hierarchical structures of the
guerrilla movement offer the insurgent a vested stake in the armed struggle. In a nutshell,
an insurgency offers an individual fighter something tangible to fight for while cushioned
from the long arm of the law.
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But in as much as the selfish calculations of individual fighters can guarantee a guerrilla
organization a measure of esprit de corps, in light of the imbalance in military capabilities
that is initially tilted in favour of the state military apparatus, the leadership of an insurgent
movement would still need to consider the notion that higher levels of morale would be
difficult to sustain throughout the life cycle of a rebel group.

In discussing motivation in guerrilla warfare, the recruitment
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and subversive
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stages

are critical. Whereas recruitment constitutes the membership of a rebel organization,
subversion allows it to clandestinely assemble its structures and prepare for the guerrilla
phase of its insurgent campaign. In situations where a rebel group depends on voluntary
enlistment, motivation to join and serve in the insurgent army will highly depend on the
manner in which the recruiter packages the prospects inherent in an individual pursuing an
insurgent career. In the event the recruiter heightens the risks, then the insurgent
organization is bound to realize low recruitment and morale levels. The subversive stage of
an insurgency is equally critical for motivation because at this level, a guerrilla group is
organizationally and militarily fragile and potentially vulnerable to enemy annihilation. At
this stage, the architects of an insurgency work towards preventing the state from dealing
severe blows to the guerrilla organization in a way that would lower morale among its
fighters.

The motivation strategist in an insurgent organization experiences fewer challenges when
an insurgency evolves from the subversive to the guerrilla phase. At this point, the
individual fighter’s motivational calculations are overridden by those of the fighting group.
Fairburn argues that “As the struggle gathers intensity, the ebb and flow of it imposes its
own pressures which virtually obliterate the possibility of individual choices being made on
the basis of interior ‘motivation.’ 160

In discussing the sources of motivation in an insurgent organization, Laqueur concurs with
Fairburn in arguing that guerrillas are never overly motivated by the ideals underpinning
the conflict. Attempting a typology of insurgent motivations, Laqueur points out that
personal and idealistic considerations could sustain an individual’s continued interest and
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participation in an armed struggle. An individual might be susceptible to the lure of
guerrilla adventure or the future prospects for an upward movement within the political
structures of the state. Alternatively, he argues that “guerrilla warfare is an excellent outlet
for personal aggression; it provides opportunity for settling account with one’s enemies.” 161
In this respect, the motivational lure for continued participation in an armed struggle mainly
lies in the potential career prospects and power it offers and bestows upon individual
insurgents respectively.
Laqueur also acknowledges that “The dynamic character of guerrilla movements has
always exerted a powerful attraction for young idealists—the prospect of activity, of
responsibility for one’s fellows, of fighting with equally enthusiastic comrades for the
national and social liberation of the homeland.” However, he hastens to de-emphasize the
centrality of political idealism to motivation in insurgent organizations. Lacqueur maintains
that “What induces guerrillas to stay on above all is esprit de corps, loyalty to his
commander and fellow soldiers. The feeling of togetherness and team spirit seems to be
more important than ideological indoctrination.” 162
While a guerrilla organization needs to harness an individual fighter’s interest in insurgent
activity, it is also imperative that it sustains his/her participation in concert with that of
other rebels. This proposition underscores the centrality of group dynamics to the evolution
of motivation in an insurgent movement.
Harry Holloway and Ann Norwood argue that the individual fighter’s connection to an
insurgent organization is the product of the interaction between “the psychological structure
of the terrorist’s personality and the ideological factors, group process, structural
organization of the terrorist group and cell and the socio-cultural milieu of the
group.”Citing Jeanne Knutson, Ehud Sprinzak argues that as the ideological component of
this set of variables takes root through the process of radicalization, the group’s identity
subsumes that of the individual insurgent. Jerrold Post asserts that the identity
transformation yields a “group mind” or “group moral code.” 163
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Martha Crenshaw notes that the group then becomes the selector and interpreter of
ideology. This phase also realizes three other critical developments: the terrorist group
evolves into a family that accords the individual terrorist a sense of belonging;
counterterrorist activity constitutes a threat to this new community of belonging; and the
terrorist group institutes tight measures to mitigate dissent. For example in 1970, 30
members of Rengo Sekogun which later became the Japanese Red Army were “…tied to
stakes in the northern mountains of Japan, whipped with wires and left to die of exposure”
for objecting to the group’s strategy. 164

Against this backdrop, it can be concluded that while individuals may join an insurgent
organization because of idealistic considerations, in most cases, they derive the motivation
to keep fighting from loyalty to their colleagues-in-arms, prospects for career advancement
within the structures of the rebel group, the risks that come with attempted desertion and
the sense of belonging that the guerrilla movement gives them.

2.2.4: RECRUITMENT
In this thesis, we have stressed the need for a guerrilla group to construct an insurgent
identity. Among other elements, it needs an ideology to articulate its grievances, motivation
to retain its members, propaganda techniques to manipulate the emotions of the populace
and popular support to cushion its insurgent activities. At this juncture, it is important to
observe that the identity of a rebel group ultimately springs out of the interaction between
the skills, characters and personalities that new members import into the structures of the
group and the organizational attributes (ideology, esprits de corps etc) that the group
imposes on its members.

Thus, the identification and recruitment of new members of a guerrilla group emerges as
one of the more tedious challenges in conducting an insurgency.
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In this regard, an

insurgent group is faced with a number of hard questions: How can it identify, contact and
recruit new members against the backdrop of stringent enemy surveillance? What calibre of
recruits would fit into its organizational structures and adapt to its modus operandi?
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In seeking to assemble the manpower base of a guerrilla group, Nkrumah prescribes a
selective enlistment strategy. He asserts that the Africa-wide guerrilla movement should
recruit from peasants’ organizations, trade unions, progressive students’ organizations,
cooperative movements, youth and women’s organizations. His recruitment strategy is
underpinned by three factors: The need to co-opt organized civic groups or use their
structures to identify potential enlistees; Targeting constituencies that are potentially on the
receiving end of the enemy’s policies; Enlisting from groups that are potentially conscious
of the contradictions within the body politic of a given society. 166

In this context, an insurgent movement would recruit among peasant farmers and industrial
workers in times of agrarian riots and industrial unrest. These marginalized groups would
percieve the insurgent movement as a vehicle for the redressment of unpopular policies in
the country. While sometimes not directly affected by the state’s exploitative machinations,
progressive students’ groups are a critical arm of the intelligentsia that studies, interprets
the contradictions within the body politic and stokes the flames of insurrection in a given
society. A rebel organization would find it helpful recruiting from this constituency.

While segmentation of the population allows a rebel group to recruit insurrectionally
attuned individuals, this approach cannot fully insulate it against enemy infiltration. The
state could plant moles in any of the recruitment constituencies enumerated above. To
mitigate fifth columnism in an insurgent movement, Nkrumah proposes the creation of a
Guerrilla Commission of Control and Recruitment charged with the responsibility of
scrutinizing the social origins, qualities and ideological orientation of enlistees.
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In a

sense, it can be asserted that an effective insurgent enlistment strategy is premised on three
interrelated principles: The segmentation of the population in a way that pinpoints
insurgency savvy civic and social groups; the identification of potential enlistees; and the
verification of their credentials.

The nucleus of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) guerrilla group of Uganda
trained with the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique and
fought within the ranks of the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) in the liberation
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struggle that deposed Idi Amin. FRONASA and NRM were headed by Museveni.
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The

evolution of the NRM manpower base shows that the nucleus of an insurgent movement
may be populated by long time associates and loyalists of the leader of the group. This
initially safeguards the then infant organization against enemy infiltration.

Beyond the formative stage, an insurgent group expands to incorporate more individuals
with minimal or no acquaintance with their leader. According to Ngoga, NRM recruited
peasants, students, professionals, orphans and Rwandese refugees. The peasants, orphans
and Rwandese refugees were victims of the state’s counterinsurgency campaigns in the
Luwero Triangle.
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The orphans had lost their parents. The peasants had either been

displaced or lost their beloved ones. The Rwandese refugees had been harassed by
government forces because the state suspected them of supporting NRM. All these three
groups saw the NRM insurgency as an avenue for escaping state-instigated harassment.

In a way, it can be deduced that recruitment for insurgency depends on the emergence of
political contradictions within a country. Segaller explains the kind of political factors that
would push elements within the population to join an insurgent movement. A controversial
foreign or defence policy or provocative acts of injustice visited on the population would
push elements within the population to join an insurgent group. However, like Nkrumah, he
emphasizes that by the time of recruitment, some of the potential enlistees would already be
“active in marginal, extra-parliamentary political circles.” 170
According to Segaller, foreign occupation could also push individuals to participate in
liberation struggles.
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For example the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)

attracted recruits committed to contesting seven centuries of British occupation of Northern
Ireland. 172 Similarly, Basque people opposed to decades of Spanish presence in the Basque
region voluntarily joined Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). 173

It can then be argued that while the insurgent organization is initiating its recruitment
contacts, certain unpopular political developments could simultaneously push elements
within the population to seek an organizational framework for addressing their pressing
concerns. Against this backdrop, voluntary recruitment manifests at that point where the
65

recruitment initiative of an insurgent organization intersects with the population’s active
drive to contest a prevailing political dispensation.

At this point, it is worth noting that whereas certain political developments could constitute
a given population into a potential recruiting ground for an insurgent group, the decision to
participate in an insurgency presents the individual recruit with some hard choices: Joining
a guerrilla army entails committing illegal acts for which the state imposes severe penalties.
How then does the potential enlistee cope with such a dilemma? The management of
individual recruitment dilemmas appears to be the job of the rebel group. In this respect, a
guerrilla organization may gradualize the process of enlistment to make an insurgent career
more ‘palatable’ for the recruits.

Segaller illustrates the approach ETA uses to address the above dilemma. After potential
enlistees have been contacted and recruited, their trainers initially assign them simple tasks
like delivering propaganda material and “spraying ETA slogans on walls.”
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These

preliminary assignments test the recruits’ readiness for more rigorous missions. Those who
excel in performing the simple tasks are then assigned more complex ones like conducting
surveillance and delivering weapons to ETA members.
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By the time recruits end their

induction programmes, they have systematically engaged in a chain of illegal activities that
would potentially attract judicial retribution in case they chickened out of the rebel group
and returned to their communities. In this case, staying with the guerrilla organization
emerges as a better option.

As already noted, the management of enlistment dilemmas is not always addressed by the
insurgent organization. By the time a rebel group contacts them, prospective enlistees may
already have been radicalized by the institutions to which they belong. Institutions of higher
learning could act as grounds for breeding dissidence. For example many members of the
Japanese Red Army were drawn from the universities of Tokyo, Rikkjo and Kyoto. In
Spain, the universities of Madrid and Barcelona acted as breeding grounds for Spanish
dissidents. In Italy, terrorist groups recruited their members from the universities of Rome,
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Turin and Bologna. 176 In Uganda, the leadership corps of NRM was staffed with graduates
of Makerere University. 177

On the basis of the above analysis, it can be concluded that prevailing political
contradictions within a given polity present an insurgent organization with marginalized
sections of the population which can be targeted for recruitment purposes. Although a
selective enlistment strategy would allow a guerrilla group the opportunity of achieving the
above objective, the state could undermine its insurgent activities by planting moles within
the recruitment savvy constituencies. In order to mitigate fifth columnism within its
structures, an insurgent organization would need to thoroughly screen its recruits.
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CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL REVIEW II

OPERATIONALIZING INSURGENT ACTIVITY
In chapter 2, we observed that an insurgent group needs to assemble an organizational
image that attracts popular support and motivates its fighters. Principally, the construction
of an insurgent identity allows a guerrilla group to interface with and draw civilians away
from supporting the state military establishment. While the battle for the hearts and minds
of the population is a critical consideration in guerrilla warfare, an asymmetric duel is
inherently an armed contest between combatants. In this regard, a guerrilla group ultimately
needs to operationalize its insurgent activity by preparing and confronting the enemy. To
this end, it needs to train its fighters, assemble its organizational structures, secure guerrilla
bases, weapons, funding and other forms of external support and design a military strategy
and tactics for taking on government soldiers. This chapter examines how each of the above
variables facilitates guerrilla warfare.

3.1: TRAINING
As already noted, a guerrilla group needs to undertake a given set of tasks in order to
assemble its identity, prepare and confront the enemy. These range from simple to complex
activities that require expertise. For example, a guerrilla organization needs cadres with
knowledge on mass communication to organize its propaganda campaigns and those with
basic and specialized information on weapons use to conduct military operations.

The need for expertise constitutes training into an indispensable requirement for conducting
guerrilla warfare.
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Under training, our interest not only centres on the kind of skills that

insurgent organizations impart but also the extent to which capacity building in rebel
groups is related to guerrilla strategy and tactics. This analytical approach is helpful in
establishing whether a common logic underpins all the features of guerrilla warfare.
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In light of the start up numerical strength commanded by government forces, training is an
important means for redressing the imbalance in military capabilities disfavouring
insurgents. Where the state is able to deploy well equipped brigades in the battlefield, a
guerrilla organization should be in a position to field battalions of specialized fighters with
the capacity to engage a large enemy force. Thus, it is incumbent upon the training unit of a
guerrilla organization to impart highly specialized skills and institute higher levels of
morale among its fighters.

In the above context, our attention is drawn to two questions: What kind of training would
insurgents need?
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Is there a relationship between the training approach of a guerrilla

group and the organization of its insurgent activities? According to Nkrumah, guerrillas
require skills for “marching under duress,” “camping in difficult terrain,” “subsisting on
short rations for limited periods,” “enduring isolation in small groups cut off from the base”
and “rigorous individual initiative.”
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His model suggests a nexus between the

organization of guerrilla activity and the training approach of an insurgent group.
Principally, insurgent groups aim to selectively engage a superior enemy. In pursuing this
objective, they maintain a high level of mobility and operate in small groups. In this
direction, guerrillas need to be trained to improve their physical capacity to walk and run
for long distances and also to develop the requisite interpersonal skills for fighting
alongside a few combatants.

The above training only constitutes a fraction of capacity building in guerrilla warfare.
Nkrumah emphasizes the need for insurgents to muster the art of attacking, dispersing,
regrouping, encircling, retreating, close combat, commando-type manoeuvres and sabotage.
Training in the above areas equips insurgents with the skills to selectively exploit emerging
loopholes in the enemy’s military capability.
Nkrumah breaks down the above aspects of combat into more specific training objectives.
To this end, insurgents need to muster marksmanship. He reasons that “In this field, the
guerrilla-fighter must be skilled for it is necessary to use a minimum of ammunition.” 181 In
this connection, training aims to economize the resources of an insurgent organization. In
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terms of weapons use, guerrillas not only need to learn how to use different weapons in
their possession but also familiarize themselves with those possessed by the enemy. A
guerrilla should then not only learn how to accurately shoot at fixed and moving targets but
also know the different kinds of aircraft used by the state military apparatus. 182

Although combat is a critical consideration in guerrilla warfare, an insurgency does not
entirely depend on this variable. Rebel organizations need to engage in a range of other
activities. For example, it has been observed that among others, the cultivation of popular
support, enlistment and information dissemination are indispensable to the effective
execution of an insurgent campaign.

In seeking to marshal self sufficiency in its armed struggle, a guerrilla organization needs to
equip its recruits with skills for resource generation. Depending on the context, enlistees
should learn the principles and practice of plantation farming, cattle rearing, handicraft and
basic industrial manufacturing.
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With this expertise, an insurgent group would

presumably not suffer shortages in food, clothing and military hardware. Shifts in external
support would not significantly affect the resource base of a self sufficient insurgent
organization. 184

It is also imperative to observe that guerrillas are not tailored to operate like mercenaries or
robots. Revolutionary guerrilla warfare theorists like Mao, Che Guevara and Nguyen assert
that the propagation of ideology should be at the heart of any insurgent campaign. In this
sense, there is a need for fighters to comprehend the ideological basis of the armed struggle
.185 This mentally strengthens and prepares them to endure any operational and tactical
setbacks that the organization might suffer along the way. Political indoctrination then
emerges as an important area of training for recruits. Nkrumah stresses the need for
guerrilla recruits to learn the colonial and neo-colonial history of Africa.
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This

indoctrination equips them with basic recruitment skills and the burning desire to contest
the prevailing political order.
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From the foregoing, it is evident that guerrilla groups seek to constitute training into a
theatre for the reversal of the imbalance in military capabilities favouring the state military
establishment. Where the enemy boasts superior armaments, the insurgent should make up
this shortfall by mustering the art of asymmetric combat. Where a superior conventional
military capability eases the operational tasks of government forces, insurgents need to
marshal a greater investment in individual initiative and skill.
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For example, while the

availability of tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) eases the movement of
government forces, insurgents need to learn to effectively cover long distances on foot to
elude and take on the enemy.

Deriving from the above exposition, insurgents need to be Jacks of all trades. They need to
perfect all the skills that the conventional soldier commands. According to Nkrumah,
insurgents need to learn how to shoot with rifles, revolvers and machine guns; manufacture
and detonate bombs; study and interpret maps; and “send and receive messages in Morse
code.”
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This training approach theoretically positions them at a level of parity with

conventional government soldiers.

In a bid to establish an edge over the enemy, insurgents also need to acquire extra skills in
areas conventional soldiers are least expected to prioritize. With naval frigates, tanks and
Armoured Personnel Carriers, government soldiers do not need to overly muster the basic
skills for facilitating rudimentary movement. On the other hand, the unavailability of stateof-the-art movement aids pushes insurgents to learn to rudimentarily facilitate movements
in theatres of guerrilla activity. According to Nkrumah, they then need to learn how to “ride
bicycles, paddle canoes, row boats, climb walls, surmount obstacles with ropes, change and
mend wheels on bicycles and cars” and conduct elementary repairs. 189 In this discourse, it
is evident that there are marked differences between the training needs of insurgents and
those of conventional soldiers.

In chapter 2, it was observed that asymmetric warfare could manifest as agrarian guerrilla
warfare, urban guerrilla warfare, terrorism or a combination of some or all of these strands.
Given these variations, an intriguing question arises: Do the training needs of insurgents
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differ from genre to genre? For example, does an urban guerrilla require more specialized
training than an agrarian guerrilla?

The technical training for an urban guerrilla showcases some of the fundamental
similarities and differences in training approach among the different genres of asymmetric
warfare. In terms of similarities, agrarian and urban guerrillas use similar techniques for
movement, communication, subsistence and reconnaissance. However, operation in urban
settings and differences in target definition and selection warrant some fundamental
differences in training approach. In the discussion on the nature of urban guerrilla warfare,
it was observed that an urban guerrilla shares a terrain with the urban criminal. In order to
adapt to a crime-laden environment, urban guerrillas have to adopt some of the tactics
employed by urban criminals. According to Nkrumah, an urban guerrilla has to learn how
to “make rubber stamps, imitate hand writings and forge documents.” 190 This allows them
to blend in the crime-laden environment in urban settings. In a way, training aims at
assisting insurgents adapt to their operational environment. In this direction, differences in
operational circumstances may call for the adoption of different training approaches among
different strands of asymmetric warfare.

With training, it can then be concluded that a guerrilla organization is in a position to
transform a raw recruit into an actively skilled member. It accords a rebel group the
opportunity of assembling a knowledge base of insurgent practice. Through the repetitive
conduct of guerrilla training sessions, training instructors of an insurgent group are in a
position to develop and refine training strategy and tactics. Over time, the training approach
of an insurgent organization evolves into a fully fledged body of knowledge on capacity
building in an insurgency.

3.2: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
We have argued that a guerrilla group needs to recruit and train new members to construct
its identity and operationalize its insurgent activities. It is important to observe that the
above key objectives are unattainable without an organizational framework that manages
the manpower of an insurgent group. In this sense, a guerrilla organization requires
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structures that organize and define the different tiers of its leadership. These facilitate
command, control and cohesion within an insurgent movement.
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Under organizational

structure, this thesis focuses on the manner in which the different organs of an insurgent
movement relate to each other and how the overall structural organization of a guerrilla
group meets the purpose of an insurgency.

In light of the fact that the ultimate aim of an insurgent movement is to capture state power,
its structures should not only mirror the organs needed to violently pursue this mission but
also those needed for managing the post-conflict situation. In this connection, an insurgent
movement should be a politico-military institution.

In discussing the anti-colonial struggle in Africa, Nkrumah proposes the establishment of
two organs: the All African People’s Revolutionary Party (AAPRP) that would coordinate
the policies and direct the actions of an anti-colonial African guerrilla movement and the
All African People’s Revolutionary Army (AAPRA) that would unify all of Africa’s
liberation forces and effect an armed struggle against the colonial establishment. 192

Alongside these two organs, he proposes the formation of the All Africa Committee for
Political Coordination (AACPC) which would act as the political arm of the AAPRA. The
AACPC would coordinate the political initiatives of the African guerrilla movement and
foster anti-colonial alliances among Africa, Asia and Latin America. The supreme organ in
the AAPRA would be the High Command which in terms of organizational hierarchy
would operate under the AACPC. In stressing the supremacy of the AACPC over the
AAPRA, Nkrumah notes that the African guerrilla movement’s strategy would be designed
by the AACPC. This strategy would encompass all the political, military and economic
aspects of the African guerrilla movement in contested and enemy zones. 193
Nkrumah’s organizational model attempts a separation of functions in insurgent
movements. One organ manages people in conflict and post-conflict situations. The other
prosecutes the armed conflict. In acknowledging the pre-eminence of politics over combat
in an insurgency, his model subordinates the armed wing, AAPRA to the political wing,
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AACPC. The logic behind this organizational structuring is that the successful prosecution
of the armed struggle depends on the interpretation of political contradictions within the
body politic. The AAPRA cannot swing into armed action unless the AACPC has
interpreted and articulated the basis of the armed conflict.

With the political wing of a rebel group taking precedence over the military wing, how does
an insurgency unfold into contested and unliberated zones? Nkrumah points out that
“…AAPRA forces will act in support of the people’s struggle and not precede it…”
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He

adds that the political committees 195 and guerrilla units should always operate ahead of the
frontline manned by AAPRA. Here, Nkrumah shows the relationship among the organs of a
rebel group and the order in which they engage the enemy. This illustration also probably
shows the order of significance of different aspects of guerrilla strategy. The political
committees operate ahead of the conventional forces (and guerrilla units) because of the
primacy of popular support in a rebellion. Essentially, rebel groups pursue two broad
objectives: In the immediate term, they aim to defeat government forces. In the long term,
they seek to govern the population. In order to attain both objectives, a guerrilla group
needs to interact with the population. Through its political committees, a rebel organization
articulates its ideology and uses propaganda to cultivate popular support. The primacy of
the above task gives the political wing (the organ that executes it) added significance hence
its supremacy within the structures of an insurgent organization and the vanguard role it
plays in an insurgent campaign.

The guerrilla units and the conventional forces play sub-vanguard roles. They swing into
action to reinforce the work of the political committees. Guerrilla units operate ahead of the
conventional forces of an insurgent group because of the imbalance in military capabilities
tilted in favour of government forces. A rebel group will seek to reverse this state of affairs
by using its guerrilla units to selectively erode the capability of the state military apparatus.
Once the balance in military capabilities is relatively even, then the conventional forces of
the guerrilla group can start taking on government forces.
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The separation of functions and the manner in which an insurgency unfolds into contested
and unliberated zones presents enormous command and control challenges for the
leadership of an insurgent organization. In this sense, what chain of command would a
rebel group employ in such circumstances? Nkrumah proposes a triple chain of command
that attempts a separation of command and control in a guerrilla movement: The political
executive would have its chain of command that runs from the national right down the
village level (in rural areas) and ward level (in urban areas); the partisan or guerrilla wing
of the movement would have a dual chain of command consisting of the political and
military executives; and the military executive would also have its own parallel chain of
command.
In this set up, the partisan executive would only swing into action after the political and
military executives have initiated action. The triple chain of command insulates both the
political and military wings of a guerrilla movement. Within its structures, these organs are
fused and separated. While the partisan command incorporates political and military
elements, his proposed movement also has separate political and military executives. This
structural arrangement plays an important function. In the event the partisan chain of
command were successfully targeted by the enemy, the pillars of the political executive
would remain intact, relocate underground and continue with the armed struggle. 196

Like Nkrumah, Laqueur acknowledges the importance of a political wing in an insurgency.
According to him, “Organization implies the existence of a political party or movement or
at least a non-combatant fringe, semi-legal or underground party providing assistance to the
guerrillas—money, intelligence and special services.” He observes that “In some instances,
the guerrilla movement has been more or less identical with the party (Cuba, Uruguay,
Algeria); elsewhere it has acted as the armed instrument of the party. Wherever guerrillas
had no such connection with a political party (EOKA, the Stern Gang, many African and
Latin American guerrilla movements) they could at least rely on a periphery of
sympathizers, which albeit unorganized, provided support.”
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Laqueur introduces an

interesting dimension to this debate. Those who populate the political wing may be situated
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in the same place (theatre of the insurgency) as those of the military wing or they may
constitute what is known as the external wing. In the latter case, they would be resident in a
foreign country far detached from the military wing and for that matter, the theatre of the
insurgency. The cohesion of the guerrilla movement would depend on how well the two
organs interact against the backdrop of geographical distance separating them.

The pre-eminence of the political wing over the military wing in guerrilla groups
underscores the centrality of politics to the organization and execution of an insurgency. 198
In order to attain its political objectives, a guerrilla movement then needs to interface with
the population. To this effect, its political wing has to constitute a nucleus of mid-level
cadres by indoctrinating trade unionists, semi intellectuals, marginalized and rebellious
youths and the unemployed.
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The selective approach to enlistment not only ensures that

an insurgent group recruits potential loyalists but it also minimizes the chances of the state
disrupting the formative development of its structures.

Thus far, this discussion has stressed the theoretical supremacy of the political wing over
the military wing of a guerrilla movement.
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However, it is imperative to reiterate that

although subordinated to the political wing, the military wing is an indispensable part of an
insurgent movement. In this study, the organization of the military wing is particularly
important because it offers insights into the military priorities of an insurgent group.
Guerrilla organizations attach importance to espionage.
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As such, they require an

Information Section that gathers intelligence in a number of areas: On inhabitants in a
theatre of insurgent activity; insurgents would be interested in distinguishing among
supporters and opponents as well as people who are indifferent to the armed struggle; They
would also need information on the ideal places for situating bases. In this case, the
suitability of rivers, forests, mountains and valleys for the establishment of guerrilla
sanctuaries would be assessed.

Insurgent groups would need information on the strategic relevance of different
geographical positions to the conduct of military engagements. For example, the
Information Section would be interested in assessing the importance of overrunning,
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occupying and holding towns, airfields and bridges among other vantage points; Equally,
information on the attitude of its fighters and those of the enemy would be of critical
interest to an insurgent organization.
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The collection of accurate information about the

enemy would allow rebels to target the weak spots in the state’s military capability.

In terms of preparation for combat, an insurgent organization needs among others: an
Instruction Section that trains its fighters and sensitizes the masses; an Armament Section
that purchases, stores and distributes weapons; a Provisions Section that provides
insurgents with food, uniforms and supplies; a Health Section that mitigates the outbreak
and spread of disease among the insurgents; a Communications Section schooled in radio
telegraphy and whose mandate is to organize and supervise communications networking. In
order to take on the enemy, it would need an Operations Section that spearheads combat
operations and a Sabotage Section that among other things identifies the enemy’s
vulnerabilities and deploys operatives to aggravate these points of weakness. 203
From the above discussion, it is evident that a guerrilla organization requires units within
its structures that accord its fighters holistic preparation and support. In this respect, its
organizational setup is designed to recruit, train, sensitize, equip, feed, clothe and treat its
fighters. In seeking to meet the above objectives, a rebel group structurally separates those
organs that articulate its political mission from those that facilitate the violent pursuit of
this goal.

3.3: GUERRILLA BASES
In defining and operationalizing guerrilla warfare, we noted that at the start of an
asymmetric duel, the state military apparatus usually has a conventional military edge over
an insurgent organization. In order to gradually reverse this imbalance in military
capabilities in its favour, a guerrilla group needs to selectively engage government forces.
In seeking to attain the above objective, guerrilla groups adopt the principle of mobility. 204
However, mobility in perpetuity is unsustainable in light of the fact that guerrillas need a
sanctuary to recuperate and prepare for fresh insurgent campaigns.

205

What kind of

sanctuary or base would meet this need? Ideally, guerrilla bases should be situated in
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inaccessible regions that the enemy would find difficult to attack in full strength.
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Mountains, forests and swamps would be ideal locations for guerrilla bases.

In the mid 1990s, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), a Ugandan Islamist guerrilla group
situated its bases in the rugged Rwenzori mountain ranges along the Uganda-Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) border.
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During its five year guerrilla campaign against the

Obote regime in the 1980s, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) guerrilla group
operated in what was known as the Luwero Triangle. According to Pascal Ngoga “this area
was hilly and densely populated at its southern end, fading out towards the drier and less
densely inhabited Singo plains in the north.” 208

In Rwanda, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) guerrillas operated within the Virunga
volcanic ranges where the weather was hostile to the extent that some of the insurgents died
due to exposure.
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In all these three cases, the rugged terrain was an inhibition to regular

forces accessing the guerrilla sanctuaries.
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An even better approach for insulating

guerrilla bases against enemy attack would involve setting them up on foreign territory. In
seeking to attack these bases, a state would risk a war with the country hosting the
guerrillas.

It is important to note that the establishment of guerrilla bases is not without drawbacks: As
areas of fixed insurgent activity, sanctuaries offer government forces the opportunity of
engaging guerrillas in set-piece battles. In the mid-1990s, the Allied Democratic Front
(ADF) had a false start to its campaign when Ugandan government forces overrun its bases
in Buseruka, Hoima district; Locating bases in very remote areas detaches guerrillas from
the population. This disconnect denies the insurgents food, recruits and intelligence; In
situations where a country is undergoing rapid urbanization, locating a guerrilla base in a
remote area would be counterproductive. Laqueur reasons that “The village cannot encircle
the city if the majority of the population resides in urban areas.” 211

The debate on the establishment of guerrilla bases points to the notion that guerrilla warfare
will only thrive in areas with favourable conditions. Would it then follow that different
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insurgencies occurring at different times in a given country would always spring up in the
same places? Laqueur asserts that guerrilla wars are more likely to occur in specific parts of
the country that favour this military strategy. However, whilst geographical factors are an
important consideration in guerrilla warfare, weak central government control and a culture
of political violence are indispensable to the evolution of a theatre of insurgency (guerrilla
bases). Whereas weak state control over a country allows a guerrilla movement to
germinate unchecked,
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a cultural predisposition to political violence encourages an

unwavering long term popular commitment to the violent resolution of political disputes.

In post-independence Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the eastern part of the country
has evolved into a perennial hot-bed for insurgency. This region is home to some of
Africa’s densest tropical forests. The inability of the Government of the DRC (GoDRC) to
extend firm control over this area has allowed different insurgent groups to contest its
authority. 213 For example the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and
the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) have been active in eastern
DRC. 214

Whereas a culture of political violence is indispensable to the evolution of a theatre of
insurgent activity, its impact depends on the population’s predisposition to organized armed
resistance and a guerrilla group’s capacity to cultivate popular support. In this regard,
Chaliand identifies four characteristics of guerrilla savvy societies: “profound nationalism,”
“village level solidarity and communal institutions,” “thousand year old habits of collective
work and patient and precise labour of a rice-growing peasantry with intense ties to the
soil,” and a capacity to keep secrets and cultural traditions favouring adaptation. These
characteristics foster “National cohesion…” and “…a capacity for prolonged resistance.” 215

The discussion on guerrilla bases throws up some of the critical dilemmas that insurgents
encounter. In order to avoid being obliterated by better equipped government forces,
guerrillas have to maintain mobility. Yet mobility in perpetuity undermines their capacity
to effectively recuperate and prepare for fresh insurgent campaigns. In this case, rebels
need sanctuaries that government forces cannot easily access, preferably on foreign
86

territory or on topographically rugged terrain. However, the establishment of bases negates
the guerrilla principle of mobility and accords government forces the opportunity of
attacking a fixed area of insurgent activity.

3.4: FUNDING AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT
Whereas a state can legally generate revenue domestically and internationally and allocate
substantial chunks of its annual budget to the defence sector, an insurgent group does not
enjoy a similar luxury. Yet, like all organizations, it needs funds to purchase arms and
ammunition, medicine and clothing among other things for its fighters

In chapter 2, we observed that an insurgent group may either cultivate cordial relations or
severe its ties with the population. Popular support allows rebels to raise funds and other
forms of aid domestically. However, reliance on this approach presents them with some
stiff challenges: How can people regularly supply insurgents with food, clothing and money
against the backdrop of stringent surveillance mounted by the state’s counterinsurgency
units? In urban areas, the environment is murkier. The urban guerrilla shares the terrain
with urban criminals and counter revolutionaries. How would an insurgent group mobilize
resources in such an environment? 216

The challenges in mobilizing resources domestically push guerrillas to explore criminal
activity and external support as alternative avenues for funding insurgent campaigns. In this
connection, insurgent operatives engage in theft, extortion, blackmail and burglary to
finance their activities.
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However, in light of the state’s propensity to limit the levels of

criminal activity in a given country, how much funds are terrorists able to mobilize locally?
The state cannot completely eliminate domestic funding for an insurgency. Rebellions are
relatively cheap. One Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing campaign in different English
cities only cost £ 25,000 and yet caused infrastructural damage to the tune of £ 10,000,000.
In this sense, there is one cardinal loophole in countering insurgent financing: Insurgents
only need a minute slice of unaddressed criminal space to generate minimal funds to
finance their activities. 218
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However, in discussing the amount of funding needed for insurgent campaigns, it is
important to note that insurgencies may expand to a point beyond which pockets of funding
would be inadequate. When a rebel group is constrained in mobilizing funds domestically,
it may solicit for external support. This option introduces an important feature of modern
rebellions—the role of foreign countries in fuelling civil conflicts. In the ensuing
paragraphs, we examine the nature of support that foreign states offer Non State Armed
Groups (NSAGs).

According to Byman, states extend monetary, logistical, military, operational,
organizational, ideological and diplomatic support to insurgent organizations. In terms of
capacity building, insurgents are trained to use explosives, small arms and conduct
surveillance and counter surveillance. A state may directly train an insurgent group or use
another as a proxy for training it. For example, Iran extends military training to Hezbollah
which in turn trains Palestinian militant groups. Operationally, states may assist terrorist
organizations in improving their precision in attack. In this respect, the Iranian intelligence
is known to have worked closely with Hezbollah in the assassination of Iranian dissidents
in Europe. 219

In addition to training and operational assistance, insurgent organizations need monetary,
organizational, logistical, ideological and diplomatic support to effectively conduct their
campaigns. In relation to monetary assistance, they need funds to purchase equipment and
run operations. In the 1970s, Libya extended military aid to the Provisional Irish
Republican Army to the tune of $ 3,500,000. Insurgent funding may be earmarked for
specific tasks. For example, Iran and Pakistan extend funding to the Lebanese Hezbollah
and Kashmiri Hizb-ul Mujahideen specifically for training purposes and supporting the
families of fighters. 220

In terms of logistics, states may assist rebel groups in securing real or forged travel
documents and establishing companies and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as
fronts for employing insurgents. In extending organizational support, a state may push for
the unification of all the insurgent groups it supports. For example, in rendering
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organizational support to insurgent groups in 1988, Iran united eight small Afghan Shi’a
groups into a bigger organization known as Hezb-i- Wahadat (The Unity Party).
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Once

integrated into a wider insurgent circuit, a guerrilla group would cut down on costs by
sharing tasks and resources with sister organizations.
External support can have a lasting impact on a group’s capacity to conduct an insurgent
campaign. Training is particularly beneficial in the sense that once it is delivered, in case of
a deterioration in relations between the foreign state and the proxy rebel group, the state
cannot ‘withdraw’ it. The pioneering set of trainees can constitute the group’s Military
Instruction Unit and train future recruits. On the other hand, monetary support makes a
rebel group dependent on its foreign sponsor. Unless the group devises a capacity for selfsufficiency, the withdrawal of external funding would badly affect it. External support then
emerges as a double edged sword in insurgent campaigns. While it may assist a group in
building its capacity to execute an insurgency it may at the same time make it overly
dependent on its foreign backer.

Thus far, this discussion has only focussed on a proxy conflict involving three actors—a
rebel group, a state opposed to it and a foreign state supporting it. At this stage, a question
arises: Are the activities of an insurgent group only affected by the behaviour of these two
states? Since the support of one external actor within the international system may affect
the outcome of an insurgent campaign, the behaviour of the international community as a
whole could have a more profound impact. Thus, as part of an external support package,
insurgent groups need diplomatic cover to engage the international community. In the
1960s and 1970s, the Arab world was known to provide this assistance to Arab militant
groups. 222

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that external support is pivotal in shaping the
outcome of an insurgent campaign. How different is it from domestically sourced support?
Whereas the surveillance system of the state could restrict the scope of domestic funding, a
non-restrictive external support environment could allow a rebel group an unrestrictive
assistance package. For example, while it might be difficult for an insurgent group to train
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its fighters in its theatre of insurgent activity, this objective would be attainable on the
territory of a foreign state backing its activities.

It is imperative to note that not all insurgent groups are predisposed to benefit from external
support. In order for external insurgent assistance to flourish, the right kind of geopolitical
dynamics need to prevail. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, Somali and Ethiopian rebel
groups exploited poor relations between the governments of Somalia and Ethiopia to secure
external support. While the Somali government of General Siad Barre backed Ethiopian
guerrilla groups seeking to overthrow the Ethiopian government led by Colonel Mengistu
Haile Mariam, the Mengistu regime reciprocated by aiding anti-Barre Somali groups. In
more recent times, Al Shabaab, a Somali insurgent group has benefited from Eritrean
support due to poor Ethiopia-Eritrea relations.
Movement (UFM),
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In the case of the Uganda Freedom

there were no geopolitical contradictions that it may have

significantly exploited to secure external support. While the UFM insurgency was ensuing,
Uganda was relatively at peace with her neighbours.

It can then be argued that insurgent groups cannot totally escape the need to solicit funding
domestically. Even groups that are beneficiaries of external support need a measure of
locally generated funds to push their campaigns forward. Since an insurgent group would
not be in control of the state apparatus, it would require time and elaborate organization to
smuggle weapons and other provisions into the theatre of insurgent activity. In this case,
while awaiting the external support network to elude the state’s security system, it would
have to generate funds for the campaign domestically.

What tactics would insurgents then use to generate funds locally? Rebel groups use bank
hold-ups, kidnappings and the institution of a revolutionary tax as means of domestic
resource mobilization. For example Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a Basque separatist
movement in Spain, dispatches letters to specific individuals and institutions demanding
money. These messages are usually laced with threats. In these letters, ETA states that it
would visit terror on whoever fails to meet its demands. In this respect, we deduce that
domestic insurgent resource mobilization can be threat driven. The victims are coerced into
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mobilizing funds without coming into contact with the insurgents. In other situations,
terrorists could choose to issue threats while in confrontational contact with their victims.
For example in January 1981, ETA kidnapped and held hostage Jose Lipperheide, a
German-born Spanish industrialist until a ransom fee of $ 1,600,000 was paid. 225

In diversifying their tactics for domestic resource mobilization, insurgents can also use
methods that not only bring them into contact with their victims but also allow them to
directly generate funds. In this respect, they may engage in theft and illicit trade which
allows them direct involvement in the collection of proceeds. For example between
September 1963 and April 1964, Front de la Liberation Quebecois, a French Canadian
terrorist group stole cash to the tune of $ 40,000 and military equipment valued at $ 55,000.
In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is known to generate
its funds through drug trafficking. 226

This discussion has pinpointed some of the choices insurgents make in mobilizing
resources to finance their campaigns. 227 They not only have to choose between generating
funds externally and internally but also between getting and not getting into direct contact
with their resource mobilization canvasses. Like other variables underpinning insurgency,
funding in guerrilla warfare is deeply rooted in the insurgents’ drive to reverse the
imbalance in confrontational capabilities favouring the counterinsurgent. In this respect, the
population emerges as a principle arena for the redistribution of resource mobilizational
capabilities in asymmetric duels. It could voluntarily avail funds to either of the parties
engaged in an asymmetric duel or evolve into a canvass on which the insurgent or
counterinsurgent or both forcefully extract resources for prosecuting the conflict.

3.5: GUERRILLA STRATEGY
Thus far, this study has dwelt on the non-military variables that shape rebellions.
Ultimately, a guerrilla organization needs an approach that allows it to confrontationally
interface with the enemy.
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Guerrilla strategy emerges as one of a number of broad

frameworks that insurgents use to attain the above objective. It lays the foundation for the
tactics that dictate the nature and scope of operations conducted by rebels.
91

3.5.1: Combatant-to-Combatant Engagements
Given the start-up conventional military edge that government forces command over
insurgents, a guerrilla group faces a critical challenge in prioritizing its military objectives.
For example, it has to choose between reducing the troop numbers of the enemy and
destroying their resource base. In this case, the challenge in designing guerrilla strategy lies
in identifying and crippling the enemy’s cardinal area of strength. In “Seven Pillars of
Wisdom,” his treatise on insurgency, T.E. Lawrence argues that “In the Turkish army,
materials were scarce and precious, men more plentiful than equipment…the aim should be
to destroy not the army but the materials.”
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Lawrence’s views suggest that pockets of weakness exist within the enemy’s broader
domain of strength. In this case, insurgents should desist from conducting a blanket attack
on the pillars of the enemy’s capability. Instead, they should concentrate on targeting
specific loop-holes within this capability. In this respect, guerrilla strategy should seek to
surgically disable the enemy’s capacity to wage war.

In discussing the nature of guerrilla warfare, we noted the inextricable connection between
contradictions in the body politic and the manifestation of armed conflict. To what extent
then would the ideals of politics inform military strategy? For example, would it be
plausible to maintain that the political ideology of an insurgent organization significantly
shapes its military strategy?

In examining the relationship between Marxism and unconventional warfare (of which
guerrilla warfare is a part) Vladimir Lenin reasons that “Marxism does not tie the
movement to any particular combat method. It recognizes the possibility that the struggle
may assume the most variegated forms. For that matter, Marxism does not ‘invent’ those
forms of struggle. It merely organizes the tactics of strife and renders them suitable for
general use….Marxism never will reject any particular combat method.”
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Thus, while

defining the purpose for which the military should be used, the politics around which an
insurgency evolves do not shape the methods that a rebel group employs. However, given
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the supremacy of the political over the military organs, the military strategy of a guerrilla
organization will not develop autonomously beyond a point where it completely negates the
political purpose of an insurgency.

The inextricable connection between politics and armed confrontation also raises another
pertinent issue: When defining and operationalizing its political aims and objectives, does
an insurgent group set a time frame within which to accomplish its tasks? Are the political
and military time frames of an insurgent organization in tandem with each other?

It is important to note that different insurgent organizations project the end of their
respective campaigns differently. Whatever the political basis of these calculations, the
sustainability of an insurgent campaign greatly hinges on shifts in the military strength of
the enemy. Guerrillas require time to erode the military capability of government forces.
They seek to adopt a strategy that serializes the armed campaign against the enemy. In this
regard, a guerrilla war should not be characterized by the onset of one major military
confrontation conducted in a short period of time in a small area.
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These battlefield

circumstances are ideal for government forces to use their superior conventional military
capability (higher troop numbers, modern equipment, etc) to obliterate the ill equipped,
under-staffed and comparatively inexperienced guerrillas.
Instead, guerrilla wars should be characterized by a “series of a few big battles separated by
comparatively long intervals.” During the intervening periods, an insurgent group ought to
conduct a “large number of small engagements.”
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Shedding light on the protracted

character of guerrilla warfare, General Giap argues that “The general law of a long
revolutionary war is usually to go through three stages: defensive, equilibrium and
offensive. Fundamentally, in the main directions, our resistance war (in Vietnam) followed
this general rule. Of course, the reality on the battlefields unfolded in a more lively and
complicated manner.”
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His postulations point to the notion that military capability in

guerrilla warfare is built over time. Until they assemble sufficient capacity to conduct
offensive campaigns, guerrillas should only confront government forces selectively. From
this discussion, it can be deduced that the protracted nature of guerrilla warfare gives time
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supreme significance in an insurgency. It evolves into a resource that the insurgent uses to
wear down a conventionally superior enemy.
It is also important to note that the superiority of the state military apparatus presents an
insurgent organization with some critical dilemmas: How should it confront the state
military apparatus? Should emphasis be placed on attack or defence? Would too many
attacks unduly expose an insurgent organization? Would too many defensive battles stall an
insurgent campaign? An effective guerrilla strategy attempts to address all the above
concerns. In this respect, insurgent groups adopt a military strategy premised on alertness,
mobility and attack.
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Alertness and attack allow them to identify and strike at ideal

targets of opportunity while mobility facilitates the institution and shifting of battlefronts.
Unpredictability in the emergence and disappearance of frontlines unsettles conventionally
attuned government forces that are used to conducting military operations along fixed
battlefronts.

Guerrilla strategy is essentially premised on dual adaptation. An insurgent group
simultaneously adapts to its own condition of relative military weakness and the enemy’s
position of relative military strength. Dual adaptation in guerrilla warfare relates to the Yin
Yang concept. Otherwise known as the ‘unity of opposites,’ this philosophy acknowledges
the potential manifestation of strength within the domain of weakness and weakness within
that of strength. For example, while a small band of fighters is susceptible to annihilation at
the hands of a large enemy force, its unit size facilitates rapid deployment and retreat. Yin
Yang also explains the dynamics under which insurgents may prioritize resource use. While
territory and time are of equal importance in an insurgency, a guerrilla group can forfeit one
in order to hold onto another. In this regard, a guerrilla group could relinquish territory in
order to allow itself time to build or rebuild its capability. At a later stage, it could deprioritize time as a resource and opt to regain lost territory. 235

In 2006, faced with a formidable onslaught mounted by Ethiopian forces, the Islamic
Courts Union (ICU) opted to surrender control of Mogadishu, the Somali capital (territory)
to allow itself time to rebuild its capability. When the Islamist forces marshalled sufficient
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capability to take on the forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), they
launched a sustained attack to recapture Mogadishu (territory). 236 In similar vein, following
the success of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) counterinsurgency Operation
Bonanza (in 1983), guerrillas of the National Resistance Army (NRA) gradually
surrendered their original sanctuary in Luwero Triangle in Uganda to government forces
(territory). After marshalling sufficient capability to square off against Ugandan
government forces, in 1986, NRA guerrillas swept across the country recapturing the
Luwero Triangle and previously unoccupied parts of this East African country. 237

We have observed that an insurgent group has to adapt to its own condition of relative
military strength. Given this necessity, to what extent should it rely on its own resources to
conduct operations? Cross argues that “Rebels who cannot count on more conventional
forces moving up to relieve or support them must win their own fights as best as they can.”
238

In this case, individual insurgent units should not overly depend on sister units for

support. The challenge for an insurgent organization then lies in according its individual
units the capacity to hold their own in combat duels with enemy forces.

We have noted that insurgents use time as a means of recovering from battles with
government forces and building their military capability ahead of the next campaign. In a
sense, they inadvertently seek to utilize time to test the enemy’s capacity to engage in a
prolonged armed conflict: At this stage, an intriguing question arises: To what extent would
the state apparatus permit ‘psychological pressures’ to dictate the nature of its response to
an emerging insurgency? Cross argues that “When disciplined troops are available in
sufficient numbers; when their equipment is suited to the task; and when the government
cares nothing for popular opinion and support, an insurrection can often be stamped out by
ruthless slaughter and subsequent terror.” 239 His views suggest that a rebel group does not
have control over the behaviour of government forces in a protracted insurgency. It would
appear that the success of protracted guerrilla warfare depends on the counterinsurgency
calculations of the enemy.
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3.5.2: Combatant-to-Non Combatant Engagements (Terrorism)
Given the imbalance in military capabilities favouring government forces, a classical rebel
group will initially maintain a strategic defensive posture, conducting a limited series of
attacks on isolated, under-strength enemy units. In large measure, this will be a
confrontation between combatants. In the modern era, the growing importance of popular
support in asymmetric warfare has constituted the population into a critical battleground.
Insurgents and counterinsurgents not only battle to win the support of civilians but also
attack them as part of a wider campaign.
However, the adoption of terrorism as a strategy does not directly weaken the state’s
capacity to wage war. A rebel attack on civilians does not reduce the manpower of
government forces. The challenge for an insurgent group then lies in attacking the
population in a way that will indirectly affect enemy soldiers. 240 An intriguing issue in this
debate is the contrast between the target selection of insurgents and that of
counterinsurgents and its impact on the outcome of an asymmetric conflict. Whereas
guerrillas may seek to attack civilians whilst avoiding regular confrontational contact with
government forces, government soldiers may find themselves struggling to locate and fight
the highly elusive insurgents.

Terrorism then emerges as a psychological contest between insurgents and the state military
apparatus. It shifts the war from the actual theatre of skirmishes onto a psychological front.
In the unfolding war of nerves, the civilian population is constituted into a theatre of
indirect confrontational contact between insurgents and the state. 241 Whereas the insurgents
demonstrate their military potency by attacking civilians, the state is unable to demonstrate
its own conventional military might since the insurgents are not intent on engaging in headon duels with government soldiers. Yet the state cannot ignore the attacks on the population
by the insurgents. The duty of the state is to protect its citizens. If the state fails to halt the
terrorist attacks, the insurgents will have scored psychological victories.

In seeking to direct violence at the population, a rebel group has to grapple with some
critical choices: Would it demonstrate its terrorist potency by killing or maiming en masse?
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In this case, genocide or ethnic cleansing would be a suitable approach. Would it pursue a
selective demonstration of its terrorist capability? Since the population only serves as a
canvass on which the group can showcase its potency, then the use of indiscriminate
terrorism

242

would be counterproductive. The non-selective targeting of civilians would

constitute the population into the ultimate target of the insurgents. In order to survive, the
population could be pushed to side with the state.

Because of the above reason, insurgents generally employ terrorism selectively. This
strategy sends out a simple message to civilians: If you do not cooperate with the state, you
will not be targeted. Selective terrorism targets state officials, civilians collaborating with
the state in counterinsurgency campaigns and neutral citizens. In pursuing a selective
terrorist strategy, insurgents use assassinations, maimings and kidnappings as tactics. These
methods allow them to strike at specific individuals who represent the enemy’s interests. As
part of its armed struggle against South Africa’s occupation of present day Namibia,
guerrillas of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) not only attacked
isolated military outposts and police stations but also Namibians who were collaborating
with the occupation forces. 243

Since an insurgent organization would seek to avoid confronting government forces while
conducting its terrorist campaign, in the long run, the state would grow frustrated at its
inability to corner and engage the insurgents in a fight. Under such circumstances,
Marighella argues that the state would be compelled to take drastic measures to identify and
take on the guerrillas. To this effect, it would step up cordon and search operations and
arbitrarily arrest civilians. This counterinsurgency approach would make life unbearable for
the citizens who would start perceiving the state as overly repressive. Consequently, the
population would throw its weight behind the guerrilla movement. 244

Based on the above analysis, it can be deduced that guerrilla strategy essentially rests on
two premises: In fighting government forces, insurgents will seek to prosecute an
unpredictable, protracted insurgent campaign, selectively targeting loop-holes in the
capability of the enemy. The rebels will also strive to adapt to their own condition of
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relative military weakness. Alongside combatant-to-combatant engagements, guerrillas will
also seek to selectively attack civilians to expose the state as incapable of protecting its
citizens. This approach will aim to push the government to adopt a heavy handed response
to the mushrooming insurgency.

3.6: GUERRILLA TACTICS
Guerrilla strategy accords an insurgent group a set of tenets that broadly determine the
shape of its confrontational interaction with government forces. For example, the launch of
a strategic offensive by a rebel group is subject to the delay or inability in the state
launching a new strategic offensive. 245 It is worth noting that this broad principle does not
prescribe specific steps that guerrillas should take in order to exploit the vulnerability of the
state military apparatus in transition between two strategic offensives. For instance, it does
not concisely show how guerrilla units should conduct movements relative to the enemy
during this phase.

Thus, for a better understanding of insurgent practice, it is imperative that we identify and
study the specific dimensions that strategy assumes in a given theatre of insurgent activity.
Otherwise known as tactics, these minute manifestations of strategy constitute the basic
mode of confrontation between guerrillas and government forces in an active theatre of
combat. Tactics derive from strategy and shape the nature of operations that a military
organization conducts.

246

In this section, we set out to answer the following questions:

What tactics do guerrillas use? What is the rationale behind the tactics they adopt? How do
shifts in guerrilla strategy affect the evolution of tactics?

When an asymmetric conflict breaks out, government forces initially command a
conventional military edge over guerrillas. At this stage, the principle challenge for an
insurgent army lies in determining the optimal allocation of its limited capabilities. For
example, in terms of deployment, an insurgent army has to make decisions on the kind of
fighting units that would suit a given set of military confrontational circumstances. The
diversity in the composition of a guerrilla group potentially gives its military wing
individuals with extensive fighting experience, those with limited fighting experience and
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those without. With a thin and diverse manpower base, how would an insurgent group
allocate its human resources?

Clausewitz asserts that the militia and civilian units of a guerrilla army should not be
deployed against the core force of the enemy. These relatively inexperienced units should
operate along the outer reaches of the main body of the enemy army. Otherwise known as
“surfaces” or “edges,” these points constitute the thinnest areas of enemy deployment and
concentration.
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Guerrillas should strike at these points while heading towards the rear of

the enemy force. In this respect, the objective of an insurgent army should be to draw areas
outside the main theatre of war from the enemy’s grasp.

From the above analysis, it is evident that two considerations underpin the allocation of
fighting capabilities in an insurgent organization. First, the fighting strength of the enemy:
A guerrilla organization will seek to deploy those units with the requisite capability to
engage a given set of enemy units. Second, attainable short term objectives: A guerrilla
organization will conduct attacks that can yield victory in the short run. The vulnerability of
the enemy’s flanks and isolated military outposts accord a guerrilla group the opportunity
of using its inexperienced units to dominate these areas and wrest them from the enemy’s
control.
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This feat allows the rebel group to register some pockets of progress within a

wider domain of initial strategic military setbacks. Tactical progress in this direction is
potentially attainable in light of the fact that at these spots, the state military apparatus
exhibits a relatively lighter concentration of its fighting capability.

It is equally important to observe that in other theatres of asymmetric confrontation,
government forces manifest in strength. Guerrillas cannot perpetually harass the enemy’s
flanks. Ultimately, they have to square off against the main body of the enemy force. With
a relatively limited capability, how would insurgent units cope with this challenge?
Guerrilla movements should be deceptive. Insurgent units intent on attacking government
forces from the west should deceptively appear to be approaching enemy positions from the
east. Rebels should conduct attacks when there are lulls in the manifestation of enemy
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strength. To this end, insurgents should mount attacks when government forces halt an
offensive or commence a troop withdrawal. 249

This study has mainly attempted to prescribe the specific steps that guerrillas should take in
reaction to temporary lapses in the manifestation of the enemy’s strength. This tactical
approach is dictated by the enemy’s modus operandi. In this respect, an insurgent force has
little control over the evolution of the enemy’s tactical vulnerability. If the enemy
drastically minimized the loopholes in their capability, then an insurgent army would have
limited opportunities of winning an asymmetric duel. Under such circumstances, insurgents
would need a reservoir of their own advantages they would independently exploit to
tactically out-manoeuvre the enemy. Cross asserts that insurgents should draw their
advantage from two areas: The capacity to marshal “greater mobility than conventional
forces” and “detailed and intimate knowledge of the countryside.” 250

In relation to mobility, some puzzling issues arise: Given the resources at their disposal,
government forces are in a better position to marshal machines and equipment to facilitate
quicker movement of troops than guerrillas. In the Niger Delta, the Nigerian army would be
expected to use its modern ships to transport troops faster than guerrillas of the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).
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Similarly, the lavishly equipped

Angolan army would be expected to use its Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and battle
wagons to crisscross the tiny Cabinda enclave faster than separatist guerrillas of the Front
for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). 252
In this sense, at a technological level, conventional forces are better predisposed to marshal
mobility than insurgents. An insurgent army would then only be left with the option of
enhancing the mobility of its individual fighter vis-à-vis that of a government foot soldier.
However, the challenge in adopting this tactical approach is that the state military apparatus
could reorientate its own foot soldier to match the mobility of the individual guerrilla. In
this case, insurgents would then find it difficult to constitute troop movement into a critical
area for the reversal of the imbalance in military capabilities favouring the state military
apparatus.
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Given the above challenge, how can guerrillas marshal mobility? Cross points out that
greater insurgent mobility does not denote greater absolute speed. In other words, the
mobility of units of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in the Sudanese region of
Darfur should not be measured in terms of the kilometres they are capable of covering in an
hour. Rather, their mobility should broadly be quantified in terms of their capacity to
conduct movements throughout the theatre of insurgency on “short notice with greater ease
and less fanfare.”
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In this direction, insurgents seek to marshal a relative and not an

absolute mobility edge over government forces.

It is also worth noting that in order to effectively marshal mobility, insurgents need to
muster terrain intelligence. Cross points out that guerrillas should demonstrate superior
knowledge on “trails and short cuts,” “remote hiding places,” “promising spots for
ambushes” and the “surest escape routes.”
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It could be argued that a given guerrilla unit

is mobile not because it has the means to quickly move from one part of a theatre of
insurgency to another but because it knows and uses routes that present the least obstacle to
faster troop movement.

In this analysis, it has been argued that guerrillas need to adopt mobility to maintain a
tactical edge over government forces. Thus far, the specific tactical posture that mobility
assumes in guerrilla operations has not been addressed. In seeking to address this need,
insurgents should spend minimal time accessing, operating in and withdrawing from a
battlefield. They should vacate a battlefield in minutes and a region of confrontational
interaction with the enemy in days.
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This approach denies the enemy the time and space

to effectively respond to insurgent activity. For instance, when a guerrilla unit mounts a
tactical offensive, government forces immediately assume a tactical defensive posture. But
because the guerrilla attack lasts for a very short period, by the time government forces
switch from a defensive to an offensive posture, the insurgents have vacated the battlefield.
This state of battlefield affairs prevents government forces from directly exerting their
offensive momentum against retreating guerrillas.
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Thus, in engaging with the principle of mobility, insurgents have to make optimal use of
time. However, it is important to note that they cannot monopolize this resource. The state
military apparatus could alter its own management of time. Guerrillas would then have to
introduce a new dimension to their wellspring of tactical potency. To this effect, they would
need to mount ambushes against the enemy.
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The element of surprise renders the

enemy’s time management strategy obsolete. Where insurgents ambush government forces,
the state military apparatus would be unsettled by the lack of time for taking on rebels
appearing in both expected and least expected places.

This thesis has dwelt on the dynamics underpinning the manifestation of insurgent mobility
in the theatre of skirmishes. It is important to note that this domain constitutes the highest
area of confrontational interaction between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. In order
to access it, insurgents need to conduct movements in its environs. Given the fact that the
environs lie outside the theatre of combat, the intensity of confrontational interaction in
these areas is expected to be less than that in the theatre of skirmishes. Does it then follow
that there are differences in the way insurgent mobility manifests inside and outside the
theatre of combat?

Whereas speed underpins insurgent mobility inside the combat theatre, clandestinity
characterizes that outside the theatre of skirmishes. While operating in the environs of the
theatre of combat, insurgents are least preoccupied with conducting fast movements and
more concerned with making undetectable movements. To this end, they seek to cover all
their tracks and desist from generating noise that would arouse the enemy’s suspicion.

In addition, they conduct different mobility-related activities at different times of the day.
They march at night and conduct mobility-support activities during the day. At night,
insurgents desist from holding conversations and smoking. While marching, they adopt an
unusual pattern of movement: In order to avoid tripping over stones, branches and other
obstacles, they walk with their feet high up. 257 Whilst realizing undetectability in mobility,
the adoption of an unusual pattern of marching tends to slow down their movement.
However, it is imperative to remember that in the areas outside the theatre of skirmishes,
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insurgents could afford to forego speed for undetectability-in-mobility since the degree of
confrontational interaction with the enemy is expected to be at its lowest. In this case, the
chances of government forces quickly locating and taking them out are expected to be
relatively minimal.

With the hours of the night dedicated to marching, what activities does a field operational
unit conduct during the day? In what ways do these activities support their movements in
the areas outside the theatre of combat? During the day, guerrillas engaged in field
operations take turns to sleep and study maps.
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Rest accords them collective

reinvigoration ahead of the commencement of the next phase of their field operations. In
discussing the nature of mobility, we argued that geographical knowledge on the theatre of
skirmishes is essential in marshalling insurgent mobility. In this connection, map reading
emerges as one of the critical avenues for determining routes that present the least obstacles
to insurgent mobility.
This research has stressed the significance of mobility in facilitating limited and selective
confrontational interaction between guerrillas and government forces. With initial minimal
interaction between the two sides, insurgents are allowed the time and space to assemble
their capability. However, it is important to note that guerrillas cannot cripple the enemy’s
capacity to wage war by perpetually avoiding confrontation with government forces.
Ultimately, the strength of government forces will only decline if guerrillas can impose
costly battles on them. Mindful of its fragile capability and the inescapable need to engage
the enemy, what would constitute ideal targets for an insurgent attack? 259

Nkrumah identifies the communication sector as one of the more vulnerable elements in the
enemy’s capability. Guerrillas should not only seek to attack communication infrastructure
but also enemy forces in transit. Whilst seeking to disable roads, railway lines and airfields,
they should also strike at enemy military convoys.
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The key question at this stage: Why

would mobility evolve into a critical area of vulnerability for government forces?
It is imperative to observe that in seeking to disrupt the enemy’s mobility, insurgents attack
government forces heading to an area that is expected to evolve into a theatre of skirmishes.
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In this sense, guerrillas ambush government forces while they are outside the theatre of
combat. In discussing insurgent mobility, we noted that guerrilla movements are at their
slowest outside the theatre of skirmishes. We also observed that while insurgents are at
their most vulnerable in this domain, the low degree of confrontational interaction with the
enemy permits them to trade speed for undetectable movements. Similarly, we note that in
terms of movement, government forces would also be at their slowest outside the theatre of
combat. If insurgents constituted this area into a domain for confrontation, then government
forces would struggle to adapt to these unexpected circumstances.

Against this backdrop, it can be concluded that there are two key elements in a guerrilla
tactical framework: First, insurgents will seek to attack weak points within the capability of
the state and avoid outright confrontation with its armed forces. Second, they will seek to
use terrain intelligence to marshal mobility, conduct deceptive movements within the
theatre of insurgent activity and mount ambushes against the enemy.

3.7: WEAPONS AND WEAPONS ACQUISITION
We have noted that armed confrontation is the usual means by which guerrillas and
government forces seek to settle an asymmetric duel. With arms, Segaller argues that
combatants command the strength to “enforce” and “enable activity” and precipitate
“action” that results into “death, injury and damage.” Without these instruments of
coercion, he asserts that an insurgent is a “powerless radical.” 261

Given the imbalance in confrontational capabilities that is initially tilted in favour of the
state military apparatus, insurgents face an uphill task in assembling their arsenals.
Marighella enumerates some of these challenges: They have to capture and divert arms
from the enemy. This is a Herculean task in light of the fact that government forces initially
command greater firepower than them; and whilst insurgents can manage to source for
different weapons in different places, it is always difficult securing ammunition that suits
these arms. 262
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In light of the above constraints, how would an insurgent organization assemble its arsenal?
What kind of weapons would it use and why? Che Guevara asserts that “The arms
preferable for this kind of warfare are long range weapons requiring small expenditure of
bullets, supported by a group of automatic and semi-automatic arms.” 263 Whilst concurring
with Che Guevara, Marighella stresses the need for guerrillas to use light, short barrelled
weapons. 264

Broadly, Che Guevara and Marighella propagate a weapons-use strategy that suits
asymmetric warfare. Minimizing the expenditure of ammunitions allows a guerrilla army to
conserve its meagre resources while the use of light weapons facilitates mobility in theatres
of insurgent activity.

Specifically, eight considerations underpin the choice and use of weapons in guerrilla
warfare: portability, availability, usability, firepower, range, accuracy, economy and
concealability. Guerrillas use automatic and semi-automatic weapons because of the above
advantages. While Che Guevara recommends “…the more modern Belgian FAL and M-14
automatic rifles,”
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Marighella specifically recommends the Brazilian made INA model

953 sub machine gun which is an effective weapon in combat, easy to conceal and
respected by the enemy. 266

Although the sub machine gun is one of the more ideal weapon for guerrilla warfare, the
Kalashnikov is perhaps the most widely used gun in asymmetric conflicts across the globe.
Segaller observes that it is “simple to use,” “dramatic in firepower,” “easily broken down
into four pieces fitting into a brief case or bulky jacket” and it counts perhaps as “the
ultimate weapon in a terrorist’s arsenal of unsophisticated and manual weapons.” 267

Whilst adding firepower to the military capability of insurgents, automatic and semiautomatic weapons are occasionally inaccurate and waste ammunition that is not readily
available. In this connection, while recommending the M-1 rifle or the Garand that is
readily available in the United States of America, Che Guevara cautions that “…this should
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be used only by people with experience since it has the disadvantage of expending too
much ammunition.” 268

In Chapter 2, we observed that guerrilla warfare is merely a phase in an insurgent
campaign. In order to seize state installations, occupy enemy territory and control the
population, an insurgent organization should transit from using guerrilla warfare to
conventional warfare. At this stage in a campaign, a guerrilla army scales down on the
mobility of its fighting units and starts establishing a fixed insurgent presence which makes
it more vulnerable to conventional military attacks mounted by government forces. With
changes in the confrontational circumstances (especially the potential onset of set-piece
battles along fixed frontlines), insurgents are pushed to upgrade their arsenals to match the
firepower of the enemy. During this phase, a guerrilla army seeks to acquire medium and
heavier weapons to bolster its existing arsenal of light arms. 269

What kind of medium and heavy weapons would insurgents then need at the conventional
warfare stage of an insurgency? Che Guevara asserts that “Medium and heavy arms such as
tripod machine guns can be used on favourable ground, affording a greater margin of
security for the weapon and its personnel, they always ought to be means of repelling the
enemy and not for attack.”
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In this case, ease of use and the balance in confrontational

capabilities are critical considerations in insurgents selecting medium and heavy weapons
for use.

Discussing the use of medium and heavy weapons, Marighella concurs with Che Guevara
in stressing that arms like bazookas and mortars should be entrusted with highly
experienced fighters. Although readily available in the arms market, longer barrelled heavy
weapons like the FAL, Mausers, Shotguns and Winchesters present insurgents with
transportation and concealment challenges. 271

Their shortcomings notwithstanding, heavy weapons present insurgents with the firepower
to conduct targeted attacks. For example, the hand-held Soviet-made Rocket Propelled
Grenade (RPG) 7 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) is a highly effective weapon with a
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capacity to penetrate 320 millimetres of armour. However, this weapon has got drawbacks:
Richard Clutterbuck observes that “It is ….thrown off course by cross winds and defeated
by wire mesh protection outside buildings (as at police stations in Northern Ireland),
because the hollow charge relies for its penetration on detonating at right angles and the
right distance from its target. It is also unsafe to fire it in confined spaces or with a wall
within two metres of the back of the launch tube.” 272

Thus far, this discussion has centred on the use of guns in guerrilla warfare. Although they
allow combatants to directly target the enemy, the need to have the enemy within shooting
range and the propensity for the enemy to strike back exposes gunners to higher casualties.
In order to limit confrontational contact with the enemy, insurgents may resort to using
explosives. They can either lob these devices at government forces from a safe distance or
prepare and clandestinely plant them behind enemy lines.

Essentially, explosives range from simple home made to industrially manufactured
incendiary devices and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Insurgents could assemble
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) by filling metal tubes or fire extinguishers with Tri
Nitro Toluene (TNT) or a mixture of sugar and weedex. Alternatively, they could assemble
these explosive devices by adding fuel to ammonium nitrate fertilizer to make the resultant
product (Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil) combustible. 273

In the modern era, insurgents have not only used highly explosive industrially
manufactured dynamite but also explored prospects of using atomic, biological and
chemical weapons. However, in seeking to use WMDs, Segaller observes that insurgents
exercise caution given the fact that they prefer to cause “tactical and not strategic ‘scorched
earth’ destruction.” 274 In light of the indispensability of popular support to the execution of
an insurgency, the adoption of a military strategy based on mass destruction would grossly
alienate guerrillas.

While insurgents have to grapple with selecting and using weapons, the procurement of
these instruments of coercion presents them with an even stiffer challenge. They have to
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rely on a thin resource base to procure arms and ammunition against the backdrop of
stringent enemy surveillance. Principally, insurgents use four avenues to source for
weapons: They either make them, steal or capture them from the enemy, purchase them in
the underworld or according to Segaller, smuggle them by “abusing diplomatic bag rules.”
275

By making their own arms, insurgents develop their own internal capacity for innovation
and reduce dependence on external sources. However, by itself, this approach does not
accord them a weapons technological edge over the enemy. The state military
establishment could either manufacture or purchase more superior arms and ammunition;
Reliance on arms and ammunition stolen or captured from government forces allows
insurgents to remain at a level of weapons technological parity as the enemy. An upgrade or
downgrade in the arsenal of government forces would precipitate no long term
technological shock among insurgents as both parties to the asymmetric duel would be
using the same calibre of weapons; Purchasing arms accords insurgents the opportunity of
either getting to a level of weapons technological parity as the enemy or even surpassing it.

Given the imbalance in military capabilities that initially favours government forces, it can
be concluded that guerrillas face an uphill task in seeking to procure and use weapons. In
order to address this challenge, an insurgent organization will adopt a weapons acquisitionand-use strategy that takes the following factors into consideration: availability, usability,
portability, concealability, firepower, range, accuracy and economy. Having looked at the
different variables that shape the organization of insurgent activity, we now seek to test the
above theoretical model on the Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda.
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CHAPTER 4

TESTING THE INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES OF LRA: IDENTITY

4.1: IDEOLOGY
As discussed in the foregoing theoretical review, political contradictions in a given polity
accord a guerrilla group a range of grievances out of which it can formulate its ideology.
The doctrine of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is of critical importance in this
discourse given the overlapping nature of insurgent activity in Northern Uganda. Since the
LRA rebellion emerges at the tail end of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA),
Holy Spirit Movement I (HSM I) and Holy Spirit Movement II (HSM II) insurgencies,

276

the task in this section is to establish whether LRA inherited and has continued to nurture
the body of ideals advanced by insurgent movements preceding it. This exercise will offer
insights into the factors that shape the evolution of ideology in overlapping insurgencies.

In this section we specifically test the hypothesis that LRA will have adopted an ideology
that is either an original synthesis of its ideals or an adaptation of existing ideologies in
order to articulate political contradictions in the Ugandan polity and justify its recourse to
violence to resolve these contradictions. Since the grievances/aims of a guerrilla group are
the building blocks out of which its ideology evolves, we shall first examine these before
analyzing how the ideology of LRA subsequently crystallizes out of its objectives.
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4.1.1: GRIEVANCES/AIMS

Evolution of the Ideology of LRA
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HSM I

HSM II

LRA
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-Human Rights violations
in Northern Uganda
-Inequitable distribution
of power

-Unseat NRM
government
-Effect equitable
distribution of power
-Protect Acholi population

-Secular

-Collapse of Northern
hegemony
-Human Rights violations
in Northern Uganda
-Inequitable distribution
of power
-Moral degeneration

-Unseat NRM
government
-Effect equitable
distribution of power
-Protect Acholi population
-Socially cleanse Acholi
society

-Faith-based / Secular

-Collapse of Northern
hegemony
-Human Rights violations
in Northern Uganda
-Inequitable distribution
of power
-Moral degeneration

-Unseat NRM
government
-Effect equitable
distribution of power
-Protect Acholi population
-Socially cleanse Acholi
society

-Faith-based / Secular

-Collapse of Northern
hegemony
-Human Rights violations
in Northern Uganda
-Inequitable distribution
of power
-Moral degeneration
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Acholi-NRM
collaboration

-Unseat NRM
government
-Effect equitable
distribution of power
-Protect Acholi population
-Violently cleanse Acholi
society
-Assemble new Acholi polity

-Faith-based / Secular

-Ethnic survivalist
-Moderate

-Ethnic survivalist
-Moderately radical
-Utopian

-Ethnic survivalist
-Radical
-Utopian

-Ethnic survivalist
-Excessively Radical
-Ultra-Utopian

Figure 1

The start up mission of LRA broadly reinforced the body of aims that had underpinned the
onset of the UPDA, HSM I and HSM II rebellions (Figure 1). LRA rooted its grievances in
the conflict discourse that evolved in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Northern
hegemony in Uganda.
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Stating its reasons for waging war against the Government of
120

Uganda (GoU), LRA decried “the lack of Northerners in government” and “violations of
human rights” in Northern Uganda.
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This set of grievances was not different from that

propagated by other Northern-based rebel groups. For example, there was a human rights
dimension to the grievances underpinning the onset of the UPDA rebellion.

Following the collapse of the Okello Lutwa military junta in 1986, Cline notes that
demobilised soldiers of the defunct Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) from
Acholiland were sent to “politicisation camps” where they “…performed manual labour.”
279

Acholi people drew parallels between the National Resistance Movement government’s

announcement in 1986 instructing all ex-UNLA soldiers to “report to army headquarters” to
a similar one by Amin in 1971 that resulted in the death of many Acholi soldiers.

280

Consequently, in justifying why members of the Acholi ethnic group joined UPDA, a
human rights activist in Northern Uganda notes that “The Acholi boys said to each other,
‘This time we are not going to die like chicken. Let us go to Sudan and join our brothers
and fight to save Acholi.” 281

Like the UPDA rebellion, the LRA insurgency was partially triggered off by economic
factors. In stating what it termed ‘Causes of Our War,’ LRA decried NRM’s poor
management of the Ugandan economy. Economic factors were similarly at the heart of the
UPDA rebellion. Following the collapse of the Northern hegemony in 1986, Ballentine
observes that ex-UNLA officers from Acholi experienced “descent from military authority
to civilian obscurity”. He deduces that “The economic impact of these factors would almost
certainly have shifted the opportunity cost in favour of involvement in rebellion.” 282

The proposals that LRA advanced to resolve the conflict in Northern Uganda were
consistent with the ideals that underpinned the UPDA rebellion. LRA proposed the creation
of an ethnically balanced Ugandan army and the relocation of the Ugandan capital from
Kampala to Kigumba, Masindi district, in Bunyoro, Mid Western Uganda.
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The first

proposal underlined the critical centrality of the military to the control of the state
machinery in Uganda. During the Pece peace negotiations between UPDA and the NRM
government, UPDA clamoured for its fighters to be integrated into NRA (the national
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army).
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The proposals of LRA and the negotiation position of UPDA underlined one

important cause of conflict in Uganda—imbalances in ethnic representation within the
military.

The second proposal showcased the place of symbolism in the North-South regional duel in
Uganda. Kampala, the Ugandan capital is situated in Buganda in the South. Although
geographically located in the Mid West, Kigumba is politically designated as an integral
part of the political South. LRA’s choice of Kigumba may have been based on three
considerations:
First, the need to check Buganda’s epicentrality to the collapse of the Northern hegemony.
NRM waged its campaign in the Luwero Triangle in Buganda
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and the 35th Battalion of

NRA that committed atrocities in Northern Uganda was mainly staffed with Baganda.
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Second, the need to locate the Ugandan capital in an area not dominated by the South.
Kigumba is inhabited by Northerners and Southerners. Third, the need to revive fifth
columnism in the North-South duel. The proposed relocation of the capital from Buganda
to Bunyoro would potentially revive rivalry between these two Southern regions and secure
an ally for the North in an otherwise hostile South. 287

Like UPDA, LRA formulated objectives aimed at attaining international crossover appeal.
Mindful of the international context within which the NRM government operated at that
time, LRA sought to cultivate external support through the exploitation of Cold War
divisions. Citing the leftist democratic attributes of the Resistance Council (RC) 288 system
and the centralized approach to the economic organization of the Ugandan state at that
time, the group attempted to link the NRM government to the communist bloc. UPDA
pursued a similar approach. In outlining its grievances in 1987, it labelled NRM a
“communist dictatorship.”289 In both cases, this strategy aimed to attract support for the
rebels from the capitalist bloc. However, the end of the Cold War and the liberalisation of
the Ugandan economy in 1990 combined to distance NRM from its original leftist
ideological inclinations thereby 290 rendering the above doctrinal strategy obsolete.
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LRA gleaned autocriticism from the ideology of HSM I. In articulating her reasons for
fighting the GoU, Lakwena, the leader of HSM I attributed the political crisis in Northern
Uganda to an upsurge in witchcraft in Acholiland. Consequently, she undertook to resolve
this crisis by attempting to eliminate sorcery in this part of the country. Pursuing a similar
objective, LRA proposed the creation of a Ministry of Religious Affairs aimed at upholding
the Ten Commandments of the Christian faith and specifically ending witchcraft in
Uganda. By acknowledging the emergence of negative social practices in Acholiland,
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both groups indirectly designated the Acholi people as partially responsible for the onset of
the crisis in Northern Uganda. The partial culpability of the Acholi positioned them as
potential targets of rebel attacks in future.

The theocratic dimension to the aims advanced by HSM I and LRA is also significant in
other ways. Given the dominance of monotheism in Uganda, the move to eradicate
witchcraft may have been calculated to endear Northern-based guerrilla movements to
Southern Christian and Muslim constituencies. Like the 1966 crisis, the pursuit of
theocratic objectives potentially accorded HSM I and LRA the opportunity of changing the
dynamics of the North-South regional duel. Henceforth, theism would become an important
factor in the evolution of regional relations in the country.

In discussing the evolution of its aims, it can be deduced that LRA largely sought to
maintain the thrust of the grievances advanced by UPDA, HSM I and HSM II (Figure 1).
This strategy allowed it to maintain a measure of popular support links among the Acholi
people whose control of the Ugandan state had ended with the collapse of the Northern
hegemony in 1986. LRA did not have to formulate aims different from those advanced by
the other insurgent movements. All four rebellions targeted the same local constituency and
sought to exploit similar political circumstances.

It is also important to note that since LRA was not seeking a secessionist solution to the
Northern political question, there was a need to formulate a set of aims geared towards
cultivating both national and international crossover appeal. Like UPDA, LRA attempted to
engineer cracks within the South by fuelling historical intra-Southern regional rivalries. At
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the international level, NRM’s initial leftist policies accorded both UPDA and LRA the
opportunity of positioning themselves as rightist leaning rebel groups aiming at
overthrowing a communist regime. By pursuing this strategy during the Cold War era, both
guerrilla organizations were potential beneficiaries of military support from the Capitalist
bloc.

Having concluded that LRA largely gleaned its aims from those propagated by UPDA,
HSM I and HSM II, the next task in this discussion is to establish how its objectives
crystallized into ideology. This exercise is important because it allows us to assess how the
organization of an insurgent campaign shapes the set of aims it has adopted.

4.1.2: IDEOLOGY
One of the perennially touted reasons for the collapse of negotiations between LRA and the
GoU is that the rebel group lacks a harmonised set of aims and values that would allow its
adversaries to make compromises needed for peacefully resolving the conflict in Northern
Uganda.
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Apparently, there is one key area of incongruence in the ideals of the group.

The realm of religion has either subordinated or remained at a level of parity with that of
the politics shaping its ideology. This state of affairs has thrown up a challenge for LRA
watchers. While some have categorized the group as a political movement others have
designated it as a religious cult.

The dual ideological outlook of LRA is a product of the contrasting doctrines it has adopted
from other insurgent movements. Whereas UPDA attributed the conflict in Acholiland to
shifts in the regional balance of power in Uganda, HSM I and HSM II mainly stressed the
role of moral degeneration in fuelling the crisis in this part of the country. While being
committed to reincarnating the Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics (like UPDA), LRA
(like HSM I and HSM II) also undertook to socially reorganize Acholi society. In
explaining the social roots of the LRA insurgency, Achama, the Personal Secretary of
Joseph Kony argues that “The Acholi are being punished because of their own sins they
have committed. Kony is the agent of God because he is bringing about the suffering that
will purify the Acholi.” 293
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The divergence in the doctrines advanced by UPDA on one hand and HSM I, HSM II and
LRA on the other generates conflicting culpability for the conflict in Northern Uganda.
Whereas UPDA blamed Southerners, HSM I, HSM II and LRA partly blamed Northerners
for the crisis in this part of the country. The ideological position of the latter three
introduced autocriticism into the body of grievances touted by rebel groups in Northern
Uganda.

While HSM I and HSM II prescribed spiritual cleansing of the Acholi to resolve the crisis
in the North, LRA advocates a radical overhaul of the Acholi society and pushes for the
construction of a new polity. Jackson observes that the ideology of LRA hinges on “…an
apocalyptic vision that the Acholi are on the brink of extinction” and the only solution to
this crisis lies in undertaking “…a radical transformation of the Acholi from within—a
moral crusade.” 294

In seeking to construct a new Acholi polity, the architects of the ideology of LRA face
some challenges: What is going to be the fate of members of the old order? Are citizens of
the old polity beyond spiritual rehabilitation? Who will inhabit the new LRA polity? In
articulating the doctrine of LRA in relation to the drive to assemble an Acholi utopia, Kony
often informs young LRA recruits that he will send soldiers to wipe out Acholis inhabiting
Acholiland in order to facilitate the evolution of a new Acholi polity where “…the children
form the seed of a new ‘pure’ generation of Acholis.” 295 The drive to construct an Acholi
utopia allows the ideology of LRA to evolve into a domain for the operationalization of its
strategy. The lure to belong to a “pure generation of Acholis”
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dissuades young LRA

recruits from escaping back to their communities.

Unlike UPDA that maintained a uni-faceted ideological outlook, LRA assumes a more
multi-faceted doctrinal posture. UPDA adopted a secular ideology centred around the drive
to protect the Acholi population against potential extermination at the hands of Southerners.
On the other hand, Lt Col Charles Otim, a former commander of LRA notes that it is
difficult to put a finger on the actual doctrinal disposition of LRA. He reveals that on
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Fridays, LRA comes across as an Islamist organization while on Sundays as a Christian
one.
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According to Jackson, despite heading a quasi-Christian fundamentalist group, at

spiritual functions, Kony dons a Kanzu, a white tunic otherwise synonymous with Islamist
religious practice. 298

The amalgamation of traditional Acholi religious practices with Christianity and Islam
makes the ideology of the group more complex. Based on the idea that spirits (Joks) are
omnipotent, traditional Acholi religion plays a central role in shaping the doctrine of LRA.
In order to strengthen the potency of the group’s ideology, Kony advocates the combination
of Jok with Allah (God as professed by Muslims) hence the hybrid deity/spirit Jok Allah.
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The expansion of the domain of spirits in Acholi tradition dates back to the evolution of

the ideology of HSM I. At that time, Acholi spiritual revivalists argued that in light of the
crisis that was gripping the North, there was a need to co-opt new spirits to cope with the
challenges of the modern age. To this effect, HSM undertook to create new spirits like Jok
Jesus (an amalgamation of an Acholi spirit and the Messiah as professed by Christians). 300
However, the incorporation of Jok Allah into the group’s cosmos of spirits points to
possible strategic calculations aimed at sustaining external support links with the Islamist
regime in Sudan. Adam Jeroen et al observe that from 1994, LRA prohibited work on
Fridays, extended the fasting period in a manner akin to the Islamic Holy month of
Ramadan and introduced bowing of heads during prayer.
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Curiously, the above

revolution in doctrinal affairs coincides with the commencement of Sudanese support for
LRA

Like HSM I and HSM II, LRA uses ideology to operationalize its military strategy. The
Holy Spirit Safety Precautions, the battlefield manual for HSM fighters attempted to link
the belief system of HSM with its combat practice. Given the perceived immunity it
enjoyed against enemy fire, HSM encouraged its fighters to engage in combat without
taking cover. LRA has adopted a similar model to marshal invincibility in combat. Kony
positions himself as the fulcrum of multiple spirits that guide the activities of his foot
soldiers. He claims to be possessed by Silli Sillindi, a spirit that designs the group’s military
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strategy, Ing Chu, a spirit that ostensibly turns enemy tanks into toys and a Korean spirit
that deflects enemy bullets in combat. 302

From the above analysis, we accept the hypothesis in this section. It can be asserted that
LRA largely gleans its ideology from those of UPDA, HSM I and HSM II. All four rebel
groups formulated their ideologies around a conflict orchestrated by changes in the regional
balance of power that favored the Southern over the Northern part of Uganda. However,
unlike UPDA that purely rooted its grievances in the politics surrounding the North-South
divide, HSM I, HSM II and LRA partly attributed the crisis in the North to an upsurge in
negative social practices in Acholiland. By making the Acholi people partially culpable for
the conflict in Northern Uganda, LRA furnished its ideology with a rationale for using
force to enlist the support of the population.

4.2: POPULAR SUPPORT AND PROPAGANDA

4.2.1: POPULAR SUPPORT
In conventional guerrilla warfare, insurgents depend on the population for recruits, food
and intelligence among other forms of support. In the problem statement, we observed a
peculiarity in the modus operandi of LRA. Over the course of its insurgent campaign, the
group has concentrated its military attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure and yet
managed to remain in operation for 25 years.

Its propensity to operate contrary to the laws of insurgency raises some critical issues about
popular support and propaganda in asymmetric conflict. Given the fact that the original
long term goal of LRA was to unseat the National Resistance Movement (NRM)
government and manage the Ugandan state, the group not only needed instruments of
coercion to fight the Ugandan army but also a set of non-confrontational techniques to
engage the Ugandan population at large. But the adoption of a terrorist strategy potentially
alienated the population that would otherwise have supported its insurgent and postinsurgency activities. Having adopted this approach, LRA would also not have needed a
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communicational strategy to sway the support of a population that it would otherwise have
been in a position to access violently.

This section deals with the uneasy place of popular support and propaganda in the LRA
insurgent campaign. We test the following hypotheses:

1. LRA will have enjoyed popular support because it can easily access civilians, its
membership is ethnically connected with the population in Northern Uganda and
civilians in this part of the country believe that the group will unseat the National
Resistance Movement government.
2. LRA will have used a communicational campaign espousing the idea of an
independent

existence

for

its

targeted

audience,

pin-pointing

political

contradictions within the Ugandan polity and rationalizing its recourse to violence.
3. LRA will have used overt propaganda techniques in territories where it commands
greater control over the population and covert techniques where it has less control.

LRA was popular at the formative stage of its insurgent campaign because it positioned
itself as a guerrilla movement seeking to liberate the people of Northern Uganda from
perceived subjugation at the hands of Southerners. Stating its reasons for waging war
against the GoU, the LRA peace team at the Juba peace talks noted that “…as soon as
NRM came into power, it became obvious that its target was not to integrate, but to finish
off members of the former armies…Scores of young men, both former soldiers and even
those who had not been in the army, were arrested, tortured and either killed or damped in
prison cells without trial, under the most squalid conditions….Our mothers, sisters and
wives were raped in front of us and in some extreme cases, men were sodomised in public
and in front of their family members. This became infamously known as ‘Tek
Gungu’…NRM soldiers went to the extent of cutting men’s anuses with razor blades and
pouring paraffin therein to enlarge them to fit their sex organs.” 303

Support for armed rebellion in Northern Uganda was not only fuelled by atrocities
committed by NRA. In the aftermath of the NRM takeover, Jackson points out that the
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people of Northern Uganda were also apprehensive about Southerners taking control of
their economic resources. For example, the Acholi people harboured concerns to the effect
that President Museveni of Uganda intended to settle Rwandese refugees (who had fought
within the ranks of the National Resistance Army) in Northern Uganda. The depletion of
the Acholi cattle population was another area of concern. Between 1986 and 1987, the
cattle population in Kitgum went down from 156,667 to 3,239. 304

In attempting an explanation for the dwindling cattle population in the sub-region, the LRA
peace team reasoned that “When the NRM came to power, their soldiers raided our
livestock in broad daylight and took them away. The government has tried to explain it
away by blaming it on the Karimojong…. But the Karimojong have never owned nor
operated a helicopter. But helicopters were used to identify our animals hidden in the
deepest of forests…The Karimojong never had army uniforms. But most of our animals
were taken by men in NRM uniforms.” 305

Given the manner in which NRM had consolidated its authority in Acholiland, any armed
group that emerged to reverse this trend of events was potentially going to enjoy popular
support. However, it is important to note that while the people of Acholiland initially
supported insurgent activity, all four rebel groups that operated in this part of the country
did not enjoy the same levels of popular support. Borzello observes that unlike UPDA and
HSM I, LRA has enjoyed limited popular support among civilians in its theatres of
insurgent activity.
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In its formative stages, the group was popular among civilians in the

North because it was seen as a counterweight to the looting, rape and general harassment of
civilians orchestrated by government forces. However, when its brutal reaction to the
emergence of civil defence groups in Acholiland started outweighing that of the Ugandan
military, its popular support declined. 307

One of the more intriguing developments in the conflict in Northern Uganda is that the
decline in popular support for LRA did not trigger off an upsurge in support for the GoU.
In seeking to explain this paradox, Andrew Mwenda argues that the Acholi population is
caught between a rock and a hard place. Although LRA conducts terror in Acholiland, he
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observes that “it is ethnically connected” to the population in this part of the country. In
addition, Mwenda reasons that counterinsurgency measures that led to the creation of
Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) camps (which he equates to concentration camps)
position the GoU as an enemy of the Acholi people and the Uganda People’s Defence
Forces (UPDF) as an “occupation force.” 308

From the above discussion, we partially accept the hypothesis in this section. In its
formative phase, LRA enjoyed popular support because it was not only ethnically
connected to the Acholi but also strived to liberate them from perceived subjugation at the
hands of Southern Ugandans. However, we reject the notion that ethnic connections
sustained popular support throughout the life cycle of the group. In the 1990s, while still
ethnically connected to the Acholi people, LRA lost popular support for its insurgent
activities. However, this development neither precipitated an upsurge in popular support for
the GoU nor stopped LRA from using violence to access civilians and civilian
infrastructure.

The creation of poorly managed protected villages (that increased Acholi resentment
towards the GoU) and civil defence groups that triggered off LRA retaliatory attacks on
civilians combined to make the Acholi population passive participants in the conflict in
Northern Uganda. The Acholi people started resenting LRA and the GoU. We accept the
notion that popular support in Northern Uganda is partly contingent on the anticipated
outcome of the conflict in this part of the country. The Acholi joined civil defence groups
probably because they believed that in the long run, the GoU would win the war. However,
the GoU did not reap popular support from counter LRA measures for two reasons:

First, its counterinsurgency strategy only aimed at preventing LRA from accessing the
Acholi population. It did not specifically seek to cultivate support for the NRM
government. Thus, even in situations where units of the Ugandan army succeeded in
preventing LRA attacks on civilians, Acholi people living under squalid conditions in
Internally Displaced People’s camps resented the NRM government as much as they did
LRA. Second, despite the establishment of strategic hamlets in Acholiland, on a number of
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occasions, LRA managed to mount attacks on civilians. These breaches in security
undermined the Acholi people’s confidence in the GoU. However, in recent years, as part
of a concerted hearts and minds strategy aimed at winning the support of the Acholi
population, the NRM government has instituted a number of development programmes
geared towards resuscitating the economy of Northern Uganda. These programmes have
included among others the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP).
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4.2.2: PROPAGANDA
Given the fluid state of popular support underpinning the insurgency in Northern Uganda,
what propaganda strategy and tactics does LRA use to maintain a non-confrontational
connection with the population? In its communicational campaign against the Government
of Uganda (GoU), the group stresses the special position that Acholiland occupies in the
Ugandan polity. It markets its armed struggle among Acholi civilians by pinpointing factors
that have facilitated the decline in Acholi political power and proposing a set of measures
to reverse this trend. Although this strategy serves to arouse the consciousness of the
Acholi, its positive impact is potentially negated by attacks that the group mounts against
civilians in its theatres of insurgent activity.

LRA uses a communicational approach that attempts to rationalize the use of terrorism as a
prerequisite to the realization of an Acholi utopia. John an ex-LRA abductee reminisces
that “There was a kind of propaganda where Kony himself would talk to the children,
captives—that the Acholi are no more, they are not there, they are already killed, that
Joseph Kony will send out some soldiers to wipe out the whole community of Acholi
because they are not supporting him so he will continue sending his soldiers to kill them,
So for those captives who were there in Sudan, they will give birth in order to begin another
generation of Acholi because those that are there will all be killed.” 310

Although LRA has formulated a set of narratives (like the above) to communicate its
mission, a state of belligerence with the GoU constrains it in effectively using propaganda
to swing popular support in its favour. Because of the imbalance in military capabilities
tilted in favour of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, the group employs a terrorist
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strategy to psychologically disorientate the Ugandan state. However, this military approach
strains its relations with the population and constrains it in using non confrontational means
to market its agenda. On the other hand, periods of peace negotiations with the GoU present
the group with perhaps the best opportunity for marshalling propaganda.

Over the course of peace negotiations between the two sides, LRA has systematically
employed a propaganda strategy aimed at projecting itself as an honest peace-seeker whilst
portraying the GoU as a war-monger. Disagreements over security arrangements at venues
for peace talks allow the group to improve its image in the public through a calculated
extension of benevolence to GoU peace delegations. In 1993, LRA precipitated a stand off
with the GoU over security arrangements at the venue for peace negotiations. In the lead up
to the second round of meetings, Kony insisted that the government delegation should
arrive at the venue unescorted. 311

When the GoU delegation agreed to let Bigombe, the chief government negotiator meet the
LRA peace team, it was already dark and negotiations between the two parties could not
take place. Apparently, apprehensive of ‘enemies of peace’ scuttling the talks, George
Omona, LRA Field Commander dispatched 30 escorts to accompany Bigombe back to
Ugandan government controlled territory. 312 When a delegation of Ugandan leaders visited
the LRA base in Garamba Forest in North Eastern DRC in 2007, Kony noted that “I am
deeply concerned about your movements. I was worried because there are very many
reckless people who would like to destroy this chance. But by God’s grace, I am glad you
are here.” 313

On the surface, the goodwill gestures of Omona and Kony were confidence building
measures aimed at pushing peace processes forward. However, on closer inspection, these
may well have been propaganda techniques aimed at parading an alternate side to the
group’s modus operandi. Potentially, LRA marketed itself as capable of acting in the
interest of peace. In both cases, the group used word of mouth as an overt communicational
approach in areas it controlled to appear to be extending benevolence to its adversary.
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In communicating its negotiation positions at peace talks with the GoU, LRA positions
itself as selfless. This propaganda technique unsettles the government and puts it
awkwardly on the defensive. At a meeting between Kony and Bigombe on 11 th January,
1994, at Pagik in Gulu, Kony stated that LRA was setting no pre-conditions for the
negotiations in light of the fact that “…the children in the bush are not my children but
Acholi children” and appealed to the GoU to genuinely commit itself to the peace process
requesting for time to regroup his forces.
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By expressing readiness to release “Acholi

children” (LRA soldiers) back into their communities, LRA was ostensibly demonstrating
the willingness to sacrifice anything for the sake of peace in Northern Uganda. But by
tactfully tying demobilization to prior regrouping, the GoU was being pushed into a
situation where it would scuttle the peace talks on grounds that LRA intended to use the
negotiations period to prepare for a resumption in hostilities.

LRA equally exploits stand-offs over ceasefire agreements to parade its ostensible
selflessness. During the Juba peace talks, it took the first step in declaring a cessation of
hostilities between LRA and UPDF. Speaking on the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) on 4th August, 2006, Otti pronounced: “I, Lt Gen Vincent Otti, second-in-command
of the LRA High Command, do hereby declare a unilateral cessation of hostilities. I order
all our field commanders to, with immediate effect; cease all forms of hostilities against the
Uganda People’s Defence Forces positions.” 315

The unilateral declaration of a ceasefire by LRA put the GoU in an awkward position in
which it had to cautiously welcome a development that could either have pushed the Juba
peace talks forward or presented LRA with the opportunity of clandestinely using the
negotiations period to regroup. In cautiously reacting to Otti’s pronouncement, Ruhakana
Rugunda, the Minister for Internal Affairs and leader of the GoU peace delegation observed
that “We will wait and see what it means on the ground because previous ceasefires have
been abused.” 316

LRA appears to use overt propaganda techniques in enemy territory when three things
occur: Peace negotiations between the two sides collapse; Counterinsurgency operations
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resume; and its military capability increases. In April 1996, Lt Col Beba Beba Oola
addressed rallies in Aswa and Kilak counties of Acholiland in which he mooted LRA’s
conditional willingness to resume negotiations with the GoU.
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This development

unfolded two years after the collapse of the Bigombe diplomatic initiative, LRA starting to
receive military support from Sudan and the Ugandan army resuming counterinsurgency
operations against the group. By expressing willingness to re-negotiate with the GoU, LRA
used propaganda to achieve three objectives: First, to demonstrate that it was not a warmonger. Second, to ease counterinsurgency pressure on it by luring the GoU into peaceseeking reciprocity. Third, by attaching conditions to the resumption of peace talks, it
demonstrated its enhanced military capability and preparedness to follow the war path
should the GoU have rejected its peace overtures.

When negotiations take place in its backyard, LRA stage manages the treatment accorded
peace delegates and takes full advantage of the media presence to repair its organizational
image. For example, while hosting a delegation of Ugandan government leaders at the LRA
base in Garamba, North Eastern DRC in 2006 and conscious of the negative image that had
been constructed around the activities of his organization, Kony observed that “Now that
you have come here and seen that I am not a monster with huge eyes and a tail, you must
have confirmed that I am a human being. Go back and tell the people of northern Uganda
that I want nothing but peace.” 318

Whilst able to use a more open approach to communicating its position at its bases, in the
enemy’s backyard (areas under the control of the GoU), LRA employs more covert
methods. For example, in attempting to market LRA as a genuine peace-seeking party to
the Juba talks, in August 2006, Kony wrote letters to the Kings of Bunyoro and Toro in
which he appealed to these cultural institutions to “…make your contribution to peace
building in northern Uganda” and sought to “…reaffirm and reassure you of my total
commitment to the current peace talks in Juba. I hope the government in Kampala will do
the same.” 319
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Against this backdrop, we accept both the second and third hypotheses in this section. The
propaganda campaign of LRA is based on a drive to pinpoint political contradictions in the
Ugandan polity, arouse the consciousness of the Acholi people and rationalize the use of
violence as a means of recapturing their glorious place in Ugandan politics. In areas it
controls, LRA uses overt communicational techniques (rallies, stage managed meetings and
antics) to mask its capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions. In territories under
government control, the group employs covert methods to communicate its agenda.

Grace Matsiko, Managing Editor of the Kampala Dispatch news magazine reveals that at its
base in North Eastern DRC, the group had access to internet. The connection was unstable.
The rebels could not hang up an antenna due to the rainy weather conditions in this area. It
was not possible to establish the extent to which LRA used this technological facility to
wage communicational warfare against the GoU.

4.3: MOTIVATION AND ESPRIT DE CORPS
Section 4.1.2 unveiled the contrasting doctrines that Uganda People’s Democratic Army
(UPDA), Holy Spirit Movement I (HSM I) and Holy Spirit Movement II (HSM II)
bequeathed LRA. Given the centrality of the North-South divide to the evolution of armed
conflict in Northern Uganda, the re-definition of the Northern Question by HSM I and
HSM II tested the endurance of the original conflict discourse that had triggered off the
UPDA rebellion. Shifts in the development of ideology among Northern rebel groups
would also potentially affect their motivation. In this section, we test the hypothesis that
LRA fighters will have been motivated by idealistic and social considerations.

In its formative phase, LRA was motivated by idealistic considerations. Bevan observes
that “…there are powerful reasons for attributing the onset of the conflict to grievances that
permeated the Northern Ugandan population following the defeat of the UNLA in 1986.”
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When guerrillas of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) seized the reigns of state

power in 1986, the North lost control of the military for the first time in the postindependence history of Uganda. 321
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The way in which NRM consolidated its authority in the North motivated civilians in this
part of Uganda to violently resist the newly reconstituted Ugandan state. Colonel Ochora
observes that the activities of the 35th Battalion of NRA undermined the government’s
chances of winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the Acholi people.
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Also

known as Gungu and predominantly staffed with former members of the Uganda Freedom
Movement (UFM) and Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMU) guerrilla
groups, the 35th Battalion of the National Resistance Army (NRA) killed 35 civilians in
Namakora village, Kitgum district in 1986. In its actions, Gungu battalion (mainy staffed
by ethnic Baganda) was apparently motivated by the drive to revenge atrocities committed
in Luwero Triangle by the Acholi dominated Uganda National Liberation Army.
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According to Jackson, NRA engaged in “…systematic rape of both men and women,
usually in the presence of their families, the murder of civilians and the burying alive of
civilians by soldiers.” 324
Given the above developments, Bevan observes that “The North was fertile ground for
anyone recruiting resistance fighters for defence against Southern occupation.” 325 Jackson
asserts that the bare knuckled tactics employed by the 35th Battalion of NRA “…fed the
paranoia already rampant among the Acholi………….People became susceptible to the
belief that the end was near for the Acholi.” 326

It can be deduced that at its formative stage, the motivation of LRA was closely linked to
that of UPDA, HSM I and HSM II. All four groups were motivated by the drive to protect
the people of the North against potential extermination at the hands of Southern forces.
This survivalist motivation in turn fed into a nostalgic desire to reincarnate the Northern
hegemony in the politics of Uganda. In this context, after protecting the people of the North
against ethnic cleansing, LRA would have moved to seize back the reigns of state power
from the South.

Given the fact that the above motivation was tied to the ethnic survival of the people of the
North, severance in relations between LRA and the population in this part of the country
would potentially have undermined the levels of motivation in this guerrilla organization.
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Critical developments at its formative stage and changes in its military strategy upset the
original idealistic basis for motivation in LRA. The turf war between UPDA and LRA,
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the conclusion of the Pece Peace Accord that ended the UPDA rebellion 328 and the creation
of counter LRA civil defence groups in Acholiland 329 punctured the North-South divide as
a basis for motivation in LRA. With some sections of the Acholi population throwing in
their lot behind the government side, LRA was no longer in a position to realize voluntary
enlistment let alone motivation purely based on the drive to reverse the collapse of the
Northern hegemony. While the pioneering officer corps of the group was still committed to
contesting the emerging political and military dominance of the South, some of the freshly
recruited members had been abducted from communities that had already reconciled
themselves to the reconstituted political order in the country. At this stage of development,
LRA was faced with the enormous task of having to harmonize sharply contrasting
motivational tendencies within its ranks.

Most of the ex LRA combatants interviewed revealed that at the time of abduction, they
were more preoccupied with the desire to escape back into their communities than
participate in a violent campaign against the Government of Uganda. Brig Acellam reveals
that on several occasions, he unsuccessfully attempted to escape from LRA captivity.
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After being caught for the third time trying to escape, Col Otim decided to stay in LRA for
fear of being killed on a fourth attempt. 331 Capt Sande Otto decided to postpone his escape
attempts until circumstances were conducive. 332

It is worth noting that the first shifts in the motivation of LRA occured when Sudan started
extending external support to it. Bevan examines the relationship between LRA receiving
military support from Sudan and adopting a terrorist strategy: “…exploitation of the
population can be characterized as rent-seeking on two accounts….First, the LRA abducts
recruits from the population to sustain what has, in the past, proved a ‘marketable’
insurgency. Sudan provided military materiel and logistical support because the LRA was a
viable proxy force. The group’s leadership did not have to make a substantial bid for
control of the Ugandan state or any territory therein. There only requirement was to remain
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a thorn in the side of the Ugandan government and its SPLA allies.....Second, the LRA’s
use of the population as the target of its aggression generates the leadership’s only source
of political capital. The LRA has clearly orchestrated extreme acts of violence to afford its
leadership the maximum visibility…” 333

The strategic calculations of Khartoum partially influenced changes in the motivation of
LRA. By not supplying the rebel group with sufficient capability to overthrow the NRM
government, Sudan pushed LRA to adjust its motivation. Since its chances of seizing state
power were minimal, the drive to reverse the regional balance of power was no longer
feasible. The most vital necessity for the group then was maintaining its links with its
backer (Khartoum). LRA could please Sudan by destabilizing Uganda. The group could
achieve this objective at a relatively cheap cost. It could avoid the well armed Ugandan
military and instead attack unarmed civilians. LRA did not have to care about losing
popular support for two reasons: First, the Acholi people were increasingly turning their
backs on the group. So from LRA’s perspective, they deserved to be punished. Second, the
chances of the group capturing state power were diminishing. LRA did not have to worry
about its image as it did not envisage a situation where it would have to govern the country.
With survival the remaining plausible vocation, the group had to maintain its relations with
Sudan by destabilizing Uganda.

Since LRA was fast losing popular support among the Acholi people, it could no longer
count on voluntary financial contributions towards its insurgent campaign domestically.
Sudan itself was strategic in extending support to the group. It only supplied LRA with
enough materiel for destabilizing Uganda. In this regard, the motivation and calculations of
the rebel group had to change. LRA had to prioritize its survival as an organization. It had
to start looking beyond its alliance with the Government of Sudan (GoS). Given the
conditional manner in which the GoS rendered support, LRA could not rule out a situation
in future where Khartoum withdrew its assistance. In order to secure its survival, the group
had to try and assemble its own independent financial base. But domestically, LRA faced a
critical challenge: It had severed relations with the population. How was it going to build its
financial base? The group had two options: Either coerce the population into supplying it
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with funds or clandestinely conduct legal or illegal business to finance its insurgent
activities. LRA chose to pursue both options which precipitated an increase in attacks on
civilians and civilian infrastructure and a corresponding reduction in attacks targeting
government soldiers. There was one rationale underlying this approach: Unlike attacks on
infrastructure guarded by government soldiers, attacks on defenceless civilians presented
LRA with a cheaper option for coercively raising funds for its campaign. Citing examples
of the profit-driven activities of the group, Billie O’Kadamerie reports that “A wife of a
senior rebel commander is said to be running an eating house in Kitgum town and at
Atanga. The money is received from her husband…..In Gulu town, a kiosk is said to be run
by a relative of a senior rebel who even named the kiosk in honour of the rebel.” 334
From other dispatches by O’Kadamerie, it is evident that the conflict in Northern Uganda
was a much bigger profiteering venture for LRA that went beyond small scale businesses.
He points out that “An NRA officer who did not want to be named said NRA recently
tracked down former Uganda Democratic Christian Army (the forerunner to LRA) rebel
army commander Obitre Gama alias Atanasio Obite on the shores of Lake Kyoga. He had
started a thriving covert business after escaping with several tolas of gold and 30,000
dollars that was entrusted to him by Kony. While attempting to escape arrest, Obitre-Gama
was shot dead by NRA intelligence men.” 335
While the above examples point to a profiteering motivation, Bevan contends that “… it is
unclear what financial means Kony enjoys, but the fact that the LRA is not resourceextractive or commerce controlling, suggests he is unlikely to have financially profited
from the conflict substantially.” 336

If we accepted the propositions that LRA is motivated neither by the desire to re-establish
the Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics nor profiteering, what new set of factors are
then fuelling the LRA insurgency?

One of the principle obstacles to ending the conflict in Northern Uganda is the direct
benefits the leaders of the group derive from the rebellion. An ex-LRA combatant notes
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that “All the good food such as chicken, meat, goats, cows and groundnuts are given to
rebel commanders.” When abduction parties return from their expeditions, LRA rebel
commanders are at liberty to select female abductees of their choice. 337
According to Feldman, “It is doubtful that Kony, the son of peasant farmers and a school
drop out, could attain what he has outside of LRA. Indeed, for many of the rebel
commanders, the LRA has enabled them to acquire by force what they never would have
been able to earn through work.” However, a former LRA commander contends that the
“…material condition of LRA commanders has deteriorated 100%. They have lost a lot.
Most commanders are willing to negotiate because of this. If the government can give the
LRA a quarter or half of what it wants, we may as well take it.” 338

The loss of its guerrilla bases in Sudan and the DRC may have significantly denied LRA
sanctuaries for its leaders to enjoy the trappings of insurgent power. It then follows that a
completely different set of factors must be motivating the group. Angelo Izama argues that
the current motivation of the group is constructed around a survivalist strategy that seeks to
“keep” it “alive as long as possible,” “create a tribe of new believers” and settle in a new
haven. 339

Against this backdrop, we accept the hypothesis in this section. LRA has largely been
motivated by idealistic considerations. When it launched its insurgent campaign, it derived
its motivation from the conflict discourse that had precipitated the UPDA, HSM I and HSM
II rebellions (Figure 1). All four guerrilla groups were motivated by idealistic
considerations geared towards reversing the collapse of the Northern political hegemony in
Uganda. The sustenance of this motivation was contingent on the above rebel groups
cultivating and maintaining cordial relations with the population. The reincarnation of the
Northern hegemony would not only protect the people of Acholiland against potential
extermination at the hands of Southern forces but also reinstate the North as the dominant
region in Ugandan politics.
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We accept the section of the hypothesis that partly attributes the motivation of LRA to
social considerations. Shifts in popular support, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency
operations and the geo-political calculations of Sudan significantly altered the motivation
of LRA. Sudan extended limited and conditional material support to LRA. With this
assistance, the group lacked the capability to change government. As a result, the group
could not sustain its motivation based on the drive to reverse changes in the regional
balance of power. The emergence of self defence groups in Acholiland denoted dwindling
popular support for insurgent activities in this part of the country. With this development,
LRA could not bank on the population for voluntary support. In order to secure its survival,
the group then had to do two things: First, maintain its relations with Sudan by
destabilizing Uganda. Second, build an autonomous financial base to support the group just
in case its relations with Khartoum deteriorated. The above circumstances paved way for
profiteering to emerge as a motivation for LRA. The group needed funds to keep going as
long as it could.

The above changes in the motivation of LRA depended on Sudan continuing to offer the
group a sanctuary. When Uganda-Sudan relations improved, LRA lost its rear bases which
acted as sanctuaries for it to organize its profiteering enterprise. With the North-South
divide and profiteering (as motivational factors) rendered obsolete, the leadership of the
group is now left with two motivations—enjoy whatever remains of its trappings of
insurgent power and survive for as long as is possible. On the other hand, the rank-and-file
(mainly abductees) are motivated by the desire to survive until an opportunity for escape
arises. Both sets of motivation are not idealistic (and do not demonstrate ‘selflessness’ on
the part of LRA members). They border more on the social side of things and bring out the
‘selfish’ dimension to the motivation of the group’s members.

4.4: RECRUITMENT
As part of the drive to assemble its identity, an insurgent group needs to recruit members.
Mode of recruitment is an important barometric measure of the levels of popular support
that a guerrilla movement enjoys and the effectiveness of counterinsurgency campaigns
mounted by the state military apparatus. Higher levels of voluntary enlistment would
141

normally point to popular support for a rebel group while low numbers would either be an
indication of low levels of popular support for its activities or effective counterinsurgency
measures mounted against it.

Section 4.2.1 discusses shifts in popular support for LRA insurgent activities. We observed
that the creation of self defence groups and protected villages by the Ugandan state and the
adoption of a terrorist strategy by LRA have combined to deny the group popular support.
The central question in this section then is: How does LRA recruit its members without the
backing of civilians? In seeking to resolve this puzzle, we test the hypothesis that LRA will
have selectively recruited its members from civic groups and constituencies that are either
conscious and or targets of marginalization ostensibly perpetrated by the National
Resistance Movement (NRM) government.

At the stage of formation, LRA predominantly recruited its members from among military
officers who had served in the Obote and Okello regimes in Uganda. The collapse of the
Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics rendered most politicians and soldiers from the
North jobless and made rebellion against the reconstituted Ugandan state an attractive
vocation for some.

However, doctrinal differences among rebel groups fighting the NRM government pushed
LRA to adopt persuasive and coercive approaches to constituting its membership. After
reportedly praying for two weeks on Mount Odek in Gulu, Northern Uganda, in 1987,
Kony persuaded six boys and one girl to participate in an armed struggle against the GoU.
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If this account hold true, then Kony used persuasion to constitute the nucleus of his

group. Although UPDA and LRA were committed to reversing changes in the regional
balance of power in Uganda, UPDA pursued a secular ideological position that run into
conflict with the faith-based approach adopted by LRA.

In order to consolidate its position as the strongest rebel group in the North, LRA not only
engaged in bitter turf wars with UPDA and HSM II, but also forcefully recruited members
from these organizations. For example, following the signing of the UPDA-NRM Accord,
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Kony attacked the 100 remaining fighters of UPDA killing some and incorporating the rest
into his fighting group. The members of UPDA who were integrated into LRA were
graduates of prestigious universities and military academies like Sand Hurst in the United
Kingdom (UK). This group included among others Brig Justine Odong Latek, Lt Col
Basilio Opwonya, Lt Col Dr James Kweya, Lt Col Terensio Okullo, Lt Col Athocon, Lt
Col Mazoldi Lubangakene, Col Joseph Obonyo, Maj Kenneth Banya, Maj Stephen Moyi,
Maj Benjamin Apia and Lt Col Kaggwa. 341

By recruiting top calibre personnel, Kony potentially set the stage for a clash of egos within
LRA. While the above ex-commanders of UPDA boasted illustrious military careers, Kony
was merely a former altar boy who had had short stints as a Spiritual Advisor and Ritual
Assistant in UPDA
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and HSM I
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respectively. The differences in academic and

military background between the pioneering officer corps and those who joined LRA at a
later stage were potentially a recipe for schisms within the group.

However, in constituting the leadership of LRA, Kony ensured that former senior officers
of UPDA remained hierarchically peripheral to the structures of his movement. For
example Brig Latek was appointed to the ceremonial post of Chairman, Military Advisory
Board while other ex-UPDA officers took up sinecure responsibilities: Lt Col Okullo was
appointed Chief of Logistics and Engineering, Lt Col Athocon, Chief of Artillery and Air
Defence while Lt Col Dr Kweya assumed the position of Chief of Medical Services. 344

The above officers occupied positions more suited for a conventional military institution.
LRA was an unconventional armed group. At its stage of formation, it had neither the
military capability nor institutional capacity to warrant the appointment of Heads of
Artillery and Air Defence. O’Kadamerie provides a probable logic behind the
organizational structure of LRA: “….he (Kony) needed those who would not doubt his
mystic powers and preferred to use men without military experience or officer life…..”
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Thus, while seeking to appoint inexperienced and loyal cadres to sensitive positions in his
organization, Kony at the same time ensured that he depleted rival groups of their highly
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trained officer corps. It can be deduced that LRA first used coercive enlistment as a method
for consolidating its position on the conflict scene in Northern Uganda.

It is worth noting that although Kony used a coercive approach to conduct enlistment at the
stage of formation, all the target groups of LRA at that time were committed to armed
insurrection against the Government of Uganda. Ex-UPDA military officers had served in
the Uganda National Liberation Army (Uganda’s defunct national army). The collapse of
the NRM regime would potentially have paved way for them to regain their positions
within the structures of the Ugandan military establishment. Thus, although coerced into
joining LRA, ex-UPDA commanders were presented with an opportunity to fight to reclaim
their status.

However, a downswing in popular support presented the group with a recruitment dilemma:
Unlike the phase of formation where it had used persuasive and coercive methods to recruit
members from constituencies that resented the NRM government, beyond this stage, LRA
could only use a coercive approach to constitute its membership from communities
exhibiting divided loyalty. The conclusion of the Pece peace agreement between UPDA
and NRM in 1988
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meant that some sections of the Acholi population had started

disfavouring the prolongation of the conflict in Northern Uganda. Naturally, this segment
of Acholi society would not voluntarily join the group.

Consequently, in order to cope with negative shifts in popular support for its insurgent
activities, LRA adopted a recruitment model premised on the abduction of civilians, most
especially children. 347 Whereas young boys were forced to take up roles as fighters, young
girls were coerced into becoming “rebel wives” or “Ting Ting” (domestic servants). 348 The
enlistment of children by LRA raises a critical question: Why would it prefer recruiting
children to adults?
Borzello cites an ex-LRA commander who reveals that children are “nimble, easy to train
and quick to forget home.” 349 Recounting his abduction experience, a former child soldier
reinforces the above revelation: “…One of the rebels looked at me and said, ‘This boy,
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should we take him or leave him?’ They said, ‘Let’s go with him’. And they took me. My
brothers were not taken; they are older than me. So the rebels claim if they take someone
who is mature—who has got all the tactics of knowing their movements—he can plan and
easily escape. So with a child like me, they move with him in the bush and he gets confused
and lost. So it is better to take children.” 350

The observations of the ex-LRA commander and the experiences of the child soldier
mentioned above point to certain strategic calculations in the recruitment approach that
LRA employs: It recruits those who are “nimble” and “easy to train”
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because they

potentially fit into the LRA organizational model. Since the group operates highly
centralized structures, the recruitment of manipulable individuals eases the task of
indoctrination which in turn facilitates effective command and control within the guerrilla
organization.

It is also important to note that in the long term, young recruits present Kony with a more
reliable alternative to existing leadership dispositions within the structures of LRA.
Whereas at the stage of formation, he had to strike a balance between recruiting adult
officers with questionable credentials and those boasting illustrious military careers,
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young abductees who have matured over the years have in recent times presented him with
a pool of loyal, highly indoctrinated and potentially appointable members.

Kony has fast tracked the career progression of a number of former child soldiers probably
as a way of limiting the influence of members of LRA who joined the organization as
adults. For example, Maj Gen Dominic Ongwen, a member of Control Alter, the supreme
military organ of LRA, is a former child soldier. Lt Col Otim, 353 Brigadier Acellam 354 and
Capt Sande Otto 355 were all conscripted into the LRA fighting force at a tender age.

Given the strategic advantage in enlisting young children to beef up the troop strength of
LRA, what theatres of abduction would present the rebel group with the best opportunity
for recruiting a high number of children? LRA has predominantly constituted homes,
schools and gardens into theatres for conducting abductions. Victor, a former LRA fighter
145

recounts his abduction experiences: “They came during night time while I was asleep with
my brothers,” while Peter, another ex LRA combatant reminisces: “So I had gone to the
fields to cultivate and I was abducted there.” 356 Homes and schools are strategic sanctuaries
for children. At homes, children are a constituent part of families. Targeting homes allows
LRA to recruit from primary sources (the families into which children are born). However,
unlike in families, at schools recruits (children) are regimented according to age sets
(classes). This regimentation allows rebel units to target specific age sets for enlistment.

It is also important to note that while homes and schools are ideal recruitment targets for
LRA, the state could deploy forces at these places and limit the group in conducting its
enlistment. With the state demonstrating the capacity to block recruitment at primary
sources, LRA would then only target civilians roaming the areas lying between the primary
sources. In this case, it would have to waylay children on their way to or from homes or
schools or gardens. Capt Sande Otto of LRA was abducted while on his way to school.

357

Although not a very effective approach, recruitment from secondary sources (along roads,
in gardens) accords LRA two tactical advantages:

First, the rebels can employ the principle of ambush to waylay and abduct unsuspecting
children. Second, at secondary sources (unless in situations where civilians are escorted by
military convoys), LRA units require minimal force to conduct forced recruitment. Unlike
schools and Internally Displaced People’s (IDPs) camps where LRA units could encounter
resistance mounted by Home Guards or UPDF units, along highways, foot-paths and in
farming fields, LRA would abduct civilians without engaging in gun battles. This approach
allows the group to conserve its ammunition and save it for fire fights with the Ugandan
military.

We have mainly discussed the modalities that facilitate the random recruitment of civilians
into LRA. Our analysis has mainly focussed on situations where LRA units target primary
and secondary recruitment sources without knowing the identities of those who will end up
being recruited. At this juncture, a question arises: Does random forced recruitment meet
all of the manpower needs of LRA?
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In situations where the group is unable to attract specialized personnel through voluntary
enlistment or forced random recruitment, a manpower gap may emerge within its
organizational structures. The group has plugged such gaps by conducting selective forced
enlistment. While on work leave in Kiryandongo, in Masindi district, in Western Uganda
and on the instigation of his relatives in LRA, Lt Col Francis Okwangalero, who had served
as a Training Instructor in UNLA and NRA, was specifically abducted in 1996 to
strengthen the training capability of LRA. 358 On other occasions, elements within the LRA
leadership corps have conducted selective forced recruitment for personal reasons. For
instance, on the orders of Otti Lagony, the then Deputy Leader of LRA, Capt Otto Sande
was abducted because he was in a position to provide Lagony with information about his
sister, Amela. Amela was Capt Otto Sande’s teacher. 359

As noted in the introduction to this section, negative shifts in popular support have affected
the manner in which LRA conducts its recruitment. This state of affairs means that LRA is
potentially unable to sustain its recruitment drives. However, a closer examination of the
enlistment and attendant manpower statistics of LRA upsets the above assumption. The
group has consistently demonstrated the propensity to replenish its manpower base with
civilian (especially child) abductees. Borzello notes that by 1989, LRA had abducted
30,000 civilians of whom 20,000 were children under the age of 18. Bearing in mind that
Operation North had significantly dented its capacity to wage war, in the aftermath of this
counterinsurgency campaign, LRA was expected to experience a serious manpower
shortage.
However, the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) estimates that
between 1990 and 2001, the group abducted 28,902 civilians from the districts of Gulu,
Kitgum, Pader, Apac and Lira. Of these abductees, 10,000 were children. Operations Iron
Fist I and II did not prevent LRA from conducting abductions either. Between 2002 and
2004, the group abducted 10,000 more children. 360

In explaining the mode of recruitment adopted by LRA in the pre-terrorist phase of its
campaign, we accept the hypothesis in this section. At the stage of formation, LRA
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recruited its members from among ex-soldiers of the defunct UNLA who had lost their jobs
in the aftermath of the NRM takeover in 1986. The emergence of LRA as the most
powerful rebel group violently championing the reincarnation of the Northern hegemony in
Ugandan politics made voluntary and quasi-voluntary (as in the case of ex-UPDA officers
who were conscripted into LRA) enlistment into the group an attractive vocation. In this
connection, the realization of higher recruitment numbers depended on the continued
relevance of the North-South divide to the armed conflict in Northern Uganda.

In this analysis, it can also be asserted that there is a link between the onset of
counterinsurgency operations and the decline in LRA recruitment numbers. In a period of
two years, between 1987 and 1989 (before the onset of Operation North), LRA abducted
30,000 civilians. In a period of 11 years, between 1990 and 2001 (interspersed with a series
of effective counter LRA campaigns), LRA abducted 28,902 civilians (nearly the number
abducted in two years prior to the onset of Operation North). The above statistics indicate
that on average, LRA recruited fewer members annually between 1990 and 2001 than it did
between 1987 and 1989.

From the foregoing discussion, we partially accept the hypothesis in this section.
Originally, while it enjoyed cordial relations with the population, LRA predominantly
recruited its members from among Northerners who had either lost their positions in the
Ugandan governmental setup, been or expected to be victims of the South’s drive to
consolidate its position of power in the North. However, contrary to the theories of guerrilla
warfare, recruiting from an insurgency savvy constituency did not guarantee LRA
voluntary enlistment. Due to ideological differences in its targeted recruitment
constituencies, LRA had to employ persuasive and coercive means to populate its
structures. We partially rejected the hypothesis on grounds that in subsequent phases of its
insurgent campaign, LRA did not recruit from insurgency savvy constituencies. The group
has been enlisting members lacking ideological commitment to its cause. Although its
conscripted recruits lack commitment to its armed struggle, the use of indoctrination based
on terror mitigates mass defections from LRA.
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Having examined the pillars supporting the identity of LRA, in the next chapter, this thesis
turns to the dynamics that facilitate the operationalization of its insurgent activities.
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CHAPTER 5

TESTING THE INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES OF LRA: OPERATIONAL

5.1: TRAINING

5.1.1: INDUCTION AND TRAINING
The foregoing chapter looked at the key insurgent attributes of LRA that shape its identity.
The group’s ideology, motivation and esprit de corps, propaganda and popular support and
mode of recruitment were examined. Over the course of the armed conflict in Northern
Uganda, the evolution of the identity of LRA has generated an insurgent culture replete
with unique ideals, values and norms notwithstanding similarities to previous insurgencies
in terms of grievances and aims. LRA has to transmit this organizational culture among its
fresh recruits predominantly coming from a non-insurgent background. In this context, the
adoption of an effective induction and training regimen has become indispensable to the
operationalization of the group’s activities.

This section tests the hypothesis that LRA will either have designed or adopted a training
model commensurate with its military strategy and tactics and one that imparts combat and
non-combat skills. The objective will be to test this hypothesis on the mode of induction
and training used by the group before assessing how the group manages the career
progression of its new members. This approach will furnish the study with insights into the
strategy and tactics that LRA uses to integrate its initiates and maintain cohesion within its
structures.

The imbalance in military capabilities favouring the Ugandan state military apparatus
pushes LRA to amalgamate the basic training and military operational components of its
insurgent activity. Cheney cites the example of a female LRA abductee: “Chancy was not
taken to Sudan right away, but she was trained to shoot a weapon over the course of one
month and was forced to loot villages and homesteads as they made their way through Gulu
and Kitgum districts.”
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The above training approach accords LRA three advantages: First, it saves it time. Instead
of waiting to get back to bases outside Uganda to train its recruits, LRA units can undertake
field operations and capacity building simultaneously. Second, this training approach gives
fresh LRA recruits first hand practical combat experience. Third, field-based training and
induction increases the troop strength of field operational units of the group. Recruits who
learn the art of insurgency immediately after being abducted are rapidly transformed into
quasi-fighters who can take on government forces before even reaching the guerrilla bases.
However, this approach is not without disadvantages: LRA operational units will
potentially be placed in danger given the lack of fighting ability among fresh recruits and
the lack of time to weed out those who are unsuited to insurgent activity.

Given the centrality of ideology to the execution of insurgencies, LRA attaches importance
to indoctrination as an integral part of its training regimen.
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Capt Sande Otto’s induction

programme commenced with a trip to the ‘Yard’ or church where he was given a white
stone and had ‘Moo Yaa’ shea butter oil smeared on his body. He was subsequently
forbidden from drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes and eating mutton or pork. 363

Offering further insights into the shape of indoctrination in the group, a former LRA fighter
notes that “If they’ve just abducted you, they smear you with oil in the sign of the cross, on
your forehead and on your chest…After we had been with them for three weeks, they drew
a picture of a large heart in the ground, and divided it into thirty squares. They told us to
bathe and remove our blouses and remain bare-chested. They told each of us to stand in one
of the squares. They dipped an egg in a mixture of white powder and water, and drew a
heart on our chests and backs. They also made a sign of the cross on our foreheads
and…across our lips. Then they poured water on us. [A leader] said what they were doing
was written in the Bible. Another man told us they were doing this for our protection.” 364
Francis, another ex-LRA combatant reminisces that “There was a lot of killing of children.
Whoever tries to escape will be killed. For walking straight ahead, you will be killed and
even for a minor mistake children will be severely tortured.” 365
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The above initiation experiences point to some of the more strategic functions of training in
LRA. The paramountcy of religious indoctrination over military training nurtures LRA
recruits into becoming fearless fighters. LRA recruits are predisposed to fighting fearlessly
because they believe that God is on their side.

The amalgamation of orthodox Christian and traditional Acholi religious practices brings
forth a bizarrely unique doctrine that LRA recruits cannot intellectually challenge. While
they may be knowledgeable on the workings of Christianity or traditional Acholi religion, a
combination of the two religious practices makes it difficult for recruits to interpret the
group’s doctrine. With the leadership corps of the group acting as the intellectual
custodians of the hybrid doctrine, recruits into LRA are highly susceptible to manipulation.

The execution of would-be LRA escapees acts as a contingency measure. An abductee
unconvinced about the validity of the group’s doctrine would not easily escape back into
their community given the harsh penalties that LRA has instituted to mitigate attempted
defections.

However, whilst constituting an important part of the training regimen of the group, it is
worth noting that religious indoctrination does not equip LRA recruits with the skills for
physically fighting government forces. Ultimately, the recruits require training in combat
tactics and weapons use. In light of the imbalance in training capabilities disfavouring
LRA, what are its capacity building priorities?

The group subjects the bulk of its recruits to basic military training commensurate with its
drive to selectively engage the national army. After completing a three month religious
induction course, Brig Acellam was subjected to basic military training that equipped him
with knowledge on the principles of attack and military drills.
taught how to use a gun and participate in military parades.

366

367

Capt Sande Otto was

While strategically and

tactically operating differently from conventional armies, as a guerrilla group, LRA largely
remains a military institution.
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In this sense, like combatants serving in conventional armies, recruits of the group need to
learn how to load and use guns, match into and retreat from a theatre of combat. At this
stage, it is worth observing that while basic military training accords the group the essential
expertise needed for insurgent operations, over the years, the expansion in the scope of its
strategic objectives has pushed it to seek expertise in specialized areas. Its relocation to
Southern Sudan not only accorded it territory and the opportunity to assemble para- state
structures but also exposed it to potential enemy attack. In a bid to prepare for future set
piece battles with Ugandan government forces, LRA sought to enhance its conventional
military capability by sending its officers to Khartoum, Sudan for specialized training. For
example Lt Col Okwangalero undertook specialized training in the use of landmines and
time bombs 368 while Brig Acellam acquired the expertise needed to operate SPG9 anti-tank
missiles. 369

Based on information provided by former commanders of LRA, the following deductions
can be made in relation to capacity building in the group: Training in LRA is an ongoing
process that starts immediately after one has been abducted and continues while one serves
in the rebel force; Induction for freshly recruited members follows a systematic pattern:
Recruits first learn to accommodate the idea of death and dread that of defection and
thereafter, acquire the basic and specialized skills for fighting. Whereas basic military
training is mandatory for all recruits, Lt Col Okwangalero, the former Head of Training of
LRA reveals that only those with exceptional talent go on to pursue specialized training. 370

On the basis of the above analysis, we accept the hypothesis in this section. LRA has
adopted a mode of training that is in tandem with its condition of relative military weakness
vis-à-vis the Uganda People’s Defence Forces. In this respect, training in the group aims to
mould fighters that are capable of engaging in serialized campaigns against the Ugandan
military. The non-combat training model of LRA is geared towards achieving three
objectives: First, it inculcates the ideals and values of the group among its recruits. Second,
it psychologically prepares new members for the rigours of combat. Third, it emotionally
detaches fresh recruits from their old communities, minimizes defections and facilitates
integration and cohesion within the organizational structures of the group.
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5.1.2: CAREER PROGRESSION
Since LRA mainly conscripts children who lack ideological commitment to its struggle, the
group potentially faces challenges in integrating them into its structures. In this direction,
this section seeks to address some key questions: How well do new members of LRA
embrace its insurgent culture? At what point do freshly recruited members start consciously
participating in the insurgent activities of the group? What organizational and career
progression incentives does LRA use to facilitate the full integration of its members?
Answers to the above questions will show whether the training model adopted by LRA
provides a foundation for the effective integration of its newly recruited members.

While LRA is in a position to conduct abductions and allocate abductees to its fighting
units, preliminary indoctrination notwithstanding, its recruits psychologically struggle to
embrace its insurgent culture. Discussing the dynamics underpinning recruitment and
integration into LRA, Angela Veale and Aki Stavrou identify two phases in the emotional
transition of the group’s initiates:

During the first phase, abductees are still emotionally attached to the old order (the normal
lives they led in their communities) and resist emotional integration into the structure and
workings of the new order (the abnormal lives they are beginning to lead while in LRA
captivity). At this stage, Veale and Stavrou observe that “…there is still the existence of
‘us,’ the abducted children and of ‘them,’ the rebel commanders.” 371 Although allocated to
different LRA fighting units, freshly recruited members nostalgically harbour defection
plans. However, the twin fear of having no family to return to and the prospects of being
tried for atrocities they were forced to commit by LRA operational units is one of two
factors that mitigates against defections from the rebel force.

The other relates to LRA inhibiting negative shifts in its manpower levels by preventing the
collective crystallization of abductee nostalgia. Veale and Stavrou argue that “any solidarity
children may feel because they share the same plight or are from the same village was
systematically and brutally broken down as children were forced into positions of extreme
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isolation. All former abductees interviewed said they felt they could not trust anyone while
in the LRA.” 372

During the second phase, LRA institutes its preliminary career progression incentives that
facilitate the start of emotional transition among its freshly recruited members. Veale and
Stavrou observe that “The military uniform served as a powerful external symbol that also
created internal conflict for abductees. This is captured in the way the youth struggled to
express the identity transition they had experienced: ‘I didn’t want to be a soldier’ is
followed by ‘but when I became a soldier.’ There are rewards to this identity transition:
Beatings and violence became less and having a gun conferred power, in contrast to the
complete powerlessness of the new abductee.” 373

It is worth observing that assenting to initial career progression in LRA does not
necessarily denote a genuine embrace of the insurgent culture and practice of the group.
Veale and Stavrou note that in certain situations, “Resistance to this identity is conveyed
through their perception that their identity is imposed. It is likely that some abductees adopt
a survival strategy within the LRA of identification with the aggressor and move to a
position of fuller participation.” 374

It can be deduced that quasi-integration into the organizational structures of LRA manifests
at that point where freshly recruited members are accorded the first set of career
progression incentives. However, at that material stage, the survivalist strategy adopted by
some of the new members potentially exposes the group to defections in future. In this case,
the manner in which LRA institutes additional career progression incentives (as well as
disincentives for leaving) determines the extent to which its manpower levels will be
affected by defections.

How then does LRA dispense additional career progression incentives? The group subjects
all its freshly recruited members to the same promotional benchmark. Career progression
for a new member of LRA is characterized by a gradual shift from handling less sensitive to
critically sensitive affairs. For example, Brig Acellam graduated from serving as a Security
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Officer in LRA for four years to heading the Operations Room at the LRA headquarters (in
his capacity as Chief of Staff).

375

Lt Col Okwangalero went from acting as a training

instructor for Kony’s body guards to commanding the LRA supremo’s protection unit. 376

The apparent existence of universal opportunities for advancement for those who can
demonstrate their worth mitigates mass defections from LRA and accords members of the
rebel group the opportunity of pursuing a career within its structures. Capt Apiire’s rise to
the helm of the LRA chaplaincy is attributed to the stellar performances he posted at the
group’s prayer functions while he was still a freshly recruited member. 377

Given the high risks inherent in an insurgent career, members of LRA are constantly
exposed to death and fatal injury. The onset of physical injury to a serving officer of the
group raises a pertinent question: As a guerrilla organization, LRA operates on a thin
resource base. Normally, the group would be hard pressed spending its scarce resources
maintaining a fatally injured or terminally ill rebel officer or fighter.

However, in seeking to institute career security within its structures, LRA does not alter the
career progression of its injured members. Although he had been interned among women
and children after sustaining injuries in combat, Brig Acellam was appointed to the LRA
team that engaged the Government of Uganda in peace negotiations held at Palabek in
Kitgum in Northern Uganda in 1994.
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It is also imperative to observe that security in

career progression is not only a preserve of the officer corps of LRA. As part of its terms
for participating in the 1993 peace talks, LRA demanded that the Government of Uganda
treats all its injured fighters.

379

Recovery from injury presented LRA fighters with the

opportunity of reactivating their insurgent careers or embarking on post-insurgency
activities. Subsequently, they would be in a good position to seek promotion within the
organizational structures of the group or the Ugandan state (in the aftermath of a negotiated
settlement to the conflict).

The theoretical review in Chapter 2 underscores the connection between politics and war.
In this regard, the ultimate objective of insurgents is to overthrow seating governments. The
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future control of the reigns of state power demands prior organizational preparation. In
seeking to meet this requirement, insurgent groups organizationally try to mirror the groups
they intend to replace and the institutions they intend to seize. In this context, Lt Col
Kulaigye observes that general promotions in LRA occur immediately after those in the
Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF).
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By building and maintaining a promotional

model similarly parallel to that of UPDF, LRA psychologically positions itself at a level of
parity with Ugandan government forces. This career progression disposition accords
promoted members of the LRA officer corps inflated seniority status and an attendant
vested stake in the organization.

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that LRA uses its career progression model
to mitigate the challenges it faces in integrating freshly recruited members into its
structures. Although the use of fear helps in the allocation of recruits to different fighting
units of LRA, initially, the new members struggle to embrace the insurgent culture of the
group. This potentially exposes LRA to future defections. In order to prevent negative
shifts in its manpower levels, the group systematically introduces promotional incentives at
different stages in the careers of its freshly recruited members. In the long term, members
of LRA who commence their careers as insurgent misfits, embrace its culture and end up
becoming dyed-in-the-wool adherents.

5.2: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Sections 4.4, 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 examine the mode of recruitment, induction, training and
career progression of LRA members respectively. Like all armed groups, LRA cannot
effectively attain the above objectives without an organizational framework. The structures
of an insurgent group define its tiers of leadership and map the paths for the career
progression of its members. Since an insurgent group draws personnel to populate its
structures from its pool of recruits, in this section, an assessment of the composition and
troop strength of LRA is useful in determining the wealth of manpower resources at its
disposal.
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5.2.1: COMPOSITION

5.2.1.1: Ethnicity
The composition of an insurgent group not only reflects the ethnic, religious and political
constituencies that support its activities but also the place of gender in the prosecution of its
armed struggle. The ethnic composition of LRA reflects the enduring centrality of the
North-South divide
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to the manifestation of armed conflict in Northern Uganda and the

transnational nature of the group’s insurgent activities. Until the start of counterinsurgency
Operations Iron Fist and Lightening Thunder, LRA was predominantly staffed with Acholis
and Langis from the North and Itesots from the East.
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Although inhabiting Eastern

Uganda, politically (especially during the first and second Obote regimes), the Itesots were
in alliance with the Acholis and Langis. All these three tribes (Acholis, Langis and Itesots)
are united by a common Nilotic ancestry as opposed to the Bantu ancestry that
characterizes some of the tribes in Eastern Uganda and all those in the South.
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However, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations inside Uganda has grossly
limited LRA’s capacity to conduct recruitment in the above tribal areas. Left with no other
option for replenishing its manpower levels, the group has had to conduct forced enlistment
in Southern Sudan, North Eastern DRC and South Eastern CAR. In terms of composition,
Lt Gen Koreta of Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) observes that LRA has since
ceased being a Ugandan and graduated into a “regional group.” 384

Changes in the ethnic composition of LRA potentially expose Kony to an internal coup.
Most of the group’s recent recruits do not speak Acholi and as a result, a communicational
gap may emerge between Acholi speaking LRA officers and non-Acholi speaking LRA
fighters. Whereas Acholis still dominate the top echelons of the group, the increasing
depletion of the officer corps of LRA (through death and defections) leaves Kony with the
tricky option of having to promote non-Acholis to top positions within his organization.
With a gap in ethnic connections emerging between Kony and the reconstituted officer
corps, he can no longer count on loyalty to him based on ethnicity.

164

5.2.1.2: Gender
While largely seeking to restrict female abductees to non-combat activities, LRA has left
the doors open for talented and skilled female members of the rebel group to assume roles
as fighters. Brig Acellam reveals that while most LRA units are staffed with males, there
are some mixed units with female fighters. He cites the example of an exceptional female
fighter who rose to the rank of Captain in LRA.
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By allowing women to participate in

combat operations, LRA is in a position to harness all its human resources to push its
violent campaign forward.

5.2.1.3: Age
In the discussion on recruitment, we noted some of the strategic advantages inherent in
LRA targeting children for enlistment. An ex-LRA commander observes that children are
“nimble, easy to train and quick to forget home.” 386 His position is validated by the account
of Capt Apiire who underscores Kony’s uneasiness in working with adult members of the
group. On one occasion, for questioning the brutal tactics employed by LRA, Apiire (who
was conscripted into LRA as an adult) was lashed three hundred times with a whip.

387

Whereas there is broad empirical consensus on LRA choosing to predominantly use child
soldiers, a debate on the exact number of young abductees within its ranks generates
conflicting figures. While Veale and Stavrou observe that children constitute 90% of the
fighting force of the group,
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Jackson Achama, Kony’s former Personal Secretary

maintains that only 10 to 15% of child abductees are still in LRA captivity. 389

There is one probable explanation for the above conflicting statistics. There may be a fluid
interface between recruitment and defection in LRA. The group realizes high child
enlistment numbers as it does defections and rescues. The composition of LRA can be
attributed to two factors: First, the interaction between the strategic recruitment objectives
of the group and the political contradictions fuelling the insurgency in Northern Uganda.
This interface yields the ethnic, gender and age-based elements in its composition. Second,
the transnationalization of the insurgent activities of LRA which has recently widened the
base of its ethnic composition. Ultimately, however, LRA constitutes its membership by
recruiting wherever and whomever they can limited only by constraints placed upon them.
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5.2.2: TROOP STRENGTH
The foregoing section throws up some of the challenges in examining the organization of
insurgent campaigns. In the case of LRA, scholars and counterinsurgency officers not only
struggle to estimate its ethnic, gender and age-based composition, but also the actual size of
its fighting force. In relation to troop strength, the divergence in opinion arises from two
premises:

First, there is a thin line separating fully fledged fighters from those undertaking noncombat duty. In LRA, every recruit is potentially in a position to assume a fighting role.
Yet, not every member of the group regularly fights. 390

Second, as discussed in the previous section, the composition of LRA may be shaped by
simultaneous forced mass enlistment and mass defections and rescues. 391 In this context, it
is a challenging task determining how many freshly recruited members go on to assume
fighting roles and how many recruits-cum-fighters LRA loses in defections and abductee
rescue missions conducted by UPDF.

Borzello asserts that LRA is generally a small insurgent organization. Whereas the
Ugandan military establishment estimates the troop strength of the group never to have
exceeded 5,000 fighters, LRA puts its troop strength at a figure closer to 10,000 fighters. 392
Robert L Feldman points out that Kony commands “a few hundreds to several thousands”
of fighters.
fighters.
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393

Jeroen Adam et al estimate LRA’s troop strength at between 500 and 5,000

At its formative stage, O’Kadamerie notes that Kony commanded a staggering

10,000 fighters. 395 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that by
1990, the troop strength of LRA had dwindled to between 3,000 and 4,000 fighters.
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By

1997, James Bevan notes that the size of LRA had swelled to 5,000 fighters. 397

When he surrendered to government forces in 2005, Brig Sam Kolo, the former Spokesman
for LRA estimated the size of LRA at between 400 and 500 rebels (fighters, women and
children inclusive). 398 At the time of the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
between LRA and the Government of Uganda (GoU) in 2006, LRA asked the Government
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of Southern Sudan (GoSS) to supply it with food for feeding 5,000 fighters. According to
Borzello, diplomats who visited the LRA base in Garamba forest in DRC during the Juba
peace talks in 2007 observed that Kony probably commanded a force of “...about 5,000
rebels, perhaps half of whom are women and children.”
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Although Kony is currently

estimated to command a force of between less than 500 and 700 fighters, the group insists
its troop strength stands at 1,000. 400

Figure 2

Although the debate on the troop strength of the group generates divergent opinions, we
can attempt an interpretation of the statistics. We analyze the first set of figures quoted by
O’Kadamerie, LRA and the Ugandan military together because they relate to the same
phase of the group’s campaign. According to O’Kadamerie, (at the formative stage of
LRA) Kony commanded 10,000 troops. The Ugandan military asserts that (at its peak)
LRA was a 5,000 man force. At its peak, the group insists it had 10,000 fighters. In terms
of size, LRA is likely to have been at its largest (peak) at the formative stage. The group
enjoyed popular support and the government had not yet launched Operation North that
significantly depleted its manpower base.
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Given the role of propaganda in asymmetric

conflicts, the government and the rebels may have understated and overstated the troop
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strength of LRA respectively. In constructing Figure 2, we have quoted 10,000 because this
figure is adduced by two sources. In this sense, we have been swayed by the need to
triangulate evidence.
We have not used the statistics adduced by Feldman (“a few hundreds to several
thousands”) and Adam et al (500 to 5,000) to construct Figure 2 because these figures relate
to the whole life cycle of LRA. With these numbers, it is difficult to determine the specific
size of the rebel army at the different stages of its campaign. The IISS provides a figure for
1990 (3,000). With this, we can attempt an explanation for the decline in the troop strength
of LRA [Figure 2]. The effectiveness of counterinsurgency Operation North may have
undermined the group’s capacity to wage war and recruit inside Uganda.
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By 1997, the

size of LRA had shot up to 5,000 fighters (from 3,000) [Figure 2] With Sudan supporting
LRA, the group enhanced its military capability
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and capacity to conduct abductions

inside the country.

The dwindling of the troop strength of LRA in 2005 (from 5,000 to 400 fighters) [Figure 2]
may be attributed to the effectiveness of Operations Iron Fist I and II that dislodged the
group from Southern Sudan,
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precipitated its relocation to North Eastern DRC and

curtailed its capacity to recruit and train fighters inside Uganda and Southern Sudan. The
upswing in the troop strength of the group in 2007 (from 400 to 5,000 fighters) [Figure 2]
may be attributed to one of two reasons: LRA may have used the lull in fighting occasioned
by the onset of the Juba peace process to beef up its troop numbers. In the event this figure
is inaccurate, then the group inflated its troop strength to secure and stock food (supplied by
the GoSS) ahead of a planned resumption of hostilities with Ugandan government forces.
405

In the aftermath of Operation Lightening Thunder, estimates of the group’s troop strength
range between less than 500 and 1,000. IISS estimates the size of LRA at between less than
500 and 700 fighters. This figure appears to exclude non-fighting members of the group.
Although for propaganda reasons, LRA may have overstated its strength (1,000), we adopt
this figure because it appears to accommodate the fighting and non-fighting members of
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LRA. In other words, the group may have had about 700 fighters (assuming the IISS figure
is accurate) and approximately 300 non-fighters (assuming the LRA figure is accurate).
The decline in the troop strength of LRA (from 5,000 to 1,000 fighters) [Figure 2] may be
attributed to the effectiveness of Operation Lightening Thunder that destroyed most of its
insurgent infrastructure and undermined its capacity to recruit and train fighters inside
Uganda, Southern Sudan and North Eastern DRC. 406

The above analysis points to regular shifts in the manpower levels of LRA. Whereas
counterinsurgency operations have significantly affected its troop strength, an attempt at
figuring out the actual number of LRA fighters demobilized by these campaigns generates
conflicting outcomes. The International Crisis Group attributes this problem to the different
approaches used in determining its troop strength. Whereas some figures incorporate
women and children into the estimated size of LRA, others only reflect the number of men
under arms. 407

5.2.3: STRUCTURE
Based on the analysis in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, it can be asserted that LRA assembles its
structures from a pool of predominantly male recruits drawn from the Northern and Eastern
parts of Uganda. The number of members that populate the organizational structures of the
group depends on the effectiveness of prevailing counterinsurgency operations, LRA’s own
popularity and its use of terrorism against its own people. This section tests the hypothesis
that LRA will have evolved as a politico-military organization characterized by a structural
separation of functions, with its armed wing subordinated to its political wing.

Up until the commencement of the Juba peace process, LRA lacked established tiers of
leadership devoted to articulating its political objectives. Although in the formative phase
of the LRA insurgency, there was an attempt to create a political/external wing of LRA,
Kony resisted this move. O’Kadamerie observes that exiled politicians hailing from
Acholiland such as Otema Allimadi, Dr Benjamin Obonyo, Prof O Bwangamoi, and Col
Owiny Omoya “…wanted to be recognised as Kony’s political chiefs but insisted that Kony
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changes the name of the rebel group ‘to something else more acceptable, not Holy…’” The
LRA head rejected the idea preferring to maintain total control over his forces. 408

By the onset of the Juba peace process, LRA lacked a coherent political cadreship to
negotiate with the Ugandan government. Consequently, it had to constitute sections of the
Acholi community in exile into the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM) (its political/
external wing) to take part in the talks.

However, this move was not without drawbacks: The political and military wings of the
group operated at variance with each other. This significantly affected the progress of the
Juba peace process. Jackson cites two factors that drove a wedge between the two organs:
“…the old rift of 1993 between those who are in the Acholi diaspora and those led by
Kony…;” the fact that there is “…little agreement between them (the two LRA camps) as
to the aims of the negotiations and more specifically, what Kony wants out of any peace
agreement, particularly given the existence of warrants from the International Criminal
Court on him and his associates.” 409 Matsiko shows the extent of the disconnect between
the political and military wings of LRA. He observes that “Several members of the 15member LRA delegation are viewed by some elements in Kampala and Juba as not being
truly representative of Kony and his fighters. A number of the delegation members flew
into Juba either from London or Nairobi where they live.” 410

Despite the rather late evolution of a political wing (LRM), the military wing played a more
decisive role in asserting the position of LRA at the Juba peace talks. According to Henry
Okello Oryem, Uganda’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and a member of the Uganda
Government peace delegation, LRA (the military wing) maintained its position of preeminence because Kony could not rule out some members of LRM (the political/external
wing) colluding with the International Criminal Court (ICC) to have him tried for allegedly
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
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In order to audit the activities of LRM, LRA named two guerrilla commanders, Col
Leonard Bwone Lubwa and Lt Col Santos Alit as part of its twelve man delegation to the
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Juba peace talks. 412 While the unstated mandate of the political wing was to rationalize the
negotiation positions of the group, the military wing seating at the LRA headquarters in
Garamba forest made the final decisions. The disharmony in the relationship between LRA
and LRM ultimately manifested when Kony and his commanders (military wing) rejected
the Final Peace Agreement that the LRA peace team (largely made up of members of
LRM) was about to reach with the Government of Uganda peace delegation. 413

Over the years, while stifling the evolution of a political wing, LRA has demonstrated an
appreciation for military and non-military organs within its structures. However, unlike in
the National Resistance Movement (NRM) guerrilla group where there was a separation of
powers, LRA exhibits a fusion of functions. As Head of LRA, Kony is the spiritual and
military leader of his armed group. While he delegates some of his military functions to the
LRA Army Commander, as a member of Control Alter, the division that superintends over
LRA’s four divisions,
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he is still in a position to monitor and audit all military activities

of the group.
The organizational structure of LRA is not only shaped by Kony’s personal security
concerns and his apparent drive to remain firmly in charge of his group. The prevailing
military capability of LRA may also dictate its structural posture. According to Brigadier
James Mugira, the Chief of Military Intelligence of Uganda People’s Defence Forces
(UPDF) LRA came across as a conventional fighting force while it benefited from
Sudanese military support.
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. In this respect, the group exhibited centralized command

and control. It is important to note that while there is a measure of consensus on the broad
outlook of the centralized command structures of LRA, there is a divergence in opinion on
the specific features of these leadership tiers. At the heart of the contention is the challenge
in reconciling the hierarchical attributes of LRA with traces of shared decision-making
within its structures.
From literature reviewed and interviews conducted, the ‘source’ of LRA commands is not
in dispute. Apparently, the ‘Holy Spirit’ issues spiritual edicts to Kony who in turn acts as
the Laor or Spiritual Medium/Interpreter.
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Below Kony, there are two contending

positions on the manner in which the spiritual instructions crystallize into military
commands. The first perspective posits LRA as a hierarchical organization. To this effect,
commands flow from Kony (the Head of LRA) to the Deputy Head of LRA (the Holy
Chief), the LRA High Command, divisions, brigades and battalions in that order. 417 At and
below the High Command level, there are conflicting positions on how the group’s
structures are organized. Whereas one perspective points to divisions, 418 the other points to
brigades 419 as the largest units of the LRA fighting force.

From a conventional military perspective, the existence of divisions would point to a
sizable LRA army. In explaining the organization of the British army, Mark Oliver
observes that “The composition of each brigade will differ depending on its responsibility
but could often contain 5,000 soldiers…A division would traditionally be made up of three
or four brigades depending on the specific role it is to undertake…”
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With four divisions

(ofcourse depending on the size of each), LRA’s troop strength would be somewhere close
to an astronomical 60,000. On the other hand, an army made up of four brigades (and
depending on the size of each) would put the LRA troop strength at approximately 20,000.
Whichever position one adopts (the differences between the sizes of conventional and
unconventional units notwithstanding), there is a broad consensus that there are five large
units of LRA. Control Alter (division or brigade) superintends over four divisions or
brigades, namely: Sinia, Gilva, Stocree and Trinkle.421

Borzello attempts a breakdown of the LRA organizational structure below the High
Command (presumably Control Alter) level. Commensurate with conventional military
institutions, each of the divisions is sub-divided into brigades, battalions, companies and
platoons (assuming that a division is the largest unit of the rebel group). However, a
principle point of departure in structuring emerges at the basic unit level. Unlike
conventional armies where all fighting units are staffed with fully fledged combatants, the
Rebel Family, the basic unit of the LRA fighting force is made up of combatants and noncombatants. According to Borzello, a typical LRA Rebel Family is staffed with a rebel
commander, his wife, children, escorts and helpers. 422
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The composition of the Rebel Family presents the group with some critical dilemmas: How
does it harness the non-combatant resources within its basic units? Would the wives,
children and helpers of the LRA commanders constitute a combat liability in skirmishes
with the enemy? Would the total militarization of the Rebel Family (training the wives,
children and helpers) compromise the group’s quality and ethics of combat? Confrontation
between UPDF and Rebel Families points to the underlying liability inherent in staffing the
basic units of an insurgent force with non-combatants. The wives, children and helpers of
LRA commanders are always unable to cope with fire fights and often end up surrendering
to government forces.
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These surrendering personnel may often end up furnishing

government forces with intelligence on the activities of the group.

The first perspective is significant in other ways. Besides emphasizing a hierarchical chain
of command, it draws a distinction between strategy formulation and strategy
implementation within the structures of LRA. In the formative phase of the LRA campaign,
there was no interaction between Control Alter and the brigades it superintended.
O’Kadamerie observes that in 1993, Kony’s “…early ‘division’ (or brigade) commanders
like Ben Opiro (Gilva), Otto-Otti (Condum), Obitre-Gama (Stocree) and Oyet-Waliki
(Sinia) were a collection of fanatical followers and he kept shuffling them around.”
O’Kadamerie separates the above officer corps from the “….hardliners at his (Kony’s)
headquarters such as the late Bosco Oyuk, the late Dominic Dulmony, Otti-Lagony and
Obong Kijura who ensured all his commands were followed.” 424

Under the above structural arrangement, it would appear that one set of officers constituted
a kind of military bureaucracy that sat at the LRA headquarters and probably drew the
group’s war plans while the other was in the field implementing them. On the basis of this
point, two deductions are noteworthy: First, there was a separation of powers and functions
within the structures of LRA. To this effect, the commanders of the divisions/brigades
(units for strategy implementation) were not members of Control Alter (the organ for
strategy formulation). Second, in light of the hierarchical chain of command, there was no
collegial decision-making within the leadership structures of the group.

173

The second perspective springs from the notion that there is interaction between Control
Alter and the units it controls. We can test the validity of this perspective by answering
three questions: Who populates Control Alter? What is the nature of decision-making in
this organ? Do members of Control Alter engage in strategy formulation and strategy
implementation?

Under pressure from counterinsurgency Operations Iron Fist I and II, LRA split up into two
forces: One, commanded by the late Vincent Otti (the then Deputy Head of LRA) relocated
the LRA headquarters from Southern Sudan to North Eastern DRC;
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The other,

commanded by the late Tabuleh (the then third-in-command) re-entered Uganda and
conducted attacks in the Northern and Eastern parts of the country.
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While the Juba

peace talks were under way, Ugandan military intelligence suspected that Dominic Ongwen
(one of the top five LRA commanders indicted by the ICC) and units under his command
were trapped somewhere in Northern Uganda and needed a ceasefire to link up with the
main LRA force in North Eastern DRC.
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From the above accounts, Otti and Ongwen at

one time physically commanded LRA troops. Under the first perspective, they would have
been involved in strategy implementation and would therefore not be members of Control
Alter. A closer inspection of the group’s tiers of leadership upsets this assumption.

In indicting Joseph Kony, the late Vincent Otti, the late Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo
and Dominic Ongwen, ICC was guided by the assumption that these were the top most
leaders of LRA who in their power had consciously plotted the group’s terrorist strategy. 428
If the ICC assumption is accurate, then presumably, there is a platform of some description
within LRA where the group’s strategy is debated. The culpability of the above five
commanders stems from the leverage each one of them ostensibly enjoys within the highest
decision-making organ in choosing to endorse or reject the group’s modus operandi. It is
therefore plausible to assert that Control Alter exists and Kony, Otti, Lukwiya, Odhiambo
and Ongwen were/are members of this supreme decision-making organ of LRA

There is further evidence to support the existence of Control Alter and the idea that the
Head, Deputy Head and other top commanders of LRA constitute a high decision-making
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organ of some sort. In 1993, Kony (the Head), Otti-Lagony (his Deputy), Oyuk, Dulmony
and Kijura were based at the LRA headquarters. The job of Lagony, Oyuk, Dulmony and
Kijura was to enforce Kony’s will. 429 Given the proximity (based in the same place) these
five commanders had to each other, their propensity to interact and the strategic nature of
their functions (transmitting commands to the lower tiers of the group’s leadership), the
group presumably has a top-level forum of sorts in which it collectively maps its strategy.

Having adopted the position that Otti and Ongwen are/were members of Control Alter, we
can deduce that there is interaction between the highest decision-making organ of LRA and
the units it controls. In this sense, members of Control Alter not only formulate strategy but
(like Otti and Ongwen) they also implement it by physically commanding troops. To
emphasize this point in Figure 3, the commanders of the LRA brigades appear in the same
box as the Head and Deputy Head of the group because all of them presumably belong to
Control Alter. At the same time, there are arrows showing the connection between the
brigade commanders and lower tiers of military leadership. This is intended to illustrate the
other function of these leaders—the implementation of the group’s strategy. Brigade
commanders fulfil this duty by coordinating the activities of battalions, companies,
platoons and rebel families.

It is plausible to place the Director of Religious Affairs in Control Alter as well. Since there
is a Chaplain attached to each battalion, 430 then the overall head of the Battalion Chaplains
(presumably the Director of Religious Affairs) is hierarchically positioned somewhere
above the battalion level but below the Deputy Head of LRA. This logic positions him in
Control Alter at the same level as the brigade commanders of Gilva, Sinia, Trinkle and
Stocree (but of course with different responsibilities).

While in Control Alter, the Director of Religious Affairs is presumed to be hierarchically at
par with the brigade commanders, the hierarchical relationship between a Battalion
Commander and a Battalion Chaplain is unclear. In Figure 3, dotted lines support the
assumption that parallel hierarchies exist at this tier of leadership. In this sense, while a
Battalion Commander reports to a Brigade Commander, a Battalion Chaplain presumably
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reports to the Director of Religious Affairs. Under this arrangement, the Battalion
Commander and the Battalion Chaplain are hierarchically at par.
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Figure 3: Centralized Command Structure of LRA
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Thus far, this section has examined the structure of LRA in times of enhanced military
capability and notes its akinness to conventional military institutions. There is a need to
establish whether the group is in a position to maintain its centralized organizational
posture in leaner times. Brig Mugira and Lt Col Kulayigye of UPDF and Lt Col Otim
formerly of LRA concur that a decline in military capability precipitates changes in the
structure of the group. LRA adopts a flexible, informal centralized command structure.
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Assessing the impact of UPDF counterinsurgency campaigns against the group, the
International Crisis Group notes that “LRA has further subdivided into smaller units to
avoid detection by the army….While command and control is still intact, there is no longer
a fixed headquarters such as existed for years in Southern Sudan, nor is there any longer
external support.” 432

Figure 3 largely depicts the centralized command structure of the group. As is the case with
any organization, there are informal channels of communication, rivalries and fluctuations
that

affect

command

and

control.

However,

emerging

information

on

LRA

notwithstanding, it shows the stable, formal organizational structure of the group. It is also
important to stress that while LRA might be strategically centralized and hierarchical, at the
tactical and operational level, individual units are able to act with considerable autonomy.
LRM is not included in the illustration because it has never been fully integrated into the
structures of LRA.

Given the above analysis, we reject the hypothesis in this section. Over the course of its life
cycle, LRA has not evolved as a politico-military organization. While assembling a
structure with military organs, up until the onset of the Juba peace process, it lacked a fully
fledged tier of leadership dedicated to articulating its political agenda. The hypothesis is
also rejected on grounds that LRA does not separate its military from non-military organs.
Kony is the military and spiritual leader of the group.
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5.2.4: LEADERSHIP AND INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL SCHISMS
In the previous section, we attempted to understand the rationale behind shifts in the
organizational structure of LRA. It is imperative to observe that the calibre of personnel
deployed in the structures of a rebel group may affect the way it functions. For example,
the skills and character traits that individuals (especially those who go on to become
leaders) import into the structures of an organization may shape its leadership. In order to
push this debate forward, it is important to assess the calibre of leaders who have staffed
the structures of LRA. This exercise will help us understand the relationship between
leadership style and the structure and working of the group.

Since its inception, LRA has been headed by Joseph Kony. This would imply that for over
25 years, Kony has devised an effective leadership style that has kept the insurgency in
Northern Uganda alive. If this assumption holds true, it is important that we do two things:
First, examine the kind of attributes Kony has brought to the leadership of LRA. Second,
assess the impact of his leadership style on the structure and working of the group.

As supreme head of his organization, Kony exudes a leadership style shrouded in
mysticism, invincibility, unpredictability and charisma. His fighters and individuals
external to LRA struggle to put a finger on his true character traits. According to Lt Col
Otim, Kony is a unique human being. His behaviour oscillates between that of a child and
an adult.
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He exhibits unpredictable mood swings. Within a short spate of time, he can

switch from being temperamental and rude to being highly jovial and friendly. 434

Whereas the above conduct could be a reflection of his natural character and personality,
one cannot entirely rule out Kony exploiting this behaviour to consolidate his control over
LRA. According to Jackson, Kony commands “personal charisma” and engages in
“theatrical gestures” intended to mesmerize his audience. He hypnotizes his followers by
donning aviator spectacles, long hair, women’s clothes and laughing in a “mesmeric voice.”
435

If we accepted the notion that the character traits of Kony are underpinned by strategic

calculations, then we should be in a position to show the specific role that his conduct plays
in directing the LRA insurgency.
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Among former commanders of the group interviewed, Kony’s behaviour has yielded a
leadership style that is an asset and a liability to the movement. They affirm that his
leadership style has been key to the longevity of the LRA insurgency. According to Capt
Ray Apiire, the former Chaplain of LRA, the LRA leader behaves like a chameleon. 436 In
interacting with members of the LRA officer corps, Kony rarely sticks to already agreed
positions. The unpredictable behaviour that governs the interaction between the rebels and
government forces appears to equally characterize that between Kony and his commanders.
In the armed confrontation between LRA and UPDF, the rebels maintain a measure of
unpredictability in their activities in order to avoid being wiped out by government forces.

Among the LRA officer corps (High Command/Control Alter), Kony demonstrates
unpredictability in decision-making because of either of two reasons: His character is
predisposed to inconsistency or he acts the way he does because he envisages individual or
collective threats to his position of power potentially coming from his commanders. If the
second explanation is true, then the leadership style of Kony has turned Control Alter into a
theatre for latent leadership contests. Since Kony does not fully trust his commanders, he
has to do everything within his means to secure his life. He may not only need to increase
the rate of his unpredictable conduct but also commit most of the resources and efforts of
the group towards his personal security. The above state of affairs potentially elevates
Kony’s personal security to the same level as that of the group. The survival of Kony then
potentially becomes synonymous with the survival of LRA. This in turn makes him the
centre of gravity of the group. If Kony is eliminated, LRA would potentially be thrown offbalance. In the post-Kony era, the LRA officer corps would grapple with some critical
choices: What kind of leader would replace Kony? Would his persona fit into the structure
and working of LRA as assembled by Kony?

The leadership style of Kony affects LRA in other ways. According to Brigadier Michael
Acellam and Lt Col Okwangalero, the frequent alteration of the group’s war plans stifles
the progress of the insurgent campaign in Northern Uganda. Anticipating regular changes,
Kony’s juniors usually adopt a measured approach in implementing his instructions. 437
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The pitfalls of his leadership style notwithstanding, Kony commands an aura of
invincibility in LRA. The rank and file of the group believe he is possessed by powerful
spirits.
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Equipped with these supernatural powers, Kony is ostensibly in a position to

foresee the future course of the LRA insurgency and second guess the enemies of his
movement. Lt Col Okwangalero cites an incident where a hitherto non-Arabic speaking
Kony spoke fluently in this language with members of a Libyan delegation visiting the
LRA base in Southern Sudan. 439

If Kony manipulates his persona to maintain a firm hold over LRA, then he requires a pool
of credentials and experience to authenticate his position. Prior to establishing LRA, Kony
assembled his wealth of insurgent credibility by first serving as a Spiritual Mobilizer
attached to the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) Black Battalion commanded
by Major Apia
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and later as a Ritual Assistant to Lakwena, the leader of the Holy Spirit

Movement I (HSM I). Given the centrality of ‘spiritual’ warfare to the evolution of the
HSM I and HSM II rebellions, Kony’s qualifications accorded him much needed start-up
credibility.

In light of the perceived, potential threat that his commanders pose against him and his
modest educational and military background, what kind of leaders does Kony appoint in
LRA? Over the years, he has pursued a disuniform approach in deploying personnel within
the structures of his organization. At the stage of formation, the group was staffed with
personnel with patchy credentials. Beyond this phase, Kony attempted to populate his
structures with a better trained and more refined officer corps.

In accounting for the presence of personnel with questionable records within the structures
of LRA, a former member of the group reveals that “…by 1988 when we negotiated with
the NRM government, Kony had already broken away from UPDA. When we came out, we
had already disagreed with Kony and he took the most deadly and primitive officers with
him. There were also indications that the fighters who had committed atrocities during the
fighting were willing to join Kony since they had no place else to go.”
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However, while preferring to appoint personnel with patchy credentials, Kony beefed up
the structures of LRA with some refined individuals boasting illustrious careers. While
engaged in a bitter turf war with UPDA, he integrated some seasoned military officers
formerly of UPDA into the structures of his group. For example Brig Justine Odong Latek,
Lt Col Basilio Opwonya, Lt Col Dr James Kweya, Lt Col Terensio Okullo, Lt Col
Athocon, Lt Col Mazoldi Lubangakene, Col Joseph Obonyo, Maj Kenneth Banya, Maj
Stephen Moyi, Maj Benjamin Apia and Lt Col Kaggwa assumed leadership positions
within Kony’s organization. 442

Despite their higher military and administrative expertise, the above crop of officers was
subordinated to LRA officers with less distinguished records. O’Kadamerie reasons that
while seeking to exploit the expertise of the ex-UPDA officer corps, ultimately Kony
sought to work with a crop of commanders “…who would not doubt his mystic powers…”
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In stark contrast with the highly trained ex-UPDA officers, recruits with questionable

records were more susceptible to indoctrination.

In a sense, it can be argued that Kony is weary of better trained officers overshadowing
him. Yet the rise of Maj Gen Vincent Otti to the position of Deputy Head of LRA debunks
this notion. Although not in the same mould as the highly trained ex-UPDA military
officers mentioned above, Otti came from a conventional military background and had
undertaken more formal education than Kony.
Otti was Kony’s right hand man.
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Until his execution on Kony’s orders,

During the Juba peace talks, Kony hardly spoke a

word. Otti always articulated the negotiation positions of the group. 446 What factors could
have contributed to the rise of Otti? Since he was one of the pioneering members of the
group, over the years, Kony may have grown to trust him. While weary of being
overshadowed, Kony may have needed trained officers to execute some important tasks.
For example, he needed someone with some formal education to convey his position. With
Otti occupying an important position in the group, what could have caused the rift between
him and Kony?
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Lt Col Okwangalero traces the Kony-Otti rift back to the Juba peace talks. The two
disagreed over the strategic relevance of the Juba negotiations to the LRA insurgency.
Whereas Otti wanted LRA to use the negotiations to secure a dignified exit from its
insurgent activities, Kony preferred the group using this period to regroup. 447

By adopting a pacifist position, Otti won acceptability within Ugandan and American
intelligence circles much to the chagrin of Kony.
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Consequently, in a bid to stave off a

potential challenge to his leadership, Kony executed Otti.
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The execution of Otti may

have marked the end of disuniformity in the composition of the LRA leadership.
Henceforth, Kony may have taken to appointing only individuals with patchy records and
those exhibiting unquestionable loyalty to him. Maj Gen Okot Odhiambo, who replaced
Otti, is known for being unquestionably loyal to Kony and notorious for leading some of
the most brutal LRA attacks in Northern Uganda.

On the basis of the above analysis, we can make the following deductions: By adopting an
unpredictable mode of interaction with members of the LRA officer corps, Kony elevates
the threat to his position as leader of LRA to the same level as that of the group. While the
group has to act in a deceptive manner to avoid being obliterated by Ugandan government
forces, Kony has to constantly change his commands to mitigate a coup against him. The
similarity in the behaviour of Kony and LRA makes the Head of LRA the centre of gravity
of the group. In the event Kony was killed, captured by government forces or overthrown
by his commanders, LRA would be thrown off-balance. The group would struggle to
identify a leader to replicate the leadership style of Kony. In the event the new leader of
LRA interacted with his commanders in a predictable fashion, then he would cease being
the centre of gravity of the group. Predictable interaction within Control Alter would
restore a measure of trust between the leader of the group and his lieutenants. This would
probably de-prioritize his security vis-à-vis that of the group. With other members of
Control Alter comfortable in their interaction with the Head of LRA, their confidence as
leaders would start growing. In case the government eliminated Kony, the group would not
be short of replacements.
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The Kony-Otti rift shows the fragility in disuniform insurgent leadership models. While
largely staffing his inner circle with individuals with questionable records, Kony was off
mark in thinking that a modestly better trained officer than him (Otti) surrounded by
officers with patchy credentials would not pose a future threat to his position as leader of
LRA. Significantly, it can be noted that when lower levels of leadership present a threat to
Kony, his reaction upsets the organizational foundation of the group’s structures.

5.3: GUERRILLA BASES
Since the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) command a conventional military edge
over LRA, the group strives to maintain mobility to survive. Outside theatres of military
engagement, LRA needs safe bases to train its fighters, allow them recuperation after field
operations and nurture para-state structures that would prepare it to seize the reigns of state
power.
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However, as discussed in the theoretical review, guerrilla bases accord

government forces the opportunity of attacking fixed areas of insurgent activity. Against
this backdrop, we test the following hypotheses:
1. LRA will have located its bases in topographically inaccessible areas to limit
attacks on them.
2. The LRA insurgency will have been located in an area with a history of armed
insurrection and susceptibility to weak central government control.

Henry Mukasa offers insights into the topographical challenges that faced regional forces
participating in counter LRA Operation Lightening Thunder in 2008:
“The forested Garamba National Park where the UPDF, SPLA and Congolese army are
hunting for LRA rebels has a difficult terrain. The park is dense with outlandish trees that
are strongly buttressed with umbrella-like canopies. The undergrowth of climbing plants
and thickets make movement within the park almost impossible. Dwellers depend on
footpaths. Obstacles also include impassable rivers that dissect the grasslands, hills, rocky
areas and wild animals. There is no infrastructure to talk about. In these circumstances, the
fastest means of transport would be air transport” 451
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Reinforcing Mukasa’s position, Lt Gen Koreta

452

and Scott Johnson pinpoint poor

meteorological conditions and rough terrain as the principle challenges that hampered
UPDF operations in North Eastern DRC. According to Johnson, “Shortly after dawn last
December 14 (2008), four Ugandan Mi-24 helicopters banked low over the thick forest
canopy of Congo’s Garamba National Park. A dense fog had rolled in overnight, and the
weather had turned nasty….Descending through the fog bank and hovering just above the
tree line, the pilots spotted what looked like a rebel council meeting in the largest cluster of
shelters, code named Camp K. The gun ships immediately unleashed a barrage of rockets
and chain gunfire.” 453

Because of rough terrain, there was a 48 hour time lag between the aerial strike and ground
forces arriving at Camp Swahili (the main LRA base in Garamba). Johnson notes that
“Two days after Operation Lightening Thunder begun, Ugandan commandos finally
reached Camp K. They found bloody trails heading into the jungle in all directions. Hastily
dug graves dotted the site’s periphery.” 454

In the theoretical review, we observed that the location of guerrilla bases is not only
dictated by the terrain of an area but also by its predisposition to political violence and
susceptibility to weak central government control. In choosing to locate its bases in
Southern Sudan, LRA did not exploit weak central government control in that part of the
country. Rather, there was a confluence between its calculations and those of the Sudanese
government. Operation North had dislodged it from Northern Uganda. The group needed a
sanctuary in a neighbouring country. Sudan was facing a rebellion mounted by the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in the Southern part of the country. It needed a proxy
group to help in stabilizing the area. In enlisting the services of LRA, the Government of
Sudan (GoS) allowed the Ugandan group to operate in the highly unstable Magwi, Parajok,
Imatong, Torit and Owiny Kibul areas in Southern Sudan.455 On the other hand, when it
relocated to North Eastern DRC,
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LRA exploited weak central government control to

establish its presence in that part of the country.
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In the post-colonial era, Eastern and

North Eastern DRC have been hotbeds for insurrections against successive governments
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seating in Kinshasa. Over the years, rough terrain and ineffective government control have
hampered efforts geared towards putting down rebellions in that part of the country. 458

The organization of LRA bases offers insights into some of the enduring priorities
underpinning its campaign. In designing its sanctuaries, the group showcases the centrality
of ideology to its activities. At the height of the LRA campaign, Patrick Nyakahuma
Kamara, a Ugandan radio and television journalist had the rare opportunity of visiting a
deserted LRA camp in the company of David Ongiya, a former LRA rebel who had
surrendered to Ugandan government forces in Kitgum district in Northern Uganda.
According to Kamara, the ideological beliefs of LRA were vividly reflected in the physical
architecture of its guerrilla base in Kit Valley, situated 120 kilometres inside Southern
Sudan. Ongiya revealed to Kamara that it was ritualistic for Kony to kneel outside his huts
and pray in an area where he had used stones to design replicas of the rosary.
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In this

sense, LRA marshals ideological consistency in two related ways: It embeds its faith-based
beliefs in the physical architecture of its sanctuaries. The same set of beliefs is partially
reflected in the group’s faith-based doctrine and military strategy.

In light of the imbalance in resource capabilities favouring the Ugandan state military
apparatus, LRA seeks to establish guerrilla bases that limit the costs of executing its
campaigns. For example, in order to mitigate the outbreak of disease, LRA enforces
orderliness and high hygienic standards. At Kit Valley, once home to 3,000 LRA fighters,
Kamara recalls seeing exceptionally neat, clean, well built huts.
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At Camp Swahili, an

LRA guerrilla base situated in the middle of Garamba forest in North Eastern DRC, Grace
Matsiko notes that insurgents were well supplied with fresh and clean water flowing in a
stream. 461

Whereas mitigation of epidemics is a critical priority, marshalling food security is a short,
medium and long term concern for the group. LRA bases are organized to reflect the drive
to marshal food security for its fighters. To this end, the group extensively cultivates
cereals. At Kit Valley, LRA had extensively cultivated sorghum and maize.
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At LRA

bases in Bin Rwot, Lubanga-Tek and Acholi hills in Southern Sudan, Lt Col Kulaigye
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notes that LRA had cultivated 10 square miles of food.
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At Camp Swahili in North

Eastern DRC, Scott Johnson observes that “Kony had been on the run for two decades, but
this place had the look of a settled homestead. Acres had been cultivated with sorghum,
cassava and maize. Stashes of sugar, rice and water in large plastic containers were buried
all around.” 464

According to Brig Mugira, LRA had cultivated about 13 kilometres of food crops in
Garamba forest in North Eastern DRC. However, with Ugandan government forces
overrunning this base, the group has now resorted to looting and raiding in its theatres of
insurgent activity.
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The production of cereals gave LRA food that it could easily

preserve. As observed by Johnson, the group buried its food stocks to meet this
objective.466 LRA bases reflect its levels of technological advancement. While on a guided
tour of Kit Valley, Kamara recalls seeing a vehicle, generator and camcorders. 467 Although
an agrarian Non-State Armed Group (NSAG), the discovery of modern equipment at one of
its bases showcases the importance LRA attaches to the acquisition of modern technology
to execute its campaign.
The sanctuaries of LRA are also organized to cultivate and reflect the group’s capacity to
manage the affairs of state in the post-insurgency era. It erects structures tailored to
accommodate para-state institutions that attempt to reflect its ostensible knowledge on the
structure and working of Ugandan state institutions. According to Frank Nyakairu and
Emmanuel Gyezaho, “The warlord (Kony) has built a makeshift camp in Garamba he calls
‘The LRA Parliament’ made up of four grass thatched neatly built houses in a triangular
shape.” 468 By naming one of its makeshift camps “LRA Parliament,” the group may have
attempted to acknowledge the need for a legislative dimension to political organization.
Ultimately, the above symbolic organizational paraphernalia may have been intended to
showcase its preparedness to run the Ugandan state on the basis of an established
constitutional framework. In concluding, we accept the hypotheses in this section. LRA
largely locates its guerrilla bases in topographically inaccessible areas, characterized by
weak central government control and in countries neighbouring and hostile to the Ugandan
government.
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5.4: FUNDING AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT
Over the course of its life cycle, LRA has operated in different parts of the Great Lakes
Region of Africa. Between 1987 and 1993, it was active in the Acholi region of Northern
Uganda. Between 1994 and 2002, LRA was based in Southern Sudan, 469 fought alongside
the Sudanese military 470 and conducted raids into Northern Uganda. When the Government
of Sudan officially withdrew support for the group,
Eastern DRC

472

471

Kony relocated his forces to North

where they were dislodged in 2008 by Operation Lightening Thunder

mounted by Ugandan, Congolese and South Sudanese forces.
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Currently, units of LRA

are constantly on the move, attacking civilians in Southern Sudan, North Eastern DRC and
the Central African Republic. 474

It is worth noting that shifts in the LRA theatres of insurgent activity have not only shaped
the evolution of its military strategy and tactics but also the organization of its funding and
external support activities. Whereas relocation to sanctuaries in Southern Sudan and North
Eastern DRC accorded the group space to mobilize and manage external support, the
official loss of aid and sanctuaries have pushed the group to frugally manage its resources
and seek alternative sources of funding. This section seeks to establish how the group has
assembled its domestic and international support networks, managed its resources, prepared
for and made the transition between receiving and being denied external support. We test
the hypothesis that LRA will have relied on popular support and criminal activity
domestically and exploited geo-political contradictions regionally to mobilize resources for
prosecuting a relatively cheap insurgent campaign.

In waging its armed campaign against the Ugandan government, LRA has exploited poor
relations between Uganda and Sudan to assemble its resource base. From literature
reviewed and interviews conducted, there is a strongly emerging consensus that points to
the pivotal role that Sudanese support played in sustaining the LRA insurgency between
1994 and 2002. As discussed in Chapter 1, Sudan supported LRA because Uganda was
extending military aid to rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). 475
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Although the conclusion of the Nairobi Accord of 1999 was supposed to have ended the
Uganda-Sudan proxy war,

476

intelligence and media reports indicate that the Government

of Sudan (GoS) may as well have continued covertly rendering external support to LRA
beyond 2002. 477 The enduring ties between LRA and the GoS show the weak link between
improved Uganda-Sudan relations and the state of the LRA-GoS alliance. While the
Nairobi Accord had significantly reduced hostility between the two neighbouring states,
Khartoum still had to contend with SPLA. In seeking to deal with this problem, Sudan
would have needed the support of LRA.

Given the significance of LRA as an actor on the Sudanese conflict scene, a number of
questions arise: How did the LRA-GoS alliance evolve? What was the nature of this
alliance? The initial contacts between LRA and the GoS were made by Dr Riek Machar, the
leader of SPLA United and Nyuon Bany who doubled as a leader in SPLA United and the
Equatoria Defence Force (EDF). SPLA United was a breakaway faction of SPLA.
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The

LRA-GoS alliance was feasible because of the following reasons: In SPLA (and her
external backer, Uganda), Sudan, LRA, EDF and SPLA United had common enemies. EDF
and SPLA United were weary of SPLA (with the backing of Uganda) establishing itself as
the dominant rebel group in Southern Sudan; The GoS had an interest in crashing SPLA
and destabilizing its external backer (Uganda).

In entering an alliance with the above actors, LRA may have been swayed by the following
considerations: It had taken a beating during Operation North and was in need of external
support to reinvigorate its campaign;
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SPLA was not only a threat to the GoS but also

LRA. In 1986 (on the instigation of the NRM government), SPLA attacked remnants of the
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) who had taken refuge in Southern Sudan. This
attack is cited as one of the reasons behind the onset of armed conflict in Northern Uganda.
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It can be asserted that external support for LRA evolved at three mutually reinforcing

levels: LRA exploited divisions within SPLA and poor Uganda-Sudan relations to secure
external support to fight the GoU; SPLA United and EDF exploited poor Uganda-Sudan
relations to link LRA to the GoS to fight SPLA; Sudan exploited divisions within SPLA to
extend external support to LRA to fight SPLA and Uganda. With the above alliance
189

configuration, LRA evolved into a destabilizing and stabilizing force. Regionally, Sudan
would use the group to destabilize Uganda (the principle backer of SPLA). Domestically,
Khartoum would deploy LRA to stabilize Southern Sudan by attacking SPLA.

With contact between LRA and the GoS initiated, there were a number of challenges to
contend with: How were the two sides going to operationalize their alliance? How would
LRA relate to the Sudanese military? Would it remain an autonomous force or would it be
integrated into the structures of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)? According to Izama,
Sudanese support for LRA was contingent on the Ugandan group operating as part of a
wider counter SPLA military alliance along what was known as the “Southern flank.” 481
Santos Ocaka, who claims to have served in the Gilva brigade of LRA, reveals that while at
his base at Palataka trading centre in Southern Sudan, Sudanese military officials flanked
by SPLA United officers led by Martin Kenyi, informed his unit that it had to take part in
military operations against the John Garang-led SPLA. 482
It is important to note that by operating along the “Southern flank,” LRA was not in any
way subverting the strategic course of its own campaign. In 1995, ’97 and ’98, a joint
UPDF-SPLA force had attacked its units.
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Thus, whilst appearing to meet a

conditionality set by Khartoum, LRA was in effect fighting its own war. Pursuing a similar
position that understates the control the GoS had over LRA, Capt Ray Apiire, the former
Chaplain of LRA, observes that despite pursuing Islamist foreign policy objectives at that
time, the Khartoum establishment did not force Islam down the throat of LRA. 484

Despite receiving military support and being given an external sanctuary, LRA diversified
its mobilization of resources possibly because of two reasons: First, probably due to
logistical challenges in the GoS supporting it, sometimes the group found itself with
insufficient materiel. It had to devise means of surviving during times of scarcity. Second,
LRA and the GoS were in an alliance of convenience. In case Uganda-Sudan relations
improved, it would be difficult to determine how Khartoum would behave. LRA needed to
build self-reliance beyond its alliance with the GoS. These two factors may have pushed the
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group to adopt criminal activity as a way of independently mobilizing funds for its
campaign.

Upon relocating to Southern Sudan, LRA faced critical shortages of food, clothing, arms
and ammunition. The group had to devise means of meeting these key necessities in the
short and medium term. According to O’Kadamerie, “…the food shortages had continued
to worsen and a Sudanese army column had recently come to bring them arms…Because of
food shortages, they had begun raiding Dinka villages for food, usually maize, cassava,
chickens and goats.” 485

However, the adoption of the above strategy was not without drawbacks: According to
Ocaka, a former LRA rebel, “…the problem is that the Dinka villagers are armed.
Sometimes we had to fight them. Sometimes, Garang’s SPLA would come and chase us
out.” Equally, attempts at conducting raids inside Uganda presented LRA with challenges.
Maj Charles Angina, 4th Division Intelligence Officer in the Ugandan army, notes that at
one point in its life cycle, LRA contemplated dispatching a contingent to loot clothing in
Uganda but backed down for fear of getting caught up in ambushes mounted by units of
SPLA that had cut off all major routes to Uganda. 486

In discussing the diversified approach to resource mobilization adopted by LRA, each
theatre of insurgent activity presents the group with opportunities for receiving and
independently mobilizing resources to prosecute its armed campaign. While in Southern
Sudan, LRA received aid from the GoS and was at the same time at liberty to conduct
looting raids in this part of the country. While operating in Uganda, LRA not only
mobilized its resources through plunder 487 but was also a beneficiary of funding organized
by Northern Ugandans in the diaspora.
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The above strategy gave the group multiple

resource mobilization contingencies: Successful counterinsurgency campaigns inside
Uganda would not completely cripple its capacity to mobilize funds. The group would still
be in a position to receive aid from the GoS, the Northern Ugandan community in exile and
it would also conduct raids inside Southern Sudan. Equally, deterioration in LRA-GoS
relations would not totally curtail its resource mobilization activities. Kony would still be
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able to rely on external support rendered by the Northern Ugandan community in exile and
conduct raids in Southern Sudan and possibly inside Uganda.

Given its reliance on plunder, some sources assert that the group has metamorphosed into a
criminal organization. Feldman observes that “Though ostensibly the money is to finance
its attempted overthrow of the government, the actions and structure of the LRA in some
ways appear to be more representative of a criminal enterprise than a revolutionary one.”
He adds that in seeking to assemble its financial structures, LRA engages in a wide array of
criminal activity: For example, it engages in human trafficking. Some of its abductees are
sold off to willing buyers. Kony’s forces also peddle illicit drugs, engage in armed robbery
targeting individuals, stores, banks, taxis and buses and in the rural areas, raid villages and
loot farms. 489

While criminal activity would undermine popular support for LRA, it would not negatively
affect its strategic calculations. Poor LRA-Acholi relations fitted in with changes in the
motivation of the group. Counterinsurgency operations weakened its capacity to overthrow
the NRM government. Sudan was not providing the group with sufficient capability to
cause regime change in the country. Sections of the Acholi population were collaborating
with the state. Because of these three reasons, LRA could not fulfil its original mission—
reversing changes in the regional balance of power in Uganda. Since the Acholi (whom the
group was supposed to protect) were siding with the enemy, then there were some strategic
benefits in the group attacking the population: First, the group would punish the population
for ‘betraying’ the ‘Northern cause.’ Second, it would destabilize Uganda, the principle
backer of SPLA. This would please Sudan which would reciprocate by providing more
support to LRA. Third, LRA would assemble its resource capacity to cope with shifts in
external support for its insurgent activities.

Thus far, this section has addressed the ways in which LRA mobilizes its resources during
the course of armed confrontation with the GoU. From literature reviewed and interviews
conducted, there is a strong indication that peace negotiations with the GoU also present the
group with opportunities for replenishing its resource base. According to Lt Col Kulayigye,
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during the Juba peace talks, LRA duped Caritas, an international humanitarian organisation
into supplying it with more food than was commensurate with its actual troop numbers.
Although the group’s estimated troop strength stood at less than 1,000 fighters, it benefited
from food supplies for a fictitious fighting force of 10,000 soldiers. 490

As already observed in this section, Sudan may have been cautious (and strategic) in the
amount of support it extended to LRA. Probably mindful of the possibility of LRA
expanding into an uncontrollable threat to the security of Southern Sudan, Khartoum
mainly equipped the rebel group with light weapons 491 to counteract SPLA and destabilize
Northern Uganda. This capability was not sufficient for the group to overthrow the NRM
government. The small arsenal of heavy weapons that LRA received from Sudan was
mainly intended to give the rebels a defensive capability against potential joint UPDFSPLA attacks on their bases in Southern Sudan. In the event the LRA-GoS alliance
collapsed, Khartoum would probably have found it easier to neutralize a lightly rather than
a heavily armed LRA.

Based on the foregoing discussion, we partially accept the hypothesis in this section. LRA
does not depend on popular support to fund its insurgent campaign. The adoption of a
terrorist/criminal strategy by LRA and the creation of protected villages by the government
have combined to limit the group’s domestic resource mobilization options. Without
cordial insurgent-civilian interaction, the Acholi population cannot extend support to LRA.
The notion that the group exploited political contradictions in the Great Lakes Region to
cultivate external support is accepted. However, this development depended on the
prevailing strategic calculations of LRA’s external backers. Where there was a confluence
of interests (between LRA and the GoS), the group secured external support. In this study,
it was not possible to determine actual expenses incurred by LRA in conducting its
campaign.

5.5: STRATEGY AND TACTICS
The problem statement pinpointed changes in the evolution of the insurrectional landscape
in Uganda. Unlike previous episodes of irregular armed conflict in the country, the LRA
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insurgency has constituted the population into a military target. However, we observed that
a terrorist strategy throws up a critical dilemma for the group: LRA would have needed the
support of the population to redress the imbalance in military capabilities tilted in favour of
the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF).
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In this respect, attacks on the Acholi

population would potentially precipitate a withdrawal of this support.

We also observed that by itself, terrorism cannot deliver the control of the state to
insurgents. In order to take effective control of the reigns of state power, insurgents need to
occupy territory and seize key installations hitherto occupied and defended by government
forces.
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Thus, for guerrillas, direct confrontation with government forces is ultimately

inescapable. At face-value, LRA appears to have operated in contradiction to the above
laws of insurgency. This section examines the military approach used by the group. It
specifically tests the following hypotheses:

1. The LRA military strategy will have been based on the prosecution of an
unpredictable, protracted insurgent campaign, selectively targeting loop-holes in
the capability of the enemy while adapting to its own condition of relative military
weakness.
2.

LRA will have selectively attacked civilians to expose the Ugandan state as

incapable of protecting its citizens. In turn, this will have pushed the government to
adopt a heavy handed approach to tracking down the rebels.
3. LRA will have attacked weak points in the military capability of the Ugandan state
and avoided outright confrontation with government forces.
4. LRA will have used terrain intelligence to marshal mobility, conduct deceptive
movements in its theatres of insurgent activity and mount ambushes against the enemy.

5.5.1: RATIONALIZATION OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS
LRA uses terrorism to strip the Ugandan counterinsurgency campaign of its auxiliary
forces. It attacks Acholi civilians to discourage them from enlisting in paramilitary groups
and providing government forces with intelligence. Brig Acellam notes that sections of the
population in Acholiland engaged in counter LRA military activity and espionage. Local
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leaders armed civilians with bows and arrows while in one incident, hunters who stumbled
on 800 boxes of LRA arms directed the authorities in Kitgum district to the location of
these weapons.

494

During Operation North, Bigombe, the Minister of State in the Prime

Minister’s Office in charge of Northern Uganda spearheaded the establishment of self
defence groups aimed at augmenting counterinsurgency operations mounted by the
Ugandan military. 495

As a reaction to these developments, LRA commenced gruesome attacks on civilians,
cutting off the lips, ears and noses of its victims.
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During the 1993 peace talks between

between LRA and the GoU, Kony attempted a rationalization of this approach: “If you
picked up an arrow against us and we ended up cutting off the hand you used, who is to
blame? It is you. The Bible says that if your hand, eye or mouth is at fault, it should be cut
off.”
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In this context, the group raises the cost of using auxiliary forces in

counterinsurgency campaigns in Northern Uganda. Civilians can only participate in counter
LRA operations at a high cost—attracting increased attacks from the group. In turn, an
upsurge in LRA terrorist attacks necessitates the Ugandan military establishment
reassessing its deployment priorities. UPDF would have to choose between deploying
fewer troops to chase LRA units and stationing more government soldiers at Internally
Displaced People’s camps and villages to protect civilian life.

During the 1993 peace talks, LRA admitted and attempted to rationalize its terrorist
strategy. During the Juba peace talks, the group admitted and deflected responsibility for
atrocities committed in Northern Uganda. According to its peace team, “While the LRA
does not deny that there were incidents of atrocities committed, it is not true that most of
them were committed as a policy of the LRA and or with the approval of the high
command….…because the enemy used the population as a human shield, whenever the
LRA attacked the UPDF positions, death of civilians in crossfire was inevitable. Secondly,
it became a UPDF policy to manipulate…… the population against LRA. The people who
we expected to support the cause of LRA………became allies and spies of the UPDF
against the LRA. Eventually, they were armed with spears and arrows to fight the
LRA......we know that many of the atrocities blamed on the LRA were committed by the
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UPDF, a typical strategy they used in the Luwero triangle when they fought the Obote
government.”
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The position of the LRA peace team shows the potential interaction between military
strategy and propaganda in asymmetric conflict. The group advanced three possible
explanations for terrorist activity in Northern Uganda: The Acholi population was armed by
the government. This constituted it into a legitimate target of LRA attacks; Not all LRA
attacks were sanctioned by its leadership. Given organizational challenges in guerrilla
warfare, at times, the group’s units operated with a high degree of autonomy; Some of the
attacks attributed to LRA may have been false-flag attacks mounted by the Ugandan
military. In order to occupy the moral high ground during the negotiations, the group had to
rationalize its terrorist activity. To this effect, LRA only attacked civilians because it was
left with no choice; Where the group was culpable, it had no control over its forces; In a bid
to establish a balance of notoriety between the two sides, the group linked some of the
terrorist attacks to covert operations mounted by the government.

Lt Col Okwangalero, an ex-commander of LRA offers further insights into the strategic use
of terror in the conflict in Northern Uganda. He argues that it is a widely used method of
conducting conflict and in the case of LRA, it draws the attention of the international
community.
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According to another former commander of the group, “They (LRA) want

to prove the world wrong, that they are not finished. Atrocities speak louder than what the
Ugandan government claims.”
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By publicizing its potency, the group makes itself

indispensable to the resolution of the conflict in Northern Uganda. In the event the
government failed to defeat LRA, then it would have no choice but negotiate with it.

Bevan pinpoints a link between the strategic calculations of Sudan and LRA adopting a
terrorist strategy. Khartoum supported the rebel group because it was capable of
destabilizing Uganda. Since LRA was not provided with sufficient capability to overthrow
the government, it could only attack the population to meet the strategic objectives of its
principle backer. In turn, the destabilization of the Ugandan state (through terrorist attacks)
was the only way the group would maintain its relevance to the Northern question. 501
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In conclusion, we partially accept the second hypothesis in this section. Mindful of the role
of the Acholi population in counterinsurgency operations and the army’s incapacity to
protect civilians while pursuing rebels, LRA has adopted a terrorist strategy that mainly
targets civilians in Internally Displaced People’s camps. This military approach exposes the
Ugandan state as incapable of protecting the population, makes participation in civil
defence activities highly costly for Acholi civilians and demonstrates the rebel group’s
disruptive capability.

If the creation of poorly managed protected villages were considered a heavy handed
counterinsurgency measure, then the second hypothesis is partially rejected. LRA attacks
on civilians commenced after the Ugandan government had established strategic hamlets in
Northern Uganda. In this regard, the adoption of a terrorist strategy by LRA did not
precipitate a harsh response to its activities by the Ugandan state. Rather, drastic
counterinsurgency measures by the Ugandan government pushed the group to adopt a
terrorist approach. Given the paradox underpinning the military strategy adopted by LRA,
the longevity of the group can be attributed to its sheer use of force and circumstance
occasioned by the external support it has received from Sudan and the topographical
constraints inherent in trying to eradicate it.

5.5.2: OPERATIONALIZATION OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS
Given the centrality of terrorism to the insurgent strategy adopted by LRA, over the years,
the Ugandan military establishment has stepped up troop concentration in densely
populated areas and enhanced the chances of a head-on confrontation with the rebels. The
above shifts in counterinsurgency strategy have had a knock-on effect on the evolution of
tactics that LRA employs in its operations. While mainly seeking to devise basic
operational methods that would allow it to violently access the civilian population in
Northern Uganda, for the group, the need to design a tactical framework for dealing with
well armed government forces is increasingly inescapable.

Discussing the evolution of tactics employed by LRA, Brig Mugira observes that over its
life cycle, the group has gone from employing conventional warfare to guerrilla warfare
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and lately, to avoiding confrontation with UPDF. 502 Prior to 2003, Lt Col Kulaigye points
out that LRA employed conventional military formations.503 However, due to
counterinsurgency pressure (starting with Operation North in 1991), the group has since
switched to conducting ambushes and outright targeting of civilians. 504

In light of the start-up strength commanded by government forces, LRA has to choose areas
where it could establish an edge over the enemy. In pursuing this objective, the group pays
special attention to the psychological preparation of its fighters. Before heading into the
battle theatre, LRA soldiers receive blessings from their spiritual leaders and are promised
immunity against enemy bullets. 505 This instils fearlessness among them and may make up
for some of the battlefield disadvantages that the group shoulders in its confrontation with
UPDF. Where UPDF boasts better equipped foot soldiers, LRA may make up for a shortfall
in this area by deploying poorly equipped but fearless fighters.

The group could also register an edge over the state in the way it selects, accesses and
withdraws from its targets. Given their lack of confrontational capability, civilians
constitute the softer target of LRA attacks. On the other hand, the military capacity at its
disposal makes the Ugandan military the harder target of rebel attacks. In seeking to exert
its military strength, LRA selectively and randomly attacks civilian and military targets.
Selective civilian targets include refugee camps, Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) camps
and schools. Over the years, some of the more definitive attacks on civilian targets have
included a raid on St Mary’s College, Aboke (a Catholic founded school for girls) in 1989
506

and an attack on Acholi Pii refugee camp in 2002.
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In prosecuting its insurgent

campaign, LRA has also demonstrated the propensity to attack specific military targets. At
the height of its insurgent activity inside Uganda, the rebels mounted a daring attack on
Gulu barracks where President Museveni was residing while on a visit to Northern Uganda.
508

Whereas selective targets accord the group already assembled canvasses on which to
exercise its military potency, in their absence, random targets act as a backup operational
platform. Acholi Pii had the hallmarks of an LRA selective target. It had a large
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concentration of civilians and was lightly guarded. The group could attack it (as it did) and
exercise its terrorist potency without expending much military effort.

509

Where the

Ugandan military has beefed up security at IDP camps, LRA can conduct random attacks
against civilians and soldiers along highways. In the long run, the intensification of
ambushes pushes the Ugandan military to reassess its deployment priorities. More troops
are released from guarding the protected villages and sent to man military patrols. This
development then re-exposes the strategic hamlets to future rebel attacks.

According to Matsiko, the units that LRA deploys against civilians are stronger than those
that it deploys against government forces.510 This deployment approach underlines the
centrality of terrorism to the group’s insurgent campaign. LRA has deconventionalized its
duel with Ugandan government forces by constituting the Acholi population into a primary
target of its attacks. In order to reconventionalize the armed conflict in Northern Uganda,
UPDF has had to beef up its deployments at civilian settlements. This counterinsurgency
strategy aims at re-establishing a confrontation between combatants—that is LRA and
UPDF. 511

We have observed that LRA attacks civilians in order to dissuade them from enlisting in
self defence groups also known as Home Guards.

512

Despite adopting this approach, the

group has not fully attained its objective. LRA attacks have neither stopped government
creating militias nor discouraged civilians from joining them. However, Home Guards have
since evolved into another target of LRA attacks. Self defence groups are neither soft
targets as they are made up of civilians under arms nor hard targets as they have not
undertaken rigorous military training and lack heavy weaponry. Their paramilitary
credentials notwithstanding, they present the first line of resistance against LRA attacks on
civilians. In order to attain its terrorist objectives, LRA has to neutralize these militias.
According to Col Ochora, rebels attack Home Guards at bars on pay day.
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In conducting

these attacks, the rebels exploit the paramilitary (semi-civilian, semi-military) disposition of
the self defence groups. Since they are semi-civilian, Home Guards are more susceptible to
unregulated leisure activity during times of conflict than soldiers. When caught off-guard,
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they are vulnerable to rebel attack. On the other hand, given their highly regimented lives,
government soldiers would be less likely to suffer a similar fate.
Having examined the rationale behind LRA’s target selection, the next area of interest in its
tactical framework is the mechanism it uses to insert fighters into the theatre of armed
confrontation. Cline attempts a description of the group’s attack operandi: “Typically, the
rebels appear to divide into small bands in order to lead raids into Uganda. Groups of five
to twenty rebels wander through the bush, maintaining radio contact with their fellows.” 514
Brig Acellam reveals that for operational purposes, LRA units typically split up into groups
of 10 to 11 fighters. 515 James Bevan maintains that this tactical approach is “…effective for
attacking and abducting people from the local community, as well as for avoiding costly
encounters with UPDF.” 516 However, Brig Acellam contends that this operational approach
has since pushed UPDF to similarly split up its counterinsurgency units in order to
tactically match LRA in this area. 517

Since attacks on civilians constitute the hallmark of the activities of LRA, a question arises:
In situations where the group conducts random attacks, how do its units locate targets?
Former abductees reveal the role of conscripted guides in pinpointing the location of
civilians. According to Chancy, a former abductee, “We thought it was safe to sleep in the
bush and wake up in the morning. But the rebels got a certain lady who knew where we
were sleeping. So she led them to us…They asked ‘Are there government soldiers around?’
‘Is there a trading centre around?” Richard, another former LRA abductee notes that “They
wanted me to direct them where there are more children…” 518

The use of conscripted guides underscores the indispensability of locality intelligence to the
execution of selective attacks in insurgencies. Guerrillas not only need to know the
footpaths and roads leading to selected targets but also require accurate information on the
identities and locations of inhabitants in these designated places. According to Brig
Acellam and Capt Sande Otto, LRA usually deploys fighters in their respective areas of
origin.
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For example, the unit that abducted Capt Sande Otto in Koch Goma, Gulu

district in 1994 was commanded by Otti Lagony who hails from this area. 520
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While the mode of confrontation between LRA fighters and government forces is relatively
predictable (fire fights), that between the rebels and civilians requires closer inspection. The
population lacks the capacity to take on the insurgents. How much force then does LRA use
when attacking civilians? Cline attempts a description of a typical confrontation between
LRA operational units and the population in Northern Uganda: “In town, the rebels loot
trading posts and steal medicines from small health clinics. In the bush, they loot
compounds, beating and often killing the adults, and abducting many of the children. They
burn huts when they leave, and steal everything edible or useful.”521

It can be deduced that LRA uses terror to acquire provisions, recruit members and
demonstrate its capability. In interacting with civilians, the rebels demonstrate the amount
of harm they can inflict. The minimum ill-treatment civilians can expect from the rebels is
beatings and abduction. The maximum, death. This continuum fits in well with the group’s
strategy. Those who are subjected to minimum ill-treatment count themselves lucky and
will cooperate with the group to avoid being subjected to maximum ill-treatment. LRA
needs this group of victims for two reasons: Those it captures will be least expected to
defect. The prospect of being caught and summarily killed would loom in their minds;
Those who escape back to government controlled areas will recount their horrible
experiences thereby publicizing the lethality of the group.

Since there is an imbalance in confrontational capabilities between the rebels and civilians,
what specific instruments does the group use to attain its terrorist objectives? Describing a
raid mounted by the group on July 25th 2002 in Kitgum district, Northern Uganda, Feldman
notes that “…the elderly were killed with machetes and spears. Babies were flung against
trees.”
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Chancy (an ex-LRA rebel) reminisces the killing of a rebel who was caught

trying to escape: “They used clubs or big sticks and they beat and hit him. They always hit
the back of the head.”
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The group uses rudimentary instruments and objects in the

environment to lower the cost of conducting its operations. Unlike guns, rebels do not need
replenishable accessories (ammunition) to use matchetes, spears and clubs. Hard objects
against which people can be flung readily exist in most of the places the group attacks. By
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hitting the heads of their victims with blunt objects, rebel units probably aim to cause
instant death thereby economizing the amount of time needed to attain operational
objectives.

Having successfully conducted a raid, the next challenge for the insurgents is disengaging
from the theatre of skirmishes. Unlike the stages at which LRA inserts its units and
conducts its attacks, when it starts withdrawing from the scene of the attack, confrontation
with government forces is more likely. UPDF units that may have failed to foil an insurgent
raid usually await contact with the rebels as they retreat from the scene of the attack. The
tactical posture of retreating LRA units is usually geared towards eluding contact with
UPDF. In this direction, the group uses the following tactics:

When rebel units anticipate an ambush by government forces, they disperse. Richard, a
former abductee reveals some of the tactics that LRA uses to camouflage its movements:
“When we were moving in the bush, we reached an area which was not safe. The rebels
were fearing the government troops. So they told us not to move in lines but to disperse and
each one should move in the same direction but not following each other so that our routes
cannot be traced.” 524 This tactic not only camouflages the field operational movements of
rebel units but also where UPDF manages to establish confrontational contact with them,
all of them would not be wiped out.

When rebels anticipate hot pursuit mounted by UPDF rapid response units, they retreat in
circles. According to Feldman, LRA’s mastery of the terrain in Northern Uganda accords
the rebels the luxury of taking “…the army in circles across the entire region with ease,
much to the frustration of UPDF.” 525 Capt Otto reveals that the party that abducted him
moved in circles never returning to the scene of his abduction.
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This tactic not only

covers the movements of the group’s units but also psychologically disorientates
government forces.

In the event the rebels successfully eluded or fought off counterinsurgency units engaged in
hot pursuit, the next phase in the operational cycle of an LRA attack is facilitating a safe
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return to the guerrilla base. Whereas the group disperses its forces when inserting them in a
theatre of combat, it concentrates them when preparing to return to its sanctuaries.
According to Chancy, a former abductee, the LRA unit that abducted her “…joined up with
the rest of the battalion and reported their new acquisitions. Chancy estimated there were
around one hundred soldiers...” 527 Cline notes that “The small rebel bands then reunite, and
march together back across the Sudanese border.” 528 Reassembling allows LRA units to
take preliminary stock of the gains and losses registered in combat and facilitates an orderly
return to the group’s bases.

In concluding this section, it can be asserted that the insurgent activities of LRA generally
conform to guerrilla strategy and tactics. The first hypothesis is partially accepted. LRA
wages an unpredictable campaign. In conducting random attacks along the busy highways
in Northern Uganda and by retreating in circles, the group demonstrates a capacity for
unpredictable activity. However, the notion that an insurgent campaign should be
protracted does not hold entirely true for LRA. As noted by Uganda’s Chief of Military
Intelligence and Army Spokesman, the strategic military disposition of LRA has always
depended on its prevailing military capability.

When LRA was a recipient of Sudanese military aid, it engaged in conventional warfare. In
this case, armed confrontation between LRA and UPDF units was mainly defined by a few
big clashes along fixed frontlines. This was not a serialized mode of armed confrontation
(protracted campaign). On the other hand, when the military capability of the group
declined, it adopted a guerrilla posture, engaging Ugandan government forces in a series of
skirmishes along shifting frontlines. We partially accept the third hypothesis. While
predominantly seeking to attack soft targets (unarmed civilians and lightly armed self
defence units), as evidenced by the daring raid on Gulu military barracks, on certain
occasions, LRA has not hesitated to take on the Ugandan army. In this regard, LRA does
not always avoid confrontation with the Ugandan military. However, it is important to note
that this is more of an exception than a rule.
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The fourth hypothesis is accepted. LRA’s tactics are principally hinged on deceptive
movements that heavily rely on terrain intelligence and mobility. As Capt Sande Otto notes,
knowledge on the physical and human geography of targeted areas allows LRA raiding
parties to conduct retreat in circles, psychologically disorientating Ugandan government
units that are engaged in hot pursuit.

5.6: WEAPONS AND WEAPONS ACQUISITION
This thesis maintains that in asymmetric duels between the two sides engaged in the armed
conflict in Northern Uganda, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) command a
start up military edge over LRA. Principally, an imbalance in confrontational capabilities is
measured in terms of the quantity and calibre of weapons at the disposal of the contending
sides to a conflict and the ease with which they acquire and use these instruments of
coercion. We set out to test the hypothesis that LRA will have used a wide range of
weapons according to availability and will have purchased and stolen its arms and
ammunition from a variety of domestic and foreign sources. The discussion in this section
will be guided by the following specific questions: How does LRA acquire its weapons?
What kind of weapons does it use? What is the relationship between the mode of
acquisition, the quantity and calibre of weapons used and the strategic, tactical and
operational calculations underpinning the insurgent activities of the group?
Over the course of its life cycle, LRA’s weapons acquisition campaign has significantly
been shaped by shifts in the state of Uganda-Sudan relations. In Chapter 1, we noted that
between 1994 and 2002, Sudan rendered external support to LRA in retaliation for
Ugandan support for rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).

529

Ofwono

Opondo notes that in 1994, “…the Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) Brigadier Jerome
Mugume also admitted that Kony had recently acquired landmines and other explosives
from the Sudanese government.” 530

Although the Nairobi Accord of 1999 was expected to repair hitherto frosty Uganda-Sudan
relations,

531

the extent of Sudanese support for LRA in the aftermath of the conclusion of

this agreement remains a subject of intense debate. Borzello notes that “There have been
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repeated and unconfirmed allegations by the Ugandan military that the Sudanese
government has continued to supply the LRA through arms drops in Garamba national
park. In 2006, when rebels moved towards assembly points as part of the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement, newspaper reports said onlookers were surprised at the number,
quality and apparent newness of the weapons carried by the LRA.”

532

However, Brig

Mugira stresses that “there is no evidence of fresh supplies of arms” for the group. The
stocks that LRA is currently using were concealed before the start of Operation Iron Fist.
According to Mugira, the group is currently avoiding contact with UPDF because it lacks
an adequate supply of arms and ammunition. 533

The above contending perspectives suggest long term shifts in the weapons acquisition
strategy employed by LRA. With the conclusion of the Nairobi Agreement, LRA may have
gone on to use its old stocks of weapons or identified new weapons suppliers altogether. In
discussing the first scenario, Feldman points out that LRA is a “self sustaining
organization” with sufficient stockpiles of weapons. It needs only a few of these arms and
ammunition for operational purposes. 534 In this sense, the strategy and tactics employed by
the group determine its weapons acquisition approach. While attacking civilians in its
theatres of insurgent activity, LRA rarely uses guns. Thus, deterioration in relations with its
principle external supporters would neither push it to hurriedly seek an alternative weapons
supplier nor affect its capacity to conduct operations in the short and medium term.

The second scenario is spurred by the argument that LRA may have been securing its
weapons from the arms trade fuelling other conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.
The Inter Press Service (IPS) notes that “Zaire is an arms trafficker’s dream. With the help
of corrupt military and civilian officials, arms merchants are funnelling weapons through
the country to a plethora of conflicts in the area.” The IPS report names some of the
beneficiaries of arms trafficking in the Great Lakes Region of Africa as Angola’s National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Hutu dominated Former Army
of Rwanda (FAR), Hutu rebels fighting the Government of Burundi. 535
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The IPS report adds that “Other customers for the arms may be the shadowy Ugandan rebel
movement, the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Christian rebels in Southern Sudan who are
wrapped in a conflict with the Muslim north.” IPS quotes a Human Rights Watch (HRW)
Arms Project report released in 1995 that attempts to pinpoint states involved in arms
trafficking in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The HRW report alleges that “France,
Zaire (currently DRC) and South Africa were actively aiding the direct shipment of arms,
facilitating such shipments from other sources, and providing other forms of military
assistance including military training.” According to Gerald Owachi, former Soviet satellite
republics particularly Bulgaria were also allegedly involved in arms trafficking in this part
of Africa. 536

While offering insights into some of the probable alternative sources of weapons for the
group, the IPS report does not specifically address LRA’s weapons acquisition strategy in
the aftermath of the conclusion of the Nairobi Accord. The probable French and Zairean
(Congolese) support for LRA may have been occasioned by Uganda’s military
interventionism in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. In the mid-1990s, Uganda was aiding
guerrilla groups in Sudan, Rwanda and Zaire (currently DRC). Since Uganda is an
Anglophone country, its interventionist designs in predominantly French speaking
countries (with the exception of Sudan) of the Great Lakes Region of Africa were perceived
by France as a geo-political affront on its sphere of influence on the continent. The alleged
French support for Ugandan rebel groups may have been aimed at checking growing
Anglophone influence in this part of Africa. However, it is worth noting that by 2005,
Uganda had repaired relations with her principle adversaries in the Great Lakes Region
thereby limiting the chances of LRA receiving military aid from the above Francophone
states and Sudan. 537

Although the debate on the sources of weapons that LRA uses generates divergent
perspectives, in all the interviews conducted and literature reviewed for this study, Sudan
emerges as a principle source of external military aid to LRA.
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The LRA-GoS alliance

was underpinned by a confluence of calculations. The GoS supplied the group with
weapons only sufficient to disrupt the Government of Uganda (the principle supporter of
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SPLA). LRA did not mind receiving limited support from Khartoum as long as it
maintained the capability to conduct attacks inside Uganda and remain a thorn in the flesh
of the NRM government. 539

LRA is mainly equipped with small arms and ammunition.
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Brig Mugira reveals that it

uses Sub Machine Guns (SMGs), Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and land mines.
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Brig Acellam reveals that the LRA arsenal consists of light weapons, mainly AK-47 rifles,
light machine guns, G-2s and heavy weapons like the Russian-made SPG-9 and SA 7
Strella anti-aircraft missiles. 542 Given the fact that a significant number of LRA recruits do
not come from a military background, there is always the need for the group to train its
members in weapons use. As part of a capacity building programme, the GoS made
arrangements for Lt Col Otim of LRA to undertake specialised training in the use of Strella
anti-aircraft missiles. 543

With light weapons, the group is in a position to maintain mobility in its theatres of
insurgent activity. This guarantees for the group selectively minimal contact with
government forces while it assembles its military capability. On the other hand, the
acquisition of sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons gives LRA the capability to defend its
bases against potential aerial assaults mounted by the Ugandan air force. In this sense,
whilst unable to seize state power, with the array of weapons at its disposal, LRA was in a
position to selectively exercise its military potency and destabilize Uganda—Sudan’s
regional enemy.

It is probable that the group may currently be using arms and ammunition acquired while it
enjoyed cordial relations with the Sudanese government. This would call for effective long
term concealment and preservation of weapons caches. Borzello observes that in the mid1990s, LRA concealed its weapons in Northern Uganda. 544 Lt Col Kulayigye notes that the
conclusion of the Nairobi Accord (which normalized Uganda-Sudan relations) pushed the
group to conceal most of its arms and ammunition in Equatorial Province in Southern
Sudan. 545
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Based on the foregoing discussion, we partially accept the hypothesis in this section. LRA
uses a wide array of weapons. Its arsenal ranges from rudimentary instruments for subduing
civilians, small arms for engaging the enemy in the field of combat to heavy Surface-to-Air
Missiles (SAMs) for defending its guerrilla bases. Over the course of its life cycle, the
group has mainly received its arms and ammunition from Sudan which was engaged in a
proxy war with Uganda. On the basis of the Inter Press Service and Human Rights Watch
reports, LRA purchased arms from arms dealers supplying weapons to other rebel groups in
the Great Lakes Region of Africa. In this research, there was no evidence to suggest that the
group acquires its weapons through theft.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This chapter summarizes the relevance of the theories of guerrilla warfare in explaining the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in Northern Uganda. Our task is twofold: First,
to determine whether there has been a significant discrepancy between the hypotheses
developed in the theoretical review and the organization of the LRA insurgency. Second, to
establish whether the principles of insurgency have ultimately helped us answer the broad
and specific research questions in this study.

Out of 16 hypotheses generated in the theoretical review, 5 were accepted, 10 partially
accepted and 1 rejected (Appendices 1 and 2). The key features of LRA are as follows:
Ideologically, the group seeks to construct a new Acholi polity. Its doctrine is an
amalgamation of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) commitment to
reincarnate the Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics 546 and the Holy Spirit Movement I
(HSM I) and Holy Spirit Movement II (HSM II) drive to socially cleanse Acholi society; 547
The group’s popular support has been shaped by its reaction to counterinsurgency
operations. When the Government of Uganda (GoU) created protected villages and civil
defence groups, LRA reacted by attacking civilians thereby undermining the popular
support it enjoyed. 548 However, due to pathetic conditions in the protected villages and the
group’s capacity to breach the security of the strategic hamlets, the decline in support for
LRA did not lead to an increase in support for the GoU. 549

LRA uses overt propaganda techniques in areas it controls and covert ones in those it does
not. The group’s communicational campaign pinpoints the failings of the GoU, markets the
viability of an Acholi polity and justifies the recourse to violence as the best means for
constructing the polity;

550

The motivation of the group has been shaped by shifts in

domestic and external support for its insurgent activities and the effectiveness of
counterinsurgency operations. At the stage of formation, LRA was motivated by the drive
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to protect the Acholi population against potential extermination at the hands of Southern
Ugandans and reincarnate the Northern hegemony in Ugandan politics. 551

Beyond this phase, its motivation was affected by two main factors: First, the GoU created
protected villages to curtail insurgent-civilian interaction and civil defence groups to fight
the group. LRA reacted to these developments by attacking the Acholi population.

552

Attacks on civilians undermined the group’s credentials as a protector of the Acholi people.
In turn, LRA could no longer marshal motivation to protect people who were not
supporting it. Second, the effectiveness of the GoU counterinsurgency campaign 553 and the
end of Sudanese support 554 for the group’s activities diminished its chances of seizing state
power. Unable to effect regime change, the group could no longer cultivate motivation
based on the drive to reverse the NRM takeover.

LRA was not only unable to overthrow the NRM government but it could also not realize
voluntary enlistment. The group then resorted to conducting abductions.

555

As a result of

the above developments, there was a further change in the motivation of LRA. The officer
corps of the group was motivated by two considerations: First, the drive to sustain its
insurgent power as an alternative

556

to the Northern hegemonic power it had failed to

achieve. In order to sustain the trappings of sub-national authority, the group had to engage
in profiteering activity.

557

Second, given the horrendous atrocities commited by LRA, the

officer corps was also motivated by the need to elude the long arm of retributive justice. 558
On the other hand, members of the group who had been coercively recruited and lacked
ideological commitment to the LRA armed struggle were motivated by the need to survive
while in captivity until an opportunity for escape presented itself. 559

In terms of capacity building, LRA recruits are subjected to military and religious training.
Whereas all male recruits undergo basic military training,
undertake specialized military training.

561

560

only the talented go on to

As part of their induction programme, recruits

are introduced to a doctrine they can neither interpret nor challenge. While some of the
recruits may separately understand the principles underpinning Christianity, Islam and
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Animism, a combination of these doctrines introduced in an atmosphere of fear makes for
difficult interpretation. 562
LRA is largely a hierarchical organization exhibiting centralized command and control. 563
However, at the strategic level, it showcases some traces of shared decision-making. To this
effect, the Head of LRA, Deputy Head, Director of Religious Affairs and commanders of
the four brigades of LRA are all members of Control Alter, the supreme decision-making
organ of the group.

564

At the tactical and operational levels, the group’s units enjoy a

measure of autonomy in executing assigned tasks. Thus far, in seeking to establish its
bases, LRA has exploited two factors: In Southern Sudan, it capitalized on poor UgandaSudan relations to secure a sanctuary. 565 In North Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,
it exploited weak central government control to set up base in that part of the country. 566 In
both cases, the group situated its sanctuaries in topographically inaccessible areas.

567

The

group uses its bases to muster ideological consistency, food security and technological
advancement. 568

LRA mobilizes resources for its campaign during the course of armed confrontation and
peace talks with the Government of Uganda (GoU). While in a state of belligerence with
the GoU (before Uganda-Sudan relations improved), the group relied on support from the
Government of Sudan (GoS), Acholis in the diaspora and plunder by its units.

569

While

engaged in peace negotiations, the GoU, Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and
international aid agencies extended support to LRA to discourage it from preying on the
population.

570

Some sources suggest that the group may also be engaged in illicit drug

peddling. 571

Depending on its prevailing military capability, LRA has oscillated between using
conventional and guerrilla warfare. In either case, consistent attacks on civilians have been
an integral part of its modus operandi.

572

The group attacks the population in order to

demonstrate its potency 573 and precipitate a troop deployment dilemma for the GoU. 574 In
this regard, the Ugandan state has had to choose between protecting civilians and pursuing
marauding units of the group; LRA uses an assortment of weapons ranging from
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rudimentary tools it uses for subduing civilians
uses in fire fights with government forces.

576

575

to light and heavy automatic weapons it

Whereas light weapons allow it mobility

while conducting field operations, heavy ones give it the capability to defend its bases.

This study questions insurgency theory in four key areas: First, there is a discrepancy
between the need for targeted recruits to demonstrate ideological commitment to a group’s
armed struggle and its capacity to recruit and retain them.
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The LRA case shows that a

rebel group can conscript members without prior commitment to its cause and retain them
for a long time.
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Second, this research unsettles the place of popular support in an

insurgency. Whereas guerrilla warfare theory accommodates scenarios where a rebel group
may attack the population without triggering off corresponding popular support for the
state, 579 the sheer extent to which LRA uses this approach without disintegrating questions
the role of popular support in insurgencies.
Third, the highly peripheral place of the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM) within the
structures of LRA questions the role of political wings in insurgencies.
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Theoretically, a

guerrilla group needs an organ to design and articulate its cause. This tier of leadership acts
as the non-military interface between the insurgent organization and the population. 581 The
LRA case shows that a rebel group can operate for 25 years without a clearly articulated
ideology let alone an organ to articulate it. Fourth, the non-linear development of the
military strategy of LRA unsettles existing principles of insurgency. In orthodox guerrilla
warfare, the military strategy of durable insurgent groups evolves systematically. 582 In this
respect, a rebellion will systematically graduate from the subversive through the guerrilla,
mobile to the conventional warfare phase. LRA has oscillated between adopting guerrilla
warfare, conventional warfare and outright avoidance of contact with government forces
and yet managed to remain in existence for more than two decades. 583

In the ensuing sections, the insurgent attributes of LRA are evaluated against the 16
hypotheses developed in the theoretical review.
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6.1: LRA INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES: IDENTITY
6.1.1: Ideology
In their current form, guerrilla warfare theories

584

can account for the following key

characteristics of the LRA doctrine: Its similarity to that of the Uganda People’s
Democratic Army (UPDA),
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Holy Spirit Movement I (HSM I)

586

and Holy Spirit

Movement II (HSM II); 587 The duality in the role that it plays in the LRA insurgency—it
seeks to suppress the ideals of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government
whilst simultaneously advancing those of LRA;

588

The use of rewards and sanctions to

persuasively and coercively propagate the ideology of the group; The use of the ideology of
LRA as a psychological weapon to operationalize its military strategy and tactics.589

In this study, we have come to empirical grips with the impact of the UPDA, HSM I and
HSM II rebellions on the evolution of the ideology of LRA. In the conflict in Northern
Uganda, the group that emerged at the tail end of the successive insurgencies exhibited a
multiple ideological outlook. Its doctrinal disposition was a melting pot of the ideals
espoused by insurgent groups preceding it. This finding adds to our understanding of how
the ideology of insurgent organizations might develop.

It can be concluded that overlaps in the rebellions in Northern Uganda acted as a continuum
for increasing extremity in ideology. The rebel group that set off the series of insurgencies
was less radical in its ideological disposition than the one emerging at the tail end. In
relation to this point, Kurth-Cronin observes that when an original group moves towards
disarmament, smaller more radical factions break away.
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Whereas UPDA (the first

insurgent group in Northern Uganda) mainly blamed Southerners for the crisis in the North,
591

HSM I and HSM II (the second and third respectively) blamed Southerners and

Northerners.

592

LRA that emerged at the tail end of the chain not only blamed these two

peoples but also prescribed harsh ‘punishment’ for Northerners who should otherwise have
been rendering support to its insurgent activities. 593

This study set out to test the hypothesis that LRA will have adopted an ideology that is
either an original synthesis of its ideals or an adaptation of existing ideologies in order to
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articulate political contradictions in the Ugandan polity and justify its recourse to violence
to resolve these contradictions. The hypothesis was accepted. The ideology of the group is
an amalgam of its doctrine and those of rebel groups preceding it. The LRA doctrine
pinpoints contradictions in the Ugandan polity in general and Acholi society in particular
and rationalizes the use of violence as the best means of addressing these problems.

6.1.2: Popular Support
The case of LRA does not generate a significant discrepancy between the theories of
guerrilla warfare and insurgent practice. The principles of insurgency largely explain shifts
in the support the group has been enjoying over the course of its life cycle. 594 Civilians in
Northern Uganda have supported LRA either because of their ethnic connections to its
fighters, its commitment to liberating Northerners from perceived Southern domination or
out of fear of being attacked by the group for cooperating with the NRM government. 595

Whereas ethnic connections and cordial relations between insurgents and civilians are
theoretically considered twin prerequisites for realizing popular support for an insurgency,
empirically, the treatment that LRA accorded the population was the more decisive factor.
While still maintaining ethnic connections with the Acholi people, support for Kony
dwindled when his rebel group started targeting civilians.
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Contrary to the principles of

insurgency, LRA has heavily relied on coercive tactics for support and yet managed to
survive for a long time.

In seeking to explain the calculations of the population in an insurgency, guerrilla warfare
theorists argue that civilians will initially defer support for either side to an asymmetric
conflict and later, opportunistically, rally behind the emerging winner of the duel.
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Theoretically, this means that when the outcome of an asymmetric conflict starts taking
shape, one side will command higher levels of popular support at the expense of the other.
However, the case of LRA shows that a decline in support for one side does not necessarily
lead to an increase in support for the other.
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In such a scenario, the population acts in a

passive way. Thus, in order to marshal the full cooperation of civilians, either side should
not only appear to be winning the duel but should also strive to endear itself to the
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population. Unlike armed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah that have taken the extra step
to maintain social welfare programs, 599 LRA defies the theories of insurgency in the way it
did not strive to sustain cordial links with the Acholi population while it enjoyed popular
support.

Under this section, the objective was to test the hypothesis that LRA will have enjoyed
popular support because it can easily access civilians, its membership is ethnically
connected with the population in Northern Uganda and civilians in this part of the country
believe that LRA will unseat the National Resistance Movement government. The
hypothesis was partially accepted. Popular support for the group primarily derived from its
original ideological commitment to liberate and its ethnic ties with the Acholi population.
The hypothesis was partially rejected on grounds that ethnicity was not an enduring basis
for popular support as it was undermined by LRA attacks targeting Acholi civilians.

6.1.3: Propaganda
Guerrilla warfare theories can account for the nature, forms and tactics of propaganda
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used in the conflict in Northern Uganda and the constraints that the Ugandan government
faces in having to fight LRA while remaining accountable to the citizenry. The LRA case
broadens our understanding of communicational warfare in insurgencies. Periods of peace
negotiations present the group with opportunities for conducting propaganda wars. In times
of war, it has not only to communicate to the population the shortcomings of the GoU but
also strenuously explain the logic behind its attacks on civilians.

On the other hand, lulls in the fighting (to facilitate peace negotiations) suspend the actual
need for a group to attack civilians and allows it to extend benevolence to selected
constituencies and also pin the GoU on issues at the heart of the conflict. Monnerot
attempts a theoretical explanation for this strategy: Where insurgents might be militarily on
the backfoot, they will test the resistance of the enemy by switching between “war talk” and
“peace talk.” 601 Empirically, it has been noted that whenever there are ceasefires to allow
peace negotiations to end the conflict in Northern Uganda, LRA positions itself as a selfless
peace-seeker whilst portraying the Government of Uganda (GoU) as a perennial war225

monger. The GoU finds it difficult to extricate itself from this propaganda trap because it
always suspects LRA of using peace overtures to regroup. On most of the occasions, peace
talks between the two parties have broken down because of this reason. 602

Under this section, the objective was to test two hypotheses: First, LRA will have used a
communicational campaign espousing the idea of an independent existence for its targeted
audience, pin-pointing political contradictions within the Ugandan polity and rationalizing
its recourse to violence. Second, LRA will have used overt propaganda techniques in
territories where it commands greater control over the population and covert techniques
where it has less control. Both hypotheses were accepted. The communicational campaign
of the group mainly addresses the idea of an Acholi polity. It justifies the need to dismantle
the old and construct a new order. LRA uses overt, stage-managed communicational antics
in its guerrilla bases and covert ones in areas controlled by the GoU.

6.1.4: Motivation
The theories of guerrilla warfare explain motivations for individuals participating in a
rebellion. Insurgents may be motivated by five factors: the drive to fight and die for their
comrades-in-arms; the perceived inevitability of victory for their rebel movement; the harsh
repercussions of attempting to defect from the guerrilla group; detachment from
mainstream society; and the sense of community that the insurgent organization gives them.
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Guerrilla warfare theorists also argue that over the course of their insurgent careers,

members of rebel groups find it difficult to disengage from insurgent activity because their
individual identities are subsumed by those of the rebel organizations.604

The LRA case shows the dynamics that may underpin shifts in motivation in overlapping
insurgencies. Changes in the motivation of LRA were caused by the following factors: The
motivational tendencies it inherited from other rebel movements; Changes in its life cycle
and the organization of its insurgent activities. The group’s motivation has since changed
from the drive to protect the Acholi people
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to profiteering 606 and currently, to securing

the survival of what remains of LRA. 607
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This research also reinforces the notion that different generations and ranks within an
insurgent organization may have different motivations and the overall motivation of the
organization will change overtime. LRA has had to harmonize the interests of its pioneering
officer corps who were motivated by the drive to reincarnate the Northern hegemony in
Ugandan politics with those of recently abducted members who are purely motivated by
survival.

The hypothesis that LRA fighters will have been motivated by idealistic and social
considerations was accepted. By seeking to emancipate the Acholi people, the pioneering
officer corps of LRA was pursuing a ‘selfless’ cause dictated by idealistic considerations.
By seeking to enjoy the trappings of insurgent power, the officer corps of the group are
currently pursuing ‘selfish’ causes dictated by social considerations. Equally, the rank-andfile harbour ‘selfish’ motivations. They participate in the group’s activities as long as it
takes them to escape from captivity.

6.1.5: Recruitment.
There is a discrepancy between existing theories of guerrilla warfare and the way LRA
recruits its members. In classical guerrilla warfare, rebel groups exploit prevailing
contradictions within the body politic to recuit members from among conscious members
of marginalized groups in society. Under this model, the insurgent organization has to
segment the population in order to identify and verify the credentials of prospective
members. 608 In addition, the integration of newly recruited members is gradualized in order
to test their long term commitment to the armed struggle. 609

Empirically, it has been observed that the above model does not fully accommodate
enlistment as practiced by LRA. Guerrilla warfare theories can explain the connection
between the collapse of the Northern hegemony and LRA initially recruiting its members
from soldiers of the defunct Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). However, given
the presumed idealistic basis of the LRA rebellion, all members would presumably have
enlisted in the group voluntarily.
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In discussing recruitment in LRA, we have observed that this is not the case. While
building its organizational structures, the group used persuasive and coercive approaches to
recruit former members of the Ugandan armed forces hailing from the North. While
broadly pursuing the same mission (resisting the rise of the South), LRA,
HSM I

612

and HSM II
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UPDA,
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adopted different approaches to the armed struggle. Because of

these doctrinal differences, Kony had to use force to recruit personnel from rival
organizations that otherwise subscribed to his worldview.

It has also been noted that shifts in popular support for its insurgent activities pushed LRA
to drop the strategy of voluntary recruitment altogether. The group started abducting
children to beef up its troop strength.
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Theoretically, the evolution of a largely youthful

fighting organization would present LRA with a critical challenge: Unlike adults who
would have joined the rebel group on their own volition (mainly out of ideological
conviction), children would lack the long term ideological commitment to participate in the
armed struggle and would potentially be susceptible to defection. Empirically, it has been
concluded that a rebel group can successfully indoctrinate members who are not
ideologically committed to its cause and stop them from defecting. In the case of LRA,
recruiters heighten the risks in children attempting to defect from the rebel group.
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The

above contrasting recruitment scenarios tie in with the preceding discussion on the
motivation of the group. The older fighters are predominantly swayed by idealistic and
social motivations while the younger ones, mainly social ones.

This section tested the hypothesis that LRA will have selectively recruited its members from
civic groups and constituencies that are either conscious and/or targets of marginalization
ostensibly perpetrated by the National Resistance Movement government. It was partially
accepted. Some pioneering members of LRA consciously joined the group after the
Northern hegemony of which they had been a part disintegrated. The group presented them
with an avenue for recapturing the positions they had lost. The hypothesis was partially
rejected on two grounds: First, despite being consciously committed to the reincarnation of
the Northern hegemony, some pioneering members of LRA were coerced into joining the
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group. Second, in the post-formative phase of its campaign, LRA has coercively recruited
and retained members who are/were not ideologically committed to its armed struggle.

6.2: LRA INSURGENT ATTRIBUTES: OPERATIONAL
6.2.1: Training.
The mode of training and induction used by LRA largely reinforces the principles of
insurgency. In consonance with guerrilla warfare theories, there is a relationship between
the strategy employed by the group and the training model that it adopts.
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Acknowledging the imbalance in military capabilities tilted in favour of Ugandan
government forces, LRA conducts training that adapts to its position of relative weakness.
The group aims to achieve this objective through economizing scarce resources,
marshalling self sufficiency and adapting to the military operational environment.

The LRA training model showcases some interesting features. In order to economize
resources, the group amalgamates training for its freshly recruited members with military
operations. 617 This approach yields three advantages: First, it saves LRA time. Recruits do
not have to reach the group’s guerrilla bases before learning how to fight. Second, recruits
gain first hand battlefield experience at an early stage in their careers. Third, the troop
strength of LRA raiding parties is beefed up by the availability of fresh recruits who can
participate in insurgent operations. In this context, the LRA case underlines the potential
role of time and career fast tracking in the economization of scarce resources in an
insurgency. However, it is important to note that recruits who are hurriedly trained may not
make good fighters. They may compromise the fighting capability of the group’s
operational units.

The LRA training model is also remarkable in other ways. It is merit-based. While all male
recruits are subjected to basic training, only those who are exceptionally talented go on to
undertake specialized training. On another score, the group uses a doctrine that its freshly
recruited members cannot fully interpret and challenge. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the
ideology of LRA is an amalgam of secular and faith-based explanations of the causes of
conflict in Northern Uganda.
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While some abductees may separately understand the
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religious and secular elements, the amalgamation of these ideals with traditional Acholi
religious practice makes the ideology of the group complex. This makes the group’s
doctrine difficult to interpret let alone challenge. While guerrilla warfare theories stress the
need for recruits to understand the ideology of an insurgent organization, the LRA case is
interesting in the way it shows that recruits who are introduced to a set of ideals they do not
fully comprehend will lack the capacity to challenge the basis for the armed struggle (even
if they were allowed to) yet they will also, ironically, continue serving in the insurgent
organization.

The hypothesis that LRA will either have designed or adopted a training model
commensurate with its military strategy and tactics and one that imparts combat and non
combat skills was accepted. Since it lacks the capacity to conventionally train its
manpower, LRA economizes resources by combining training with field operations. We
also accepted this hypothesis on grounds that LRA recruits are taught fighting skills
(military training) and indoctrinated (non-military training).

6.2.2: Career Progression.
Career progression in LRA is in tandem with the principles of insurgency. In order to earn
promotion within the structures of the group, new members have to demonstrate their long
term commitment to the armed struggle by graduating from handling simple to complex
tasks.
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However, the LRA case is remarkable in the way it shows the challenges in

managing the career progression of conscripted members of an insurgent group. Recruits in
LRA move from emotionally resisting the LRA insurgent lifestyle to fully accepting it or
merely continuing to serve in the group just to survive. 620 The efficacy of this model highly
depends on the gradual institution of promotional incentives, standardization, perceived
equity and security in the career progression of members of the group. There was no
specific hypothesis generated for this phenomenon. The discussion on career progression is
intended to offer insights into the induction and integration of recruits into the structures of
LRA.
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6.2.3: Organizational Structure.
In terms of organizational structure, LRA defies the principles of insurgency. Guerrilla
warfare theories stress the need for a separation of the military and non-military and the
subordination of the military to the non-military organs of an insurgent organization.
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This approach positions politics at the heart of the armed struggle, maintains a healthy
connection between a guerrilla group and the population
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and prevents it from

degenerating into a mercenary or criminal enterprise. The LRA case shows that a rebel
group may fuse the organs of its leadership structures, sever its relations with the
population and yet remain in operation for a long time. By extension, since it would lack
leadership tiers that keep it politically connected (and preferably accountable) to the
population, this kind of group could add a criminal dimension to its insurgent activities. 623

LRA upsets the principles of insurgency in other ways. Theoretically, a durable insurgency
(one that lasts for a long time) evolves in a systematic manner. It develops from the
subversive (formative) stage where its military capability is almost non-existent and its
leadership channeled through highly autonomous and clandestine cells to the guerrilla
phase where it’s military capability increases and a measure of centralized command and
control is introduced in the group’s activities. When the group significantly strengthens its
military capability, then the rebellion graduates from the phase of guerrilla warfare to that
of conventional warfare where leadership becomes more centralized.

Over the course of its life cycle, LRA has exhibited a non-linear development of its
organizational structures. At the formative stage, the group was structured like a guerrilla
army. While retaining the attributes of a hierarchical organization, LRA gave its field
operational units a measure of autonomy in executing assigned tasks. This was not in
conformity with the principles of insurgency. By commencing its campaign with a guerrilla
disposition, the group had ‘skipped’ the subversive phase. There was one potential problem
with this development: The premature transition from one stage to another would make
LRA underprepared to fight government forces. When it started receiving Sudanese
military aid, LRA assumed a more formally centralized chain of command. The structural
disposition of the group at this stage was equally at odds with the theories of insurgency.
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This was essentially the second stage in the LRA campaign. The group should have been
adopting guerrilla warfare. When external support for its activities ceased, LRA reverted to
centralized command and control but with field operational units enjoying a greater degree
of autonomy.
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The fact that LRA failed to sustain centralized command and control

beyond the phase of Sudanese support for its activities means it may have prematurely
graduated from the stage of guerrilla warfare to that of conventional warfare.

Whilst the LRA model oscillates between formal and informal centralized command, as
Head of LRA, Kony is perennially the centre of gravity and commands the levers of control
in the rebel group. Although he delegates functions to his juniors, Kony wields immense
power and influence deriving from the aura of invincibility he commands as Head of LRA.
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In order to safeguard against internal coups, Kony is unpredictable in the way he makes

his decisions. This keeps his juniors guessing as to what his next set of commands might
be.
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In the event Kony was either captured or killed by Ugandan security forces or

overthrown by his lieutenants, LRA would have to grapple with the challenge of identifying
a leader who would fit into the group’s existing leadership model. If Kony’s successor
chose to introduce a new leadership style, it would be interesting to establish how this
would improve or undermine the group’s fortunes.

This section tested the hypothesis that LRA will have evolved as a politico-military
organization characterized by a structural separation of functions, with its armed wing
subordinated to its political wing. It was rejected. The group has largely not evolved as a
politico-military organization. Save for the very brief period (the Juba peace talks) when it
constituted the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM), LRA has largely operated without a
political wing. Defying the theories of insurgency, while it existed, LRM was subordinate
to LRA. This hypothesis was also rejected on grounds that LRA does not exhibit a
separation of powers and functions within its structures. For example as Head of LRA,
Kony is a military and spiritual leader.
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6.2.4: Guerrilla Bases.
Theoretically, guerrillas grapple with the challenge of striking a balance between
maintaining mobility and establishing a fixed insurgent presence. Whereas mobility allows
them the opportunity of avoiding costly armed confrontations with the enemy along a fixed
frontline,
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the creation of safe sanctuaries gives insurgents space in which recuperation,

training and the building of para-state structures can be realized. 628

However, on one hand, rebels cannot perpetually be mobile. At some point in an insurgent
campaign, they have to engage the enemy, seize territory and assemble para-state
institutions to buttress the population under their control. On the other, the evolution of
guerrilla bases allows government forces to use their superior conventional military
capability to attack areas of fixed insurgent activity. Guerrillas can minimize the chances of
government forces destroying their bases by situating them in areas characterized by rugged
terrain, preferably located in places with a history of insurgent activity or better still on
foreign territory where a state would have to violate the territorial sovereignty of the host
country to attack these sanctuaries. 629

LRA always locates its sanctuaries on foreign territory and in topographically inaccessible
areas with a history of armed insurrection. In situating its bases on foreign territory, the
group exploits weak state control of the host country to achieve either of two objectives:
Establish a fixed insurgent presence without the consent of the host country
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or with the

consent of the host country, use its forces to assist the host country in strengthening its
control in the area where the LRA bases are located.
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This study also shows that a

guerrilla organization can use its bases to reinforce its identity and operationalize its
insurgent activities. In terms of reinforcing its identity, LRA marshals ideological
consistency by artistically embedding its ideals in the physical infrastructure of its
sanctuaries.
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As theatres for operationalizing its insurgent activities, the group’s bases

showcase its organizational priorities. To this effect, Kit Valley and Garamba Forest
reflected the critical importance LRA attaches to the health of its fighters and the need to
marshal technology and food security. 633
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Under this section, the objective was to test two hypotheses: First, LRA will have located its
bases in topographically inaccessible areas to limit attacks on them. Second, the LRA
insurgency will have been located in an area with a history of armed insurrection and
susceptibility to weak central government control. Both were accepted. LRA bases in the
Imatong hills and Garamba forest were topographically inaccessible and in areas with a
history of rebellions.

6.2.5: Funding and External Support
Theoretically, relying on popular support and criminal activity and exploiting existing geopolitical contradictions regionally, a guerrilla group can prosecute a relatively cheap
insurgent campaign.
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In the case of LRA, there is an interesting relationship between

shifts in the group’s theatres of insurgent activities and the resource mobilization strategy
that it employs. While the group was solely operating in Northern Uganda (at the stage of
formation), it relied on its own initiatives to mobilize resources. It cultivated and sustained
cordial relations with the population in Acholiland and the community of Acholis in the
diaspora which reciprocated by funding its activities. 635
With the exception of parts of Southern Sudan inhabited by Acholi speaking people, 636 the
relocation of its bases to a foreign country would largely have stripped LRA of its capacity
for resource mobilization and handed this initiative to its host country. However, while
accepting support from Khartoum, LRA sought to maintain a measure of self reliance by
partly depending on its own initiatives to fund its activities. It plundered villages in
Southern Sudan.
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In this direction, it can be concluded that the viability of external

support for LRA activities is contingent on the group maintaining self initiative in resource
mobilization.

While guerrilla warfare theories hinge external support for an insurgent group on poor
relations between its host state and country of origin, the LRA case defies this law. When
there was a thawing in relations between Uganda and Sudan, the Khartoum establishment
continued covertly funding LRA to specifically destabilize the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA)-run Southern Sudan. 638
234

This section tested the hypothesis that LRA will have relied on popular support and
criminal activity domestically and exploited existing geo-political contradictions regionally
to mobilize resources for prosecuting a relatively cheap insurgent campaign. It was
partially accepted on two grounds. First, external support for LRA can be linked to
deterioration in relations between Uganda and Sudan. Second, given its reliance on plunder,
the notion that LRA will have relied on criminal activity to fund its campaign holds true.
On the other hand, the idea that the group will have depended on popular support to fund its
campaign was rejected. Three developments undermined popular support-driven funding
for LRA activities: First, the Government of Uganda (GoU) curtailed LRA-Acholi
interaction by creating protected villages. Second, the GoU created civil defence groups to
fight LRA. Third, LRA reacted to the above developments by attacking Acholi civilians as
a way of ‘punishing’ them for ‘collaborating’ with the GoU. The harsh reaction by LRA
alienated it from the Acholi population and undermined its chances of continuing to receive
popular support-driven funding for its insurgent activities.

6.2.6: Strategy and Tactics.
Guerrilla warfare theories draw a distinction between combatant-to-combatant and
combatant-to-civilian engagements in insurgencies. In combatant-to-combatant encounters,
they generally prescribe a strategy centred around protracted, selective confrontational
contact with, adaptation to the relative strength of the enemy, maintaining alertness,
marshalling terrain and locality intelligence and mobility and attacks on soft enemy targets.
In addition, they stress the need for the military doctrine of an insurgent group to evolve
autonomous of but without negating its ideology and the deployment of the capabilities of a
rebel army according to the manifesting strength of the enemy. 639

Empirically, LRA combatant-to-combatant strategy and tactics largely conform to the
above theoretical blueprint. The group serializes its contact with the enemy, mainly
splitting up and dispersing its units, avoiding armed confrontation with the Uganda
People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) that manifest in strength and only randomly ambushing
them while in transit.
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In seeking to marshal terrain and locality intelligence, LRA
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deploys its fighters in their respective areas of origin and conscripts guides into its
operational units. 641

In terms of combatant-to-civilian engagements, the modus operandi of LRA equally
conforms to existing principles of insurgency. Theoretically, terrorism unsettles states.
While guerrillas choose to elude government soldiers and attack civilians, government
soldiers are not often in a position to establish confrontational contact with the insurgents in
order to protect the population. As a result, the state military establishment overreacts by
instituting harsh counterinsurgency measures which end up alienating the population. 642

In reinforcing the above theoretical perspectives, LRA conducts random and selective
attacks on lightly guarded Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) camps and lightly armed self
defence groups. 643 This strategy creates a troop deployment dilemma for Ugandan security
forces. On one hand, beefing up forces at IDPs reduces the number of soldiers available to
pursue highly elusive rebel units. On the other, prioritizing the pursuit of LRA rebels
exposes civilians and non-military infrastructure to terrorist attack.

However, it is worth noting that in other respects, the LRA case is at variance with existing
principles of insurgency. The establishment of IDPs in Northern Uganda was not a reaction
to the terrorist activity of LRA. The group started employing terrorism after the Ugandan
state had established IDPs and self defence groups.
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In this context, it can be concluded

that terrorist activity does not only manifest as a precipitant for the institution of harsh
counterinsurgency measures. It can also unfold as a reaction to stringent counterinsurgency
measures.

This study also showcases some of the approaches that a group may use to rationalize its
use of terrorism. LRA exploits the interaction between its propaganda and military strategy
to admit and deflect responsibility for terrorist activities in Northern Uganda.
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This

approach not only seeks to repair its image but also where the population remains
unconvinced, it attempts to establish a balance of notoriety between the guerrilla
organization and the government.
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In discussing the terrorist strategy of LRA, it is important to specify two points: In terms of
using this approach (qualitative extent), LRA is in conformity with the theories of
insurgencies. Rebel groups may attack civilians to demonstrate their military capability,
expose the state’s incapacity to protect its citizens and discourage civilians from
collaborating with government forces in counterinsurgency operations. However, in terms
of the extent to which it uses this strategy (quantitative extent), the modus operandi of LRA
is in disconformity with guerrilla warfare theory. For nearly 25 years, the group has
excessively concentrated on attacking civilians.

Under this section, four hypotheses were tested: First, LRA military strategy will have been
based on the prosecution of an unpredictable, protracted insurgent campaign, selectively
targeting loop-holes in the capability of the enemy whilst allowing it to adapt to its own
condition of relative military weakness. Second, LRA will have selectively attacked
civilians to expose the Ugandan state as incapable of protecting its citizens. In turn, the
government will have been pushed to adopt a heavy handed approach to tracking down the
rebels.. Third, LRA will have attacked weak points in the military capability of the
Ugandan state and avoided outright confrontation with government forces. Fourth, LRA
will have used terrain intelligence to marshal mobility, conduct deceptive movements in its
theatres of insurgent activity and mount ambushes against the enemy.

The first hypothesis was accepted. LRA conducts some random attacks which make its
campaign unpredictable. It has serialized its insurgent campaign over a period of 25 years.
Although the group lacks the conventional military capability to take on the Uganda
People’s Defence Forces, it is in a position to exploit UPDF’s incapacity to simultaneously
protect civilians and pursue marauding rebel units.

The second was partially rejected. LRA attacks on civilians did not precede the GoU
strategy of creating strategic hamlets and civil defence groups. The group adopted this
strategy as a reaction to these two developments. The third was accepted. By attacking
protected villages, LRA seeks to demonstrate that the strategy of curtailing insurgentcivilian contact is unachievable. It was also accepted on grounds that when it’s military
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resource base narrowed (especially in the wake of Operation Lightening Thunder), LRA
has avoided contact with government forces and concentrated on attacking civilians.

The fourth hypothesis was accepted. When retreating from theatres of combat, LRA field
operational units use their knowledge of the operational environment to lure UPDF
counterinsurgency units into circular movements. In order to marshal locality intelligence,
the group deploys its fighters in their areas of origin.

6.2.7: Weapons and Weapons Acquisition.
There is a confluence between the principles governing the acquisition and use of weapons
in guerrilla warfare and the modus operandi of LRA. Theoretically, the type, acquisition
and use of weapons in insurgencies are largely dictated by the prevailing balance in
confrontational advantages between an insurgent organization and the state military
establishment. When the scale is initially tilted in favour of government forces, guerrillas
will seek to acquire and use weapons that are readily available and relatively cheap to avoid
running short of coercive power, light to allow for mobility and concealability, usable to
ease training and those with a good range and firepower to earn insurgents the respect of
the enemy. 646

Empirically, the acquisition and use of weapons by LRA has been dictated by the
confluence of its status as an insurgent group and the strategic calculations of its principle
supplier. To this effect, the group predominantly acquired from Sudan and used weapons
that are light, easy to use and conceal and with the range and firepower for LRA to
destabilize Uganda. Sudan mainly supplied the group with light weapons 647 that would not
make it difficult for Sudanese security forces to deal with a future LRA security threat.

This section tested the hypothesis that LRA will have used a wide range of weapons
according to availability and will have purchased and stolen its arms and ammunition from
a variety of domestic and foreign sources. It was partially accepted on two grounds. The
group uses a wide array of weapons. Its arms range from machetes and clubs to AK 47
assault rifles and Surface to Air Missiles (SAM). Before Uganda-Sudan relations improved,
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Sudan (a foreign source) was the principle supplier of arms to LRA. The group may also
have purchased weapons from arms dealers supplying different fighting groups in the Great
Lakes Region of Africa. It was partially rejected because there was no evidence pointing to
LRA acquiring some of its arms domestically through theft.

6.3: Research Questions Revisited.
Through a systematic review of the principles of insurgency, a set of 16 hypotheses was
generated and tested on the insurgent attributes of the group. As is evident in this study, the
modus operandi of LRA largely conforms to the principles of insurgency. In areas where
there is a discrepancy between theory and practice, guerrilla warfare theories still provide a
benchmark on the basis of which the LRA insurgent model can be understood. In this
context, it can be asserted that the theories of guerrilla warfare are useful in explaining the
insurgent activities of LRA.

Deriving from the primary/broad research question, the task in this study was to answer two
secondary/specific research questions: How does LRA reconcile the need for popular
support with its sustained attacks on civilians? Why has LRA not systematically graduated
from the guerrilla to the conventional warfare phases of its insurgent campaign?

6.3.1: Attacking the Support Base
Existing principles of insurgency accommodate scenarios where rebels may attack civilians
and yet retain their support. Theoretically, under such circumstances, a guerrilla group
would not be enjoying popular support per se. Rather, its ethnic connections with civilians
in its theatres of insurgent activities, its capacity to violently access civilians and civilian
infrastructure, the opportunistic calculations of the population and the ruthlessness of
counterinsurgency operations mounted by the state military apparatus would combine to
either make the population a passive or unwilling supporter of the group’s activities. 648

Empirically, it has been observed that the interaction between its military and propaganda
strategies assists LRA in harmonizing the need for popular support with its sustained
attacks on civilians. As discussed in Chapter 5, the LRA leadership explains the terrorist
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dimension to the conflict in Northern Uganda from three perspectives: First, given the
autonomy that its operational units enjoy, the top LRA leadership does not authorize all the
terrorist attacks that its units carry out. Lt Col Otim reveals that the abduction of the
students of Aboke Girls School was never sanctioned by the LRA top leadership. Second,
where LRA conducts attacks on civilians, it has no choice in light of the fact that the
Ugandan state pursues a policy of militarizing the population in order to fight LRA. In this
case, civilians are a legitimate military target. Third, some of the terrorist attacks attributed
to LRA are in fact false-flag operations mounted by Ugandan security forces aimed at
discrediting the group.
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While LRA seems to prioritize popular support only up to that

point where it does not work against its military strategy, its brutal treatment of civilians
points to a probable commitment to using excessive coercion. In this case, if it relaxed the
use of violence, civilians would cease joining it and presumably, it would collapse.

6.3.2: Evolution of Military Strategy.
Given the imbalance in military capabilities tilted in favour of the state military
establishment, most guerrilla warfare theorists prescribe a strategy based on a protracted
insurgent campaign against government forces. To this end, Giap asserts that a guerrilla
campaign should systematically graduate from a defensive through equilibrium and
ultimately to a stage of offensive warfare. 650

In this connection, over the course of its life cycle, LRA should have systematically
followed the above linear trajectory. Instead, it has been observed that the group has
adopted a non-linear approach in developing its insurgent strategy largely dictated by the
prevailing balance in military capabilities in the conflict in Northern Uganda. At the stage
of formation, LRA employed guerrilla warfare. When it started receiving military support
from Sudan, the group fought more like a conventional army. When Sudan withdrew
support for its activities, LRA reverted to using guerrilla warfare. When faced with a full
scale regional counterinsurgency campaign, the group is avoiding outright contact with
government forces. 651

240

From the above exposition, it can be noted that although it has not systematically followed
a linear trajectory, LRA has at one point in its life cycle graduated to a conventional
warfare phase of its insurgent campaign. The fact that it has been able to shift back and
forth between different stages in the development of its military strategy suggests that it
operates highly flexible organizational structures. The organizational model of the group
accommodates formal and informal centralized command structures. For example as Head
of LRA, Kony epitomizes the fusion of military and spiritual powers.
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Normally, this

would mean that the group exhibits a highly centralized leadership hierarchy with absolute
power vested in the leader of the group.

However, the supreme decision-making organ of the group is Control Alter of which the
Head of LRA is a member.

653

This structural feature points to the propensity for Kony to

democratize decision-making in his organization. Yet, the principle of shared decisionmaking in LRA is negated by the fact that before issues are tabled in Control Alter, Kony
ostensibly has to be guided by the Holy Spirit. Given the faith-related foundation of LRA,
members of Control Alter would find it difficult challenging commands tabled by Kony
and ostensibly coming from The Holy Spirit.

The significance of the above model is that it does not allow LRA to stick to one military
approach. When it experiences shifts in its military strength and external support for its
insurgent activities, the group is in a position to flexibly switch back and forth between
different phases in the evolution of its military strategy and organizational structures.

In wrapping up the discussion on the insurgent credentials of LRA, it can be asserted that
on one hand, the group defies the theories of insurgency in that it favours coercion over
persuasion and yet it continues to survive. On the other hand, it lends support to those
theories in the sense that its preference for coercion is self-limiting. It cannot reach the
requisite threshold of popular support which, coupled with enhanced military capability, are
prerequisites for systematically pushing its campaign from the guerrilla to the conventional
warfare phase let alone presenting a formidable and legitimate challenge to the authority of
the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government.
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CHAPTER 7
IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

7.1: TARGETING LRA ATTRIBUTES: IDENTITY
7.1.1: Targeting Ideology.
Given resource and political constraints, targeting the ideology of an insurgent group
should be based on a hierarchy of priorities. The state should decide on which set of
grievances to address in the short (immediate), medium and long term. The rebellion in
Northern Uganda has essentially been fuelled by the evolution of disparities in the
distribution of political power and resources in the country. 654 At the outset of the conflict,
the state could only target one element in the set of grievances advanced by rebel groups in
Northern Uganda—human rights violations. In the wake of a public outcry over the
atrocities committed by the 35th Battalion of the National Resistance Army (NRA), the
Government of Uganda (GoU) instituted an immediate (short term) measure to disable the
ideology of the rebel groups. It withdrew the military unit from Northern Uganda. 655

By itself, this measure was not sufficient to stop a series of rebellions from evolving in this
part of the country. Disparities in the distribution of political power and resources still
lingered. Yet measures aimed at addressing these grievances (like economic reconstruction
programmes and levelling of the political playing field) would only yield concrete results in
the medium and long term. The dilemma for Ugandan counterinsurgency strategists then
lay in sustaining the military campaign against the insurgents in the short term without
undermining the probable positive outcome of the hearts and minds programmes (economic
reconstruction and political inclusiveness) in the medium and long term.

Given the relationship between the overlap in rebellions in Northern Uganda and the
increase in ideological radicalization, the key to resolving the above dilemma lies in the
state not negotiating with the group emerging at the tail end of the series of insurgencies.
When the conflict in this part of the country got underway, the pioneering group (UPDA)
pursued a relatively more moderate agenda which the state could accommodate (as it did)
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through a negotiated settlement. Successive rebel groups (HSM I, HSM II and LRA)
espoused more radical ideals that the state could not accommodate

When more radical groups emerge at a time the hearts and minds programmes have started
coming to fruition, the state should close the door on negotiations for two reasons: First, the
success of economic reconstruction and programmes aimed at instituting political
inclusiveness would have provided a foundation for undermining popular support for the
radical groups. Second, the radical agenda adopted by these groups would have narrowed
the space needed for arriving at a negotiated settlement to the armed conflict. In this case, a
full-blown military offensive that surgically targets the radical groups would not
significantly alienate the population. The population would percieve the radical rebel
groups as spoilers.

7.1.2: Targeting Propaganda.
It has been argued that during periods of belligerence with the Ugandan government, LRA
is constrained in using propaganda to execute its insurgent campaign. Because it attacks the
Acholi population (which should have been its natural, ethnic popular support base), its
propaganda campaign has not only to expose and exaggerate the failings of the NRM
government but also strenously rationalize its terrorist approach.
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On the other hand,

peace talks shift the focus to the issues at the heart of the conflict (usually the failings of the
state) and overly suspend the need for LRA to account for its terrorist attacks. In order to
psychologically undermine the image of such a group in the public domain, the state should
not conduct negotiations with it.

However, there are caveats to using this tactic: First, the group should have emerged at the
tail end of a series of rebellions. Second, it should have adopted a radical ideology that
narrows the scope for arriving at a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Third, its terrorist
attacks should be targeting its natural, ethnic support constituency. Fourth, by the time the
state shuts the door on peace talks, its medium and long term hearts and minds programmes
should have started coming to fruition. In the case of Uganda, the Acholi population should
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percieve LRA as a stumbling block to the reintegration of the North into the Ugandan
political process.

7.1.3: Targeting Popular Support.
Thus far, in targeting the popular support base of LRA, the calculations of the Ugandan
state have been twofold: First, in light of the enduring North-South regional divide, the
natural, ethnic support constituency for LRA would be the Acholi. In this case, the
Ugandan state security apparatus would need to keep an eye on the activities of this
population. However, this measure would not fully prevent LRA from interacting with
civilians since the state would lack the manpower and resources to institute water-tight
surveillance. Second, in order to try and cut any lingering links between LRA and the
Acholi, the Ugandan state has had to quarantine the population in the theatre of the
insurgency. 657

From the discussion on popular support for LRA activities (Chapter 4), it has been deduced
that these tactics are based on shaky assumptions. Ethnicity as a basis for popular support is
sustainable only in situations where the rebels and the population enjoy good relations. As
is the case with LRA and the Acholi population, poor relations can evolve between a rebel
group and its natural, ethnic support constituency. This means that the Ugandan state would
only need to keep the Acholi population under surveillance not because it shares ethnic
connections with LRA but because it enjoys cordial relations with the rebel group. Since, as
discussed in Chapter 4, LRA is no longer popular in Acholiland,
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the state would then

need to shift from conducting blanket surveillance of the Acholi as a potential support base
to targeted surveillance of specific elements within this constituency who might support the
activities of the group

As observed in Chapter 4, deterioration in LRA-Acholi relations has not led to
improvement in NRM-Acholi relations. Since the creation of protected villages has only
achieved half its intended purpose (minimized LRA-Acholi interaction but not improved
NRM-Acholi relations), then a counterinsurgency strategy based on the creation of strategic
hamlets needs revisiting. NRM-Acholi relations have not significantly improved because of
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the squalid conditions in the protected camps.
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In order to improve state-population

cooperation in counterinsurgency campaigns, the state would have to let civilians return to
their natural habitats. However, this measure would potentially re-expose them to insurgent
attacks as the state would not be able to concentrate a sufficient number of forces in all
areas to protect them.

In order to mitigate the above risk, the state would count on two advantages: First, releasing
the population from squalor in the protected camps and reintegrating the conflict affected
region back into the national political process would reduce resentment towards the state.
Second, deriving from the first advantage, the state would establish civil defence groups to
bolster security in areas inhabited by civilians. With resentment towards the state receding,
civilians in the theatre of insurgency would be motivated to actively participate in
counterinsurgency campaigns.

7.1.4: Targeting Motivation.
Over the course of the armed conflict in Northern Uganda, the motivation of LRA has been
changing. At its formative stage (when its officer corps was dorminated by former fighters
of the Uganda People’s Democratic Army), the group was motivated by the drive to protect
the Acholi people against potential extermination and reclaim the political power the North
had lost to the South.
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When the chances of the group ever seizing state power

diminished as a result of effective counterinsurgency campaigns, the strategic calculations
of Sudan (its principle backer) and receding popular support, motivation in the group
assumed different dimensions: The officer corps were motivated by two considerations:
First, the need to elude the long arm of retributive justice in light of the atrocities allegedly
committed by the group.
insurgent power.
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Second, the drive to sustain what remains of their trappings of

On the other hand, the conscripted rank-and-file were largely

motivated by the desire to survive while awaiting the opportunity to escape from captivity.
663

Given the above dynamics, the state adopted a multi-pronged strategy to undercut the
motivation of the rebel group. While LRA was being motivated by idealistic considerations,
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the state undermined its popular support base by instituting a hearts and minds programme
aimed at making the North feel like an integral part of Uganda. While curbing human rights
violations in the short run would have reduced Acholi resentment towards the government,
the effectiveness of the hearts and minds strategy highly depended on the long term success
of economic rehabilitation programmes and the reintegration of the region into the Ugandan
political process.

When the fear of retributive justice became a motivating factor, the Ugandan Parliament
passed the Amnesty Act 2000 to instigate defections from and schisms within LRA.

664

This approach was highly selective. While it opened the door for the mid-level officer corps
and the rank-and-file to abandon the armed struggle, it excluded the top leadership of LRA.
In order to retain its manpower, the top commanders of the group would have to act in a
more repressive manner towards their juniors. This would potentially cause infighting
within the group.

During the Juba peace talks, some quarters pushed for a strategy that would specifically
demotivate the top leadership of LRA. The International Crisis Group stressed the need for
a peace deal that would specifically address the post-conflict security and livelihood
concerns of Kony and his top lieutenants. 665 This arrangement would see the International
Criminal Court (ICC) indictees relocate to a country that is not signatory to the ICC Statute.
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In this regard, the host country would not be obliged to hand the indictees to the Hague-

based court for trial. The top leadership of the group would also be guaranteed a
comfortable post-insurgency livelihood that would render the trappings of insurgent power
unattractive.

7.1.5: Targeting Recruitment.
LRA’s recruitment methods are dictated by the level of popular support it enjoys and its
capacity to access the population. On the basis of this assertion, there are four potential
recruitment scenarios for the group: In the first scenario, LRA enjoys popular support and
can access the population. Civilians easily take the initiative or LRA persuades them to join
the group; In the second, LRA enjoys popular support but cannot easily access the
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population because it is interned in protected villages. Civilians try to sneak out or the LRA
tries to sneak or force its way into the protected villages to recruit members; In the third,
LRA does not enjoy popular support but can access the population. It needs minimal force
to conscript civilians; In the fourth, LRA does not enjoy popular support and cannot easily
access the population because it is interned in protected villages. It needs maximum force
to overcome the units guarding the protected villages in order to recruit members.

At its formative stage, LRA faced a recruitment challenge. In seeking to constitute its
membership, it had not only to interface with the population but also other groups fighting
the NRM government. Whereas at this stage, the group did not have to conscript civilians
into its ranks as it enjoyed popular support
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and could easily access the population (first

recruitment scenario), due to rivalry, it had to use a combination of persuasion and coercion
to recruit members from armed groups that ironically shared a similar long term goal with
it. 668

At this juncture, a three-way counter-recruitment strategy would have sufficed: First, the
state would have improved the human rights record of the army thereby curtailing part of
the popular support enjoyed by the insurgent group. In pursuing this approach, the NRM
government withdrew the indisciplined 35th Battalion of NRA from the theatre of the
insurgency.
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However, this positive move was undermined by subsequent cases of

human rights violations by other units of the Ugandan military. 670 Second, since this would
be the pioneering group (with a moderate ideology) in what would be an evolving chain of
insurgencies, the state would consider negotiating with this group (as NRM did with
UPDA) 671 in order to further curtail popular support for those that would succeed it.

Third, in case the state concluded an agreement with the pioneering group, it would have to
quickly attack any splinter factions that would have rejected the peace deal before they
constituted the pioneering membership of a new insurgent group. In the aftermath of the
signing of the Pece Peace Accord, Kony attacked and forcefully incorporated into his
evolving guerrilla army all the splinter factions that had rejected this agreement.
state should have mounted a concerted campaign to neutralize LRA at this stage.
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The

Subsequent to the formative phase, LRA has been faced with the fourth recruitment
scenario. It has been unpopular
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and not able to easily access the population.

674

As a

result, it has had to attack units guarding protected villages in order to recruit among
civilians.

675

In this case, the state would have had two counter-recruitment options: The

first would have entailed beefing up security at the protected camps in order to stave off
potential LRA recruitment raids. However, this approach would not have been without
drawbacks. As was the case with Acholi-Pii, 676 the group has demonstrated the capacity to
breach the security of protected villages (strategic hamlets). Besides, the squalid conditions
in the camps increased Acholi resentment towards the NRM government. The second
would have involved releasing the population back into its natural habitat. Although this
move would have re-exposed them to rebel attacks, the reduction in resentment towards the
government would have boosted civil defence activity potentially curtailing LRA’s capacity
to attack civilians in homes and farming fields.

However, it is important to note that children at schools would still constitute ideal
recruitment targets of the group.677 Unlike situations where they would have to attack
numerous homes scattered over a wide area, the high concentration of recruitable material
in one place would tempt LRA raiding parties to square off against units guarding these
institutions. Where the state has to prioritize its deployment, the protection of civilians
especially children in schools should take precedence.

7.2: TARGETING LRA ATTRIBUTES: OPERATIONAL
7.2.1: Targeting Training.
There are two cardinal features of the LRA training model: First, training is amalgamated
with military operations. Abductees are taught how to fight while LRA units are still in the
field.

678

This saves the group time, gives the recruits hands-on experience and in the

immediate aftermath of abductions, increases the number of fighters available for insurgent
activity. Second, recruits are subjected to a brand of indoctrination that is difficult to
interpret and challenge. 679 While some abductees may be conversant with the principles of
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Christianity, Islam, Acholi traditional religion and nationalism, a cocktail of these laced
with extreme fear makes for difficult interpretation.

In order to target the first feature, government forces should allow the raiding parties no
time to train the abductees. This calls for hot pursuit mounted by highly mobile, rapid
response units. Faced with this challenge, LRA field units would most likely prioritize
rapid retreat over the training of recruits. As a result, in terms of manpower,
counterinsurgency units would not have to face an enhanced rebel capability. Since the
group’s indoctrination is particularly tailored to psychologically manipulate children,
survival-in-captivity and escape-from-captivity skills should be taught and integrated into
the Ugandan school curricular. These courses would equip pupils with the skills to cope
with emotional-transitional phases that are likely to be caused by LRA indoctrination (in
case they are abducted).

7.2.2: Targeting Organizational Structure.
LRA is a hierarchical organization. 680 Although counterinsurgency pressure may push it to
change its structural posture,
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it largely exhibits centralized command and control and a

fusion of powers. The neutralization of Kony would have far reaching implications. In the
event he surrendered, was captured or killed, LRA would struggle to identify another
commander with the credentials to fit into his fused military and ‘spiritual’ roles. Within
the structures of the group, Control Alter is the only tier where LRA appears to exhibit a
measure of shared decision-making. Collegial (shared) leadership within the group allows
leaders other than the Head to grow in confidence. In case the Head were eliminated, then
the organization would not be short of personnel to step into his shoes. If government
forces killed or captured all or most members of Control Alter (where effective leadership
is nurtured), then LRA would disintegrate. There would be no other tier of leadership from
which the group would produce leaders.
As stressed by the International Crisis Group and Enough, the Lord’s Resistance Movement
(the political wing of LRA) is highly peripheral to its structures. During the Juba peace
process, the Government of Uganda (GoU) should never have negotiated with an LRA
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peace team predominantly made up of LRM members. It should have insisted on holding
direct talks with Kony and Otti who wielded real power within the structures of the group.
682

This should be an emphasis for any future talks.

7.2.3: Targeting Guerrilla Bases.
In setting up its bases, LRA is guided by two calculations: In Sudan, it exploited poor
relations between Uganda and Sudan.
exploited weak state control.
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In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it

In both cases, the site of the bases was in an area that was

not easily accessible.
In order to counteract the above calculations, Uganda improved her relations with Sudan 685
and DRC
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respectively. While none of Uganda’s neighbours is officially offering the

group a sanctuary, weak state control and large swathes of rugged terrain in the Great Lakes
Region still give it multiple options for setting up new bases. Thus, it was not enough for
Uganda to ask Sudan to expel LRA from Southern Sudan. Measures should have been
taken to block its relocation to other favourable areas. After concluding the Nairobi Accord
that repaired Uganda-Sudan relations, Ugandan, Sudanese, Congolese, United Nations
Mission in Congo (MONUC) and United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) forces
should have attempted to block the group’s relocation from Southern Sudan to the densely
forested tri-border region of Central Africa.

7.2.4: Targeting Funding and External Support.
Over the course of its life cycle, LRA has used three avenues to fund its insurgent
campaign: It has recieved support from the Government of Sudan (GoS)
Acholis in the diaspora.
activity.
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and some

It has also preyed on the population in its theatres of insurgent

Of all the three sources of funding, most analysts attribute the longevity of the

group to the support it received from Sudan.
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Beyond the signing of the Nairobi Accord

that normalized Uganda-Sudan relations in 1999,
continued aiding LRA. 692
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691

the GoS is suspected to have covertly

Whereas financial support by Acholis in the diaspora was also instrumental in sustaining
the group, that aid is likely to have ended in 2008 for two reasons: First, most exiled
supporters of LRA from the North live in Western countries. 693 United States (US) support
for counter LRA Operation Lightening Thunder (2008/2009)
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would have had serious

implications for individuals and groups supporting the group. With cooperation agreements
between the US and most Western countries, Acholi financiers of LRA risked being tried
for financing terrorism and having their assets frozen.

Second, the rift that emerged between LRA (the military wing) and LRM (the political
wing) during the Juba peace talks may have triggered an end to Acholi diasporian support
for the group. While Kony refused to sign the Final Peace Agreement, the LRA peace team
largely made up of Acholis in the diaspora (LRM) favoured a negotiated end to the conflict
in Northern Uganda.
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It is also worth noting that during the Juba peace process (2005-

2008), the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS),
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Government of Uganda (GoU)

697

and international aid agencies supplied LRA with basic necessities to discourage it from
preying on the population and encourage it to participate in the peace negotiations. 698

In future, the state may have to re-consider the policy of supplying rebels with essential
needs during negotiations. Since LRA has always gone on to use these supplies to re-launch
its campaign, then this approach might be worth abandoning. In order to assess the future
prospects of LRA re-securing external support, we would need to consider a number of
factors: The seccession of Southern Sudan from Sudan, relations between the newly created
Government of South Sudan and Government of Sudan and the challenges of governance
facing the two states. 699 These recent developments are discussed in detail in Section 7.3

If the start of Operation Lightening Thunder (2008/2009) marked the end of all external
support for LRA, then for three years (2008-2011), the group has been able to sustain its
activities by preying on the population. But as discussed in Chapter 5, LRA did not start
preying on the population in 2008/2009. While operating in Northern Uganda (without
external support) and Southern Sudan (with external support), the group preyed on the
population. This makes plunder the most enduring source of funding for LRA. In this
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respect, the long term key to crippling funding for the group lies not in the decapitation of
its external support arms but in the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure.

7.2.5: Targeting Strategy and Tactics.
Among other reasons, LRA attacks civilians in order to cause a troop deployment dilemma
for the state.
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The Ugandan military has to prioritize between pursuing LRA units and

protecting civilians. On one hand, if it chooses to overly pursue rebel units, civilians are
exposed to attacks. On the other, if it chooses to overly protect civilians, LRA units are able
to retreat with minimal harassment by government forces. Given the critical role of
terrorism in the LRA guerrilla campaign, the state should step up civilian protection. This
approach denies the group a canvass (population) on which to exert the most critical aspect
of its guerrilla strategy (terrorism).

In order to effectively marshall locality and terrain intelligence, LRA deploys its fighters in
their areas of origin 701 and conscripts civilians to act as guides. 702 This set of tactics eases
the task of locating, accessing and retreating from selective targets. In this direction, areas
of frequent abductions are more likely to become areas of future LRA attacks. While the
state should strive to spread out its troop deployments across all civilian inhabited areas, a
relatively higher concentration of forces may be needed in areas most affected by
abductions.

Whereas at the stage of troop insertion, LRA splits up its operational units,
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at the final

stage of troop withdrawal, it concentrates all of them at one spot, takes stock of its
acquisitions (abductees and looted items) 704 and makes an orderly retreat from the theatre
of insurgent activity. 705 Realizing that it cannot concentrate its conventional military power
against insurgents operating in small units, the state has had to split up its
counterinsurgency forces to pursue LRA raiding parties.
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With accurate intelligence and

enhanced troop mobility, the state can still use its conventional military capability. It can
unleash its full conventional military power at those spots where LRA field units assemble
before making an orderly match back to their bases.
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However, there is a caveat to employing this tactic: In order not to disrupt the ‘normal’
LRA pattern of disengagement, counterinsurgency units should either forfeit or scale down
hot pursuit in the immediate aftermath of a rebel attack. Sustained hot pursuit would keep
the LRA raiding parties scattered all over the theatre of skirmishes, preventing them from
assembling. This would deny government forces the opportunity of exerting its full
conventional military capability against a concentrated manifestition of rebel activity.

This tactic is not without shortcomings: It would allow rebel units the time to train
abductees and increase the number of fighters (trained insurgents and partially trained
recruits) available for confrontation with government forces. If the state is sensitive to
public revulsion over the slaughter of largely abductee rebels by government forces, then
the army may maintain hot pursuit to minimize the chances of recruits being integrated into
the rebel units and maximizing the chances of the abductees escaping during encounters
between the two sides. However, if the state’s counterinsurgency strategy is not influenced
by public opinion, it can allow the ‘normal’ LRA pattern of disengagement to take place so
that government forces can strike at the rebels when they regroup before returning to their
bases. The above counterinsurgency tactical framework cannot be based on a fixed formula
and requires situation- and resource-dependent decision-making in the field.

In disengaging from combat theatres, we have noted that LRA operational units move in
circles in order to disorientate government forces. 707 Circular movement can assume either
of two dimensions: clockwise or anti-clockwise. In the event a rapid response unit knows
the geography of an area under LRA attack, in conducting hot pursuit, it should split up its
forces between those chasing the rebels in a clockwise (or anti-clockwise) direction and
those waylaying them in the anti-clockwise (or clockwise) direction in which they are
likely to emerge. There is one challenge with this approach. The LRA unit that abducted
Capt Sande Otto moved in circles without returning to the scene of his abduction. In this
case, the clockwise/anti-clockwise approach would not be helpful. Nonetheless, with
intimate knowledge on the geography of an area, government forces would still be able to
anticipate the likely directions the rebel circular movements might take.
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7.2.6: Targeting Weapons and Weapons Acquisition.
In seeking to target the ‘weapons’ element in the LRA insurgency, there are a couple of
critical issues to consider: Who supplies LRA with arms and ammunition? How can this
supply be cut off? What kind of weapons does the group use? What circumstances dictate
usage of the different weapons in its arsenal? How can counterinsurgency operations alter
these circumstances in a way that makes it difficult for LRA to acquire and use these
weapons?

Before the sigining of the Nairobi Accord in 1999, most sources credited Sudan for overtly
supplying LRA with weapons.
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Some claim that even in the aftermath of the

normalization of Uganda-Sudan relations, the Government of Sudan (GoS) may have given
LRA a ‘send off’ consignment of arms or continued supplying it with weapons.
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The

normalization of Uganda-Sudan relations meant that if the GoS had to continue supplying
the group with arms, it could only do this covertly. In order not to arouse suspicion, the
GoS would have needed to regulate the quantity and period of weapons supply to LRA.
Given the complexities that would have been involved in such a covert mission, we can
assert that by and large, the thawing in Uganda-Sudan relations must significantly have
undercut the supply of conventional weapons to LRA.

Over the course of its life cycle, LRA has used light, medium and heavy conventional
weapons.

710

It has mainly used these in its military engagements with government forces.

The group also uses an assortment of rudimentary (unconventional) weapons like matchetes
and clubs.

711

Given the primacy of terrorism in its guerrilla campaign and the need to

conserve its conventional weapons for firefights with government forces, LRA’s
unconventional arms might afterall be the single most important element in its arsenal. It
needs and mainly uses these sharp and blunt instruments to attack and subdue civilians. 712

In order to render the use of these unconventional weapons obsolete and push LRA to
expend its limited conventional ammunition, potential civilian targets should be ‘hardened’.
Villages, schools and other civilian inhabitated areas should be guarded by government
soldiers and self defence groups armed with automatic and semi-automatic weapons. Faced
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with well armed adversaries, LRA field operational units would be forced to use their
conventional arms and ammunition without guaranteed replenishment.

Beyond this strategy, Uganda should be aiming to strengthen her relations with Sudan,
South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to prevent LRA from being resupplied with conventional weapons. However, with the conflict in the Sudanese region of
Darfur
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still unresolved and inter-ethnic clashes mushrooming in South Sudan,
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it

would be difficult to control the proliferation of small arms in this part of Africa and the
chances of LRA exploiting these circumstances to re-equip its units with weapons cannot
entirely be ruled out.

7.3: Recent Developments and Prospects for the Resurgence of the LRA Threat.
Since the collapse of the Juba peace process in 2008, the response to the threat posed by
LRA has become more concerted and assumed a multi-pronged dimension. Acknowledging
the pitfalls of treating the LRA insurgency as a Ugandan problem and according this
security challenge piece-meal attention, the international community has adopted a more
coordinated approach incorporating military, economic and legal measures. The success of
this latest regional initiative will largely depend on the sustained commitment of the actors
involved.

With the end of the Juba peace talks, military action has emerged as the primary means of
ending the LRA rebellion. Currently, the regional military initiative aims to kill or
apprehend Kony and his top commanders.
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This action would throw the group into

disarray. LRA would presumably suffer defections and infighting which would in turn lead
to the dismemberment of the group. But to achieve this objective, a number of modalities
need to be in place:

First, all the countries affected by the transnational activities of LRA (Uganda, South
Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic) need to militarily
participate in the hunt for Kony. One of the shortcomings of Operation Lightening Thunder
was the dismal participation of South Sudan and DRC in this campaign. Uganda with the
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logistical support of the United States military shouldered the burden of mounting this
operation. 716 The muted participation of DRC and South Sudan springs from the following
premises: Both countries are distrustful of Uganda’s regional interventions. In the mid-90s,
when Ugandan forces entered Eastern DRC to (among other reasons) pursue rebels of the
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), they illegally exploited the natural resources of the
country.
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In similar vein, when the Ugandan military entered Southern Sudan to attack

LRA bases, it engaged in illegal profiteering activity. 718 However, this mistrust in bilateral
relations appears to have been diffused. In January, 2012, Central African countries
affected by the LRA rebellion agreed to cooperate to end the conflict. The United Nations
Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) reported that Uganda, DRC, South Sudan and CAR
agreed to allow their troops to cross borders without any hinderance while pursuing LRA
forces. 719

Second, aside from uneasy bilateral relations, unlike Uganda which has a relatively strong
army with over 25 years of experience in conducting counterinsurgency operations, the
Congolese, South Sudanese and Central African Republic (CAR) armies are relatively
weak partners in the regional initiative. 720 In order to pursue a more effective counter LRA
campaign, there is a need to strengthen the military capabilities of these three countries and
improve that of Uganda. In 2011, the US government dispatched 100 troops to provide
expertise in the hunt for LRA.
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This initiative was executed under the auspices of the

Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act that enjoins the
American government to render military and economic assistance in the regional campaign
against the group. 722

It is important to note that in the long term, the regional military initiative might be affected
by faltering commitment on the part of some of the actors involved. With LRA no longer
active in Northern Uganda, Kampala appears to be gradually treating it as a Congolese or
CAR problem. Uganda has stepped up its troop deployments in Somalia at the expense of
its counter LRA campaign in the tri-border region of Central Africa.
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Her forces

constitute the bulk of the African Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) stabilization force that is
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protecting the African Union (AU)-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of
Somalia against an Islamist insurgent campaign mounted by Al Shabaab. 724

Because of her involvement in the conflict in Somalia, Uganda has become a target of Al
Shabaab attacks. In July, 2010, the Somali group conducted a double suicide attack in the
heart of Kampala, the Ugandan capital.
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Al Shabaab has threatened to mount more

attacks as long as Uganda maintains her military presence in the Horn of Africa. Currently,
unlike the LRA threat that is remote (in the tri-border region of Central Africa), the
propensity for Al Shabaab to use its sleeper cells to strike at targets inside Uganda cannot
be underestimated. In this direction, Uganda’s role in stabilizing the situation in Somalia
appears to be more integral to marshalling security within her own borders than dealing
with the ‘distant’ threat posed by LRA in Central Africa.

As part of an internationally supported hearts and minds initiative, the Government of
Uganda (GoU) is also spearheading multiple programmes to foster the economic recovery
of Northern Uganda. The conflict in this part of the country has partly been rooted in
disparities in economic development between the North and the South. 726 It is thought that
a redistribution of the national wealth would undermine the basis for people in this part of
the country supporting LRA or any rebel group that may spring up in future. Through the
GoU budget, donor assistance has gone to the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan
(PRDP) coordinated by the Office of the Prime Minister, the Northern Uganda Social
Action Fund (NUSAF), the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP), the
Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS) and “…sector support for agriculture, education,
health, water and environment, roads and other public works and strengthening local
governments.”
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On the legal front, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments of the top leaders of
LRA was cited as one of the principle stumbling blocks to the conclusion of the Juba peace
process. LRA conditioned ending its insurgent campaign on the revocation of these legal
instruments.
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This negotiation position raised some critical issues pertaining to conflict

resolution: Should retributive justice be sacrificed at the alter of peace-making? 729
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With the collapse of the Juba peace talks, the criminalization of the activities of LRA has
since assumed more prominence. In this vein, the African Union (AU) has joined the ICC
and the United States government in blacklisting the group. In pronouncing the AU
position on the conflict in Northern Uganda, Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for the AU
Peace and Security Council said that “The AU’s Peace and Security Council has decided to
declare the LRA a terrorist group in line with the relevant AU instruments….The next step
would be for all African countries to consider LRA as such and to enact regulations and
legislation that would forbid the activities of LRA on their national territories and also
make it punishable for any individual..(to) assist in any way the LRA to continue its
criminal activities.” 730

The international criminalization of the activities of LRA grossly narrows its prospects for
receiving external support. Sudan (which some sources suspect of covertly maintaining
links with the group) 731 would risk being labelled a state sponsor of terrorism if its support
for LRA was uncovered. Given previous efforts aimed at improving its international image,
it is plausible to assume that Khartoum would not want to get caught up in such a situation.
When Al Qeada masterminded the bombing of the United States embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998, the US accused Sudan of harbouring terrorists and retaliated by attacking
the Al Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum (which the US insisted was a chemical
weapons plant).
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In 1999 (a year after the Al Shifa attack), Sudan concluded a Carter

Centre-brokered peace deal that officially distanced it from LRA (one of several terrorist
groups it had been linked to) and improved her relations with her southern neighbour,
Uganda. 733

Tied in with the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President Al Hasan El
Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in the Darfur
region of Sudan by Sudanese security forces, 734 it is highly debatable that Khartoum would
(for example) seek to fund and use LRA to destabilize the newly established South Sudan.
There are some unresolved border disputes between South Sudan and Sudan (with
implications for the exploitation of oil resources in the region) 735 and inter-ethnic clashes in
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the Jonglei state of South Sudan736 that would give Khartoum (acting through LRA)
opennings to destabilize its southern neighbour. However, Khartoum is unlikely to seize
these opportunities for a number of reasons: The ICC indictments have made international
travel for Bashir a nervy experience. Wherever Bashir has been on recent state visits,
human rights groups have called on their governments to arrest him.737 Hot on the heels of
the Arab Spring Revolution (of insurrections) that toppled Presidents Ben Ali of Tunisia,
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya,
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Hassan Al Turabi, a former

ally of Bashir has pointed to the possibility that the Sudanese president may meet the same
fate.
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In this sense, the threat to his political power (potential insurrections) is a more

immediate concern for Bashir than the need to revive the fortunes of a proxy group (LRA).

7.4: HOW THE LRA INSURGENCY MIGHT END
Among experts interviewed, there is a relatively broad consensus that LRA is nearing the
end of its life cycle. The group is fast running out of options for manoeuvre. However,
those who disagree with this view argue that Sudan still holds the key to reviving LRA and
the circumstances for pursuing this line still exist.

Grace Matsiko advances four factors to show that the LRA insurgency is receding: First,
there is a huge geographical distance between the group’s current and original theatres of
insurgent activities. LRA’s original base of operations was Northern Uganda (in East
Africa). Currently, the group is active in the tri-border region of Central Africa. This
geographical distance creates a disconnect between the stated mission of the group
(overthrowing a government in East Africa) and the area where it is exerting itself militarily
to achieve this goal (Central Africa).
Second, the bulk of the LRA fighting force is no more. Third, its leadership’s “biggest fear
is the fear to communicate.” Kony has reportedly stopped using satellite phones to
communicate with his troops for fear of American forces using their technology to track
down his location. Angolan government forces were able to locate and kill Jonas Savimbi,
the rebel leader of UNITA by tracking his satellite phone communication. Fourth, most
members of the Acholi community in the diaspora that constituted LRA’s funding arm have
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cut communication with the group and settled back in their jobs overseas.
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This means

that without adequate manpower, the capacity to effectively maintain communication with
its field operational units and external funding for its activities (the second, third and fourth
factors), LRA cannot effectively bridge the geographical gap that has evolved between its
original and current theatres of insurgent activity (first factor).

Closely connected with the geographical disconnect, Col Tom Butime pinpoints
discrepancies in the life cycle of the group. He argues that the success of a guerrilla group
can be measured in terms of its capacity to expand in the different sectors of its insurgent
campaign. To this effect, a rebel movement should expand the territory under its control,
the size of its fighting force and its military capability. Butime asserts that for over 20
years, LRA has mainly posted “stunted growth” in these key areas. 741 It is then difficult to
imagine that with its options for maneuvre narrowing, the group can intensify its activities
at this stage.

Capt Ray Apiire, a former Chaplain of LRA reinforces the view that the group might be
nearing its demise. Before surrendering to government forces, he reveals that Kony
intimated to his top commanders that his spirits would leave him in the near future.

742

As

discussed in the sections on ideology, leadership and intraorganizational schisms, Kony’s
aura of invincibility ostensibly derives from his spiritual powers. Members of LRA believe
that he can use his spiritual resources to secure the future of the group.743

What then would be the logic behind Kony divulging information on the imminent loss of
an asset that has been at the heart of his position of invincibility in LRA? One thing seems
to be clear though: His admission was a clear insider evaluation of the declining fortunes of
the group. Now that Kony was about to cease being the spiritual insurance of the LRA
insurgency, would members of the group start deserting it? Desertions instigated from
within LRA would depend on two factors: First, members ceasing to believe in Kony’s
spiritual invincibility. Second, the group losing its capacity to use force to retain its
membership.
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While pronouncing the impending decline in his spiritual powers (and the fortunes of
LRA), Kony was not asking his followers to leave the group. Technically, any potential
defections would still be dealt with using force and whatever iota of spiritual resources
Kony would ostensibly still be commanding. Desertions from the group would also be
mitigated by another factor: While pronouncing the imminent loss of his spiritual assets,
Kony was simultaneously demonstrating the propensity to predict the future course of his
movement. Potential deserters would be held back by the belief that Kony still commands
the capacity to predict events and would know their defection plans well in advance.
There are experts who think that LRA is not a spent force. They largely argue that Sudan’s
geopolitical calculations are key to reviving the fortunes of the rebel group. Phillip Kasaija
pegs the end of the LRA insurgency to the amicable resolution of the South Sudanese
question. Specifically, he cites the disputed, oil-rich border area of Abyei as a potential
flash point in relations between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Government of
South Sudan (GoSS). Kasaija points out two credentials that would make LRA an
important player in future armed conflict in Sudan:

First, the group was among 300 proxy militias that the GoS deployed against the rebel
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). In this connection, LRA boasts the requisite
fighting experience that would be needed to destabilize South Sudan. Second, it has got a
significant South Sudanese contingent of fighters within its ranks.
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This attribute

potentially sets up the stage for non-Ugandan combatants in the group to militarily
influence the politics of their countries of origin. This feature of insurgent campaigns is not
new. Rebels of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) that seized state power in Rwanda in
1994 originally fought within the ranks of the National Resistance Movement (NRM)
guerrilla group of Uganda. 745

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that LRA may either be re-hired by the GoS
to destabilize South Sudan or it may disintegrate. The first scenario would presumably see
the group retain its insurgent attributes (or modify them) as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
The second scenario would see the group shedding off its guerrilla features. In this
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direction, Matsiko, Mwanguhya Mpagi and Feldman concur that LRA would degenerate
further into a bandit organization. 746

7.5: THE TRANSITION FROM INSURGENCY TO POST-INSURGENCY
Assuming that LRA has commenced the transition from the phase of insurgency to that of
post-insurgency, some critical questions emerge: How do members leave the group? What
strategy does the Government of Uganda (GoU) use to facilitate their defection? Are there
any arrangements in place to receive, disarm, debrief, rehabilitate and reintegrate former
members of LRA back into Ugandan society?

In order to speed up the disintegration of the group, the GoU has instituted the Amnesty
Act 2000

747

and put in place a comprehensive Disarmament Demobilization and

Reintegration (DDR) programme.
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committed while serving in the group.

The law pardons members of LRA of crimes
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This measure is significant in two ways: First, it

targets the motivation of the group. Members who are motivated by the fear of facing
retributive justice for having conducted terrorist attacks can contemplate defection since the
state has pardoned them.

Second, it attempts to generate mistrust within the group. Under the Amnesty Act 2000, the
five International Criminal Court (ICC) indictees are not entitled to amnesty.
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Weary of

mid-level commanders and the rank-and-file defecting from LRA, the top leadership corps
could become more repressive to retain the group’s manpower. This measure could
potentially set the stage for schisms within LRA. The DDR programme equally plays an
important role in the post-insurgency phase. Where it is well implemented, ex-fighters of
the group would presumably not swap their post-insurgent for renewed insurgent careers.

How then does the Ugandan state induce defections from LRA? According to Justice
Onega, Chairman of the Uganda Amnesty Commission, the military working hand-in-hand
with ex-insurgents and the United Nations use the media to contact active LRA combatants.
To this end, ex-fighters of the group who are hosted on Ugandan radio stations and featured
in newspapers urge active members to abandon the armed struggle. In areas where the
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above media campaign might not reach LRA fighters, the United Nations Mission in Congo
(MONUC) drops leaflets encouraging combatants to defect. 751

The LRA top leadership has tried to counteract this measure. Commanders of the group
sensitize the rank-and-file about the ostensible ulterior motive behind the GoU move. They
argue that the state’s ultimate intention is to lure fighters out of the bush and try them for
atrocities committed by LRA. 752 Although all ex-LRA fighters who were either captured or
surrendered have been pardoned, the case of Colonel Thomas Kwoyelo is an intriguing one.
Kwoyelo, who was captured by the Ugandan military in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), is standing trial before the International Crimes Division (ICD) of the Ugandan
High Court. 753

The trial of Kwoyelo showcases some of the challenges in the management of the postinsurgency phase of the conflict in Northern Uganda. Should ex-fighters of LRA be
subjected to restorative or retributive justice? In seeking to dispense retributive justice, is
the national judicial system competent enough to try suspects for war crimes and crimes
against humanity? In 2002, the GoU created the 105th Battalion, a counterinsurgency unit
made up of ex-LRA combatants.
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Given the appalling human rights record of LRA,

would this unit do a good hearts and minds job? Answers to these and other questions are
key to accelerating the disintegration of LRA.

7.6: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
This case study offers insights into the organization of the LRA insurgency. It tests the
extent to which theories of guerrilla warfare may uniformly explain rebel movements.
These findings are useful in analyzing the development of insurgent ideology in
overlapping rebellions. They show the dynamics that may facilitate an ideological switch
from armed groups propagating outward-looking grievances (targeting constituencies
external to their natural support bases) to those advancing inward-looking grievances
(targeting their natural support bases). 755 The LRA case is also important in examining the
nature of insurgent propaganda. It showcases the role of communicational warfare in
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facilitating transitions between negotiations and armed clashes in an asymmetric conflict.
756

This research sheds light on the relationship between terrorism and popular support. In this
study, the use of terrorism by one of the parties to the asymmetric conflict did not lead to an
increase in popular support for the other. 757 It has also been noted that contrary to the laws
of guerrilla warfare, terrorism may not act as the precipitant for harsh counterinsurgency
measures. Instead, a drastic state response to an emerging rebellion may trigger off
insurgent attacks on civilians.

758

This study is useful in assessing the evolution of

motivation in overlapping rebellions. It shows the role of time, the narrowing of resource,
popular and external support bases in the transformation of an insurgent group from one
that is idealistically into one that is socially motivated. 759

In terms of insurgent recruitment, the significance of this research manifests in two ways:
First, it discusses dynamics where competing Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) may
recruit from each others ranks. It shows the significance in the transition between an armed
group disintegrating and its competitor(s) persuasively and coercively enlisting some or all
of its members.

760

Second, it shows the dispensability of ideological consciousness to

recruitment. In this respect, an insurgent group can recruit and retain members who are not
ideologically committed to its armed struggle. 761

This study is also important in analyzing the role of multi-tasking in the economization of
time and resources in an insurgency. A guerrilla group may amalgamate the training of its
recruits with its military operations. This measure would save it time, accord it’s freshly
enlisted members hands-on experience and increase the manpower of field operational units
before they return to their bases.
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However, freshly trained recruits may not make good

fighters thereby compromising the fighting of the rebel units. The LRA case is also
significant in depicting the complex synthesization of insurgent ideology and the critical
role it plays in the induction of recruits. Whereas some of the LRA abductees may
separately understand the Christian, Islamic and Animist elements in the ideology of the
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group, an amalgamation of these coupled with the terrifying manner in which
indoctrination is conducted, 763 makes the doctrine difficult to interpret and challenge.

This case study offers insights into decision-making in insurgencies. The LRA leadership
model showcases traces of shared decision-making within a largely centralized command
and control structure.

764

Furthermore, this research looks at the role of guerrilla bases in

the building of parastate insurgent institutions. It confirms the necessity of sanctuaries as
theatres for marshalling insurgent ideological consistency, food security and technological
advancement. 765

The LRA case examines the place of criminal activity and external support in funding an
insurgent campaign. It shows that as long as an insurgent group is still able to prey on the
population, 766 shifts in external support would not cripple its capacity to fund its activities.
In this study, our attention is drawn to the interaction between military strategy and
propaganda in insurgent campaigns. In seeking to rationalize its terrorist approach, an
insurgent group may do three things: First, show justification why civilians may become
legitimate military targets. Second, feign the nature of guerrilla warfare (loose command
and control) in explaining ‘unauthorized’ attacks on the population. Third, deflect
responsibility for some of the terrorist attacks by establishing a balance of notoriety
between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.
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In this connection, LRA links some of

the reported terrorist attacks to false flag operations mounted by government forces.

Empirically, this study unveils the prospects for the non-linear development of strategy in
guerrilla warfare. For example, shifts in domestic or external support may push a rebel
group to adopt a fully fledged conventional military posture at its formative stage and
guerrilla warfare at a later stage. 768 The LRA case is remarkable in two other ways: First, it
establishes a link between theatres of recruitment and those of attack. In order to marshal
locality and terrain intelligence, an insurgent group may deploy its fighters in their
respective areas of origin (or more precisely, places where they were abducted). 769 In this
direction, a future topic for research would be studying the geographical behaviour of LRA.
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Second, it provides a clear understanding of some of the tactics that insurgents may use in
disengaging from a theatre of combat. For example, the circular retreat of rebel units770
introduces the notion of troop insertion within the broader framework of troop withdrawal.
By retreating while returning to the starting points of the troop withdrawal, an insurgent
group is literally re-inserting its forces in the theatre of skirmishes whilst at the same time
withdrawing them. Finally, this thesis establishes a nexus between guerrilla strategy and the
choice and sustainable use of weapons in an insurgency. To this effect, a rebel group will
strive to use arms that allow it to achieve its strategic military objectives.

771

However,

these weapons should be replenishable.

While all the above findings are significant in reinforcing existing theoretical and empirical
knowledge on insurgencies, the most striking are those that relate to the interaction between
popular support and the use of terrorism in an insurgency. Theoretically, an insurgent group
will attack civilians to lure the state into instituting harsh counterinsurgency measures. This
reaction would presumably drive a wedge between the state and its citizens and increase
support for the rebel group.772 In the case of LRA, the institution of ‘harsh’
counterinsurgency measures (the creation of poorly managed protected villages and self
defence groups) predates the start of LRA attacks on the Acholi people. The Government of
Uganda established strategic hamlets to curtail insurgent-civilian interaction. 773 In the postformative phase of the LRA insurgency, the population neither supported LRA nor the
Government of Uganda.

7.6: AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This research has mainly focussed on the logic that underpins the organization of guerrilla
activity. Insurgencies end in different ways: In Mozambique, rebels of the Mozambique
National Resistance (RENAMO) concluded a negotiated settlement with the state;
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The

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealan (LTTE) rebellion was crushed by the Sri Lankan armed
forces;

775

In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is fast

transforming into a fully fledged criminal organization that kidnaps for ransom and peddles
illicit drugs. 776 Since relocating to North Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, LRA has
gradually ceased manifesting as an armed group pursuing a political mission into one
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merely surviving and systematically evolving into a criminal and potentially quasimercenary force.777

When a rebellion reaches this stage, what organizational transformation does an insurgent
group undergo? How much of its guerrilla attributes does it retain? Which ones does it shed
off? What dynamics would facilitate a future re-transformation from fully-fledged criminal
enterprise back to fully-fledged guerrilla group? The way in which a rebel group
metamorphoses beyond the stage of demise would make for useful research into
asymmetric warfare in the modern age. Above all, insurgency is a dynamic phenomenon
which will continue to change over time. Methodologically, we might continue to learn
more about LRA through greater engagement with ex-members particularly those who
occupied more senior positions in the group.
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Appendix 1: Testing the Insurgent Attributes of LRA: Identity
VARIABLE
IDEOLOGY

HYPOTHESIS

LRA FEATURES

LRA will have adopted an ideology
that is either an original synthesis of
its ideals or an adaptation of existing
ideologies in order to articulate
political contradictions in the
Ugandan polity and justify its
recourse to violence to resolve these
contradictions







POPULAR SUPPORT

LRA will have enjoyed popular
support because it can easily access
civilians, its
membership is
ethnically connected with the
population in Northern Uganda and
civilians in this part of the country
believe that LRA will unseat the
National Resistance Movement
government.
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STATUS OF
HYPOTHESIS
Partly gleans its ideology Accepted (The ideology of LRA
from that of the Uganda
People’s Democratic Army
(UPDA). LRA aims to
reincarnate the Northern
hegemony in Ugandan
politics.
Partly gleans its ideology
from those of the Holy
Spirit Movements (HSM) I
and HSM II. LRA aims to
cleanse Acholi society of
social evil.
Partly advances an original
doctrine. LRA aims to
construct an Acholi utopia
by
‘punishing’
and
‘weeding out’ all Acholi
who belong to the old
order.
At the stage of formation,
LRA
enjoyed
popular
support because it sought to
liberate, its structures were
predominantly populated
by and it could easily
access
the
Acholi
population.
In the post-formative phase
of its campaign, three
factors combined to deny
LRA popular support: First,
the Government of Uganda
(GoU) created Protected
Villages
to
curtail

is an amalgam of its ideals and the
doctrines of UPDA, HSM I and
HSM II. It pinpoints contradictions
within
the
Ugandan
polity,
specifying those in Acholi society
and rationalizing the recourse to
armed rebellion as the best means
to redress these crises.)

Partially Accepted (Popular
Support for LRA primarily derived
from its original ideological
commitment to liberate and its
ethnic ties with the Acholi
population)

Partially Rejected (Ethnicity
was not an enduring basis for
popular support as it was
undermined by LRA attacks
targeting the Acholi population)



PROPAGANDA





LRA will have used a
communicational campaign
espousing the idea of an
independent existence for
its targeted audience, pinpointing
political
contradictions within the
Ugandan
polity
and
rationalizing its recourse to
violence.
LRA will have used overt
propaganda techniques in
territories
where
it
commands greater control
over the population and
covert techniques where it
has less control
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insurgent-population
interaction. Second, the
GoU created Acholi Self
Defence groups to fight
LRA. Third, LRA reacted
to the above developments
by attacking the Acholi
population.
However, the decline in
support for LRA did not
lead to an upswing in
support for the GoU. The
conditions in the Protected
Villages were pathetic and
LRA was still able to attack
Acholi people in these
camps.
LRA
uses
its
communicational campaign
to
cultivate
Acholi
nationalism.
It packages messages that
envisage the possibility of
an Acholi utopian state
coming into existence.
LRA messages underscore
the need to violently
‘purify’ Acholi society in
order to realize the above
polity.
When LRA and the GoU
are
in
a
state
of
belligerence,
LRA
is
constrained in pursuing its
propaganda campaign. It
has
to
painstakingly
rationalize its attacks on
Acholi civilians.
When LRA and the GoU
are engaged in peace talks,

Accepted (The communicational
campaign of LRA mainly addresses
the idea of an Acholi polity. It
justifies the need to dismantle the
old and construct a new order. LRA
uses
overt,
stage-managed
communicational antics in areas it
controls and covert ones in those it
does not control)






MOTIVATION

LRA fighters will have been
motivated by idealistic and social
considerations.
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LRA is less constrained in
advancing
its
communicational
campaign. The cessation of
hostilities between the two
sides shifts focus away
from the war front (where
LRA may have committed
atrocities) to the diplomatic
front where the failings of
the GoU take centre stage.
Peace processes allow LRA
to use overt and covert
propaganda techniques.
In a bid to undermine the
view that it is a brutal rebel
group,
LRA
extends
benevolence to GoU peace
teams visiting its bases
[overt
propaganda
techniques in areas it
controls]
In order to position itself as
a selfless peace-seeker,
LRA clandestinely conveys
peace overtures to the GoU
through non-governmental
actors (cultural institutions,
religious
organizations)
[covert
propaganda
techniques in areas it does
not control]
Like UPDA, HSM I and
HSM
II,
LRA
was
originally motivated by the
drive to protect the Acholi
population against potential
extermination at the hands
of Southern Ugandans and
reincarnate the Northern

Accepted

(By
seeking
to
emancipate the Acholi people, the
pioneering officer corps of LRA
were pursuing a ‘selfless’ cause
dictated
by
idealistic
considerations. By seeking to enjoy
the trappings of insurgent power,
the officer corps of LRA are
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hegemony in Ugandan
politics.
The
effectiveness
of
counterinsurgency
campaigns, the strategic
calculations of Sudan in
extending limited external
support to the group and the
loss of popular support in
Acholiland had a farreaching impact on LRA.
The group found itself in a
situation where it lacked the
capacity to overthrow the
NRM government. Since it
could not achieve this
objective, it could not
sustain motivation based on
the drive to reverse changes
in the regional balance of
power in the country. Since
it was losing popularity
among the Acholi people, it
could also not sustain
motivation based on the
drive to protect people who
were not supporting it. At
this stage, the group’s
motivation
assumed
multiple dimensions:
The original officer corps
who did not want to make
peace with the GoU were
motivated
by
two
considerations:
First, the drive to assemble
and
sustain
parastate
institutions that would
accord them the trappings
of insurgent power as an

pursuing a ‘selfish’ cause dictated
by social considerations. The rank
and file of the group (who are
mainly abductees) are equally
motivated by social considerations.
They are spurred by the need to
survive
while
awaiting
an
opportunity to escape from
captivity.





RECRUITMENT

LRA will have selectively recruited
its members from civic groups and
constituencies that are either
conscious
and/or
targets
of
marginalization
ostensibly
perpetrated
by
the
National
Resistance Movement government.
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alternative to those that the
reincarnation
of
the
Northern hegemony would
have given them. In this
connection,
profiteering
emerged as a motivational
means of realizing this
goal.
Second, the drive to escape
retributive
justice
for
atrocities
allegedly
committed by the group.
The loss of popular support
curtailed
voluntary
enlistment into LRA. As a
result, the group started
conducting abductions to
beef up its numbers.
Recruits
who
had
involuntarily joined the
group were motivated by
the drive to survive until a
chance for escaping from
captivity presented itself.
At the stage of formation,
LRA used persuasive and
coercive approaches to
recruit its members.
Some of the pioneering
officer corps of LRA had
served
in
previous
Northern-led governments
and voluntarily joined the
group after the Southernled rebels of the National
Resistance
Movement
(NRM) seized power in
1986.
Other pioneering officers
had served in previous

Partially

Accepted (Some
pioneering members of LRA
consciously joined the group after
the Northern hegemony [of which
they had been a part] collapsed)
Partially Rejected (Despite
being consciously committed to the
reincarnation of the Northern
hegemony in Ugandan politics,
some pioneering officers were
coerced into joining LRA from
other rebel groups)





Northern-led governments
but were coerced into
joining LRA from UPDA
and HSM.
In the post-formative phase
of its campaign, LRA
started using a coercive
enlistment
approach
because the creation of
protected villages by the
GoU curtailed insurgentpopulation interaction and
LRA’s adoption of a
terrorist strategy alienated it
from the Acholi population.
Because it could not count
on voluntary enlistment,
LRA started abducting
children who could easily
be indoctrinated.

Partially Rejected (In the postformative phase of its campaign,
LRA has been able to coercively
recruit
(abduct) and
retain
members (children) who are/were
not ideologically committed to its
armed struggle.

Appendix 2: Testing the Insurgent Attributes of LRA: Operational
TRAINING

LRA will have designed or adopted
a training model commensurate
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LRA
recruits
undergo
military and non-military

Accepted (LRA’s training model
suits its military strategy. Because

with its military strategy and tactics
and one that imparts combat and
non combat skills.











ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE

LRA will have evolved as a
politico-military
organization
characterized by a structural
separation of functions, with its
armed wing subordinated to its
political wing.
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training.
Whereas all male recruits
undergo basic military
training, only those with
special talents undertake
specialized training.
Basic military training
includes among others
drills, fighting skills and
weapons use.
Specialized
military
training includes among
others advanced weapons
use.
Non-military
training
(indoctrination) introduces
recruits to a doctrine that is
a combination of principles
they
may
separately
understand
(Christianity,
Islam and Animism) but
which makes for difficult
interpretation
when
amalgamated.
LRA combines recruitment
(abduction) operations with
training.
Recruits
are
trained
while
LRA
abduction parties are still in
the field.
Strategically, LRA is a
hierarchical
organization
exhibiting
centralized
command and control.
Tactically
and
operationally, LRA units
enjoy
autonomy
in
executing assigned tasks.
Although it is a hierarchical
organization,
at
the

it lacks the capability and time to
conventionally train its manpower,
the group economizes its resources
by combining training with
recruitment)

Accepted (LRA subjects its
recruits to military [fighting skills,
drills, weapons use] and nonmilitary [indoctrination] training).

Rejected (LRA has not evolved
as a politico-military organization.
Over the course of its campaign,
the group has largely operated
without a political wing. The
Lord’s
Resistance
Movement
[ostensibly its political wing] only
emerged during the Juba peace
talks)






GUERRILLA BASES





LRA will have located its
bases in topographically
inaccessible areas in order
to limit attacks on them.



The LRA insurgency will
have been located in an
area with a history of
armed insurrection and
susceptibility to weak
central
government
control.
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strategic
level,
LRA
exhibits traces of shared
decision-making. The Head
and Deputy Head of LRA,
Director
of
Religious
Affairs and commanders of
the four brigades of LRA
are all members of Control
Alter,
the
supreme
decision-making organ of
the group.
LRA does not exhibit a
structural separation of
powers and functions.
As Head of LRA, Kony
occupies a position that
fuses military and nonmilitary
powers
and
functions.
As members of Control
Alter,
LRA
brigade
commanders are involved
in strategy formulation and
as
field
commanders,
strategy implementation.
LRA locates its guerrilla
bases on foreign territory
(Southern Sudan and North
Eastern
Democratic
Republic of Congo)
LRA locates its guerrilla
bases in topographically
inaccessible areas (Imatong
hills in Southern Sudan and
Garamba forest in North
Eastern DRC)
In Sudan and DRC, LRA
located its guerrilla bases in
areas with a history of
armed rebellion. Eastern

Rejected (While it existed, LRM
[the
political
wing]
was
subordinate to LRA [the military
wing])

Rejected

(LRA exhibits a
structural fusion of powers and
functions. For example: Kony is
the military and spiritual head of
the group).

Accepted (LRA situates its
sanctuaries in insurgency savvy
areas characterized by rugged
terrain)



FUNDING

LRA will have relied on popular
support and criminal activity
domestically and exploited existing
geo-political
contradictions
regionally to mobilize resources for
prosecuting a relatively cheap
insurgent campaign.
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DRC is a hotbed for
insurgent activity. Southern
Sudan was a theatre of an
insurgency pitting rebels of
the
Sudan
People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA)
and the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF).
LRA uses its guerrilla bases
to showcase its mastery of
ideological
consistency,
food
security
and
technological advancement.
LRA has received financial
support during the course of
war and peace talks with
the Government of Uganda.
During war time, support
for its activities has mainly
come from three sources:
The Government of Sudan
(in retaliation for the
Government of Uganda
supporting SPLA); Acholis
in the diaspora; and plunder
by LRA units.
During peace talks, the
Government of Uganda,
Government
of
South
Sudan and international aid
agencies extended aid to
LRA to encourage it to
pursue
diplomacy and
discourage it from preying
on the population.
Plunder is the most
enduring
resource
mobilization strategy used
by LRA. While based in
Uganda (without external

Partially

Accepted (LRA
exploited poor Uganda-Sudan
relations to secure external
financial support for its campaign)
Partially

Accepted

(Domestically, LRA relied
plunder to fund its campaign)

Partially

on

Rejected

(Domestically, due to its adoption
of a terrorist strategy, LRA no
longer funds its campaign through
popular support).

STRATEGY AND TACTICS









The LRA military strategy
will have been based on
the prosecution of an
unpredictable, protracted
insurgent
campaign,
selectively targeting loopholes in the capability of
the enemy whilst allowing
LRA to adapt to its own
condition
of
relative
military weakness.
LRA will have selectively
attacked
civilians
to
expose the Ugandan state
as incapable of protecting
its citizens. In turn, the
government will have
been pushed to adopt a
heavy handed approach to
tracking down the highly
elusive rebels.









LRA will have attacked
weak points in the military
capability of the Ugandan
state and avoided outright
confrontation
with
government forces.

LRA will have used
terrain intelligence to
marshal mobility, conduct
deceptive movements in

286



state
support),
LRA
pillaged villages. While
based in Sudan (with
external state support),
LRA still engaged in
wanton plunder.
LRA conducts random and
selective
attacks
on
civilians and government
forces.
However, it concentrates
most of its attacks on
civilians in lightly guarded
protected villages.
By attacking civilians, LRA
aims to achieve two
objectives: First, to cause a
troop deployment dilemma
for the Ugandan state.
Government forces have to
choose between protecting
civilians and pursuing LRA
units.
Second,
to
demonstrate its military
capability.
LRA military strategy is
dictated by the prevailing
balance
in
military
capabilities. When it was a
recipient
of
Sudanese
military support, the group
engaged in conventional
warfare. When it lost this
external support, it adopted
guerrilla warfare
LRA deploys its strongest
units against its weakest
targets.
In order to marshal locality
intelligence, LRA deploys

Partially

Accepted (LRA
conducts some random attacks
which
make
its
campaign
unpredictable)
Partially Accepted (LRA has
serialized its insurgent campaign
over a period of 25 years)

Partially Accepted (Although
it lacks the conventional military
capability to take on the Uganda
People’s Defence Forces, LRA is in
a position to exploit UPDF’s
incapacity
to
simultaneously
protect civilians and pursue rebel
units)

Partially

Accepted (LRA
exploits its knowledge of targeted
areas to lure government forces
into circular movements.
Partially

Rejected (The
serialization of the LRA campaign
has been at variance with the
evolution of its military strategy.
LRA has not adopted conventional
warfare in the later stages of its
campaign
[that
is,
after

its theatres of insurgent
activity
and
mount
ambushes against the
enemy.


WEAPONS AND
WEAPONS ACQUISITION

LRA will have used a wide range
of
weapons
according
to
availability and will have purchased
and stolen its arms and ammunition
from a variety of domestic and
foreign sources.
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its fighters (abductees) in
their areas of origin or
places where they were
abducted.
A typical LRA attack
would assume the following
sequence: At the stage of
troop insertion, LRA splits
up its raiding parties into
small
units;
Former
abductees and conscripted
guides locate targets and
provide intelligence on the
movements of government
forces respectively; Raiding
parties kill, maim, abduct
and loot; LRA units retreat
from the scene of the
attacks in circles; After
disorientating government
forces with their circular
movements, the raiding
units assemble at an agreed
place and make an orderly
march back to the LRA
guerrilla base.
In its confrontation with
government forces, LRA
uses light and heavy
automatic weapons.
With light weapons, LRA
units can marshal mobility.
Heavy weapons give LRA
the capability to defend its
bases.
LRA uses rudimentary tools
to subdue civilians and
reserves automatic weapons
ammunition for fire fights
with government forces.

systematically
building
its
capability from the subversive
through the guerrilla to the
conventional warfare stages of its
campaign]).

Partially

Rejected (LRA
attacks on civilians did not precede
the Government of Uganda policy
of creating protected villages and
self defence groups)

Partially Accepted (LRA uses
a wide array of weapons. Its arms
range from machetes and clubs to
AK 47 assault rifles and Surface to
Air Missiles)

Partially Accepted (LRA gets
its arms from foreign sources.
Before Uganda-Sudan relations
improved, Khartoum was the
principle arms supplier of LRA.
The group may also have
purchased some of its arms from







288

Most of the automatic
weapons in the LRA
arsenal were supplied by
the Government of Sudan.
When
Uganda-Sudan
relations improved, Sudan
is suspected to have given
the group a ‘send off’
consignment of weapons to
keep it going.
LRA may have purchased
some of its weapons from
arms dealers supplying
different fighting groups in
the Great Lakes Region.

foreign arms dealers)

Partially Rejected (Did not
find research evidence to show that
LRA acquires some of its arms
through theft)

Appendix 3: Field Research Contacts
FIELD RESEARCH THEATRE: Kampala (Ugandan capital) & Gulu (Original theatre
of the LRA insurgency)
FIELD RESEARCH CONTACTS:
Snowball Contact (Political & Military): Hon. (Col) Tom Butime
Position: Member of Parliament of Uganda
Snowball Contact (Media): Mr Charles Mwanguhya Mpagi
Position: Political Editor, The Daily Monitor
Snowball Contact (Military): Capt Ahabyona
Position: Intelligence Officer, 4th Division UPDF
Interviewee (Military): Lt Gen Ivan Koreta
Position: Deputy Chief of Defence Forces, Uganda People’s Defence Forces
Interviewee (Military): Brig James Mugira
Position: Chief of Military Intelligence
Interviewee (Military): Lt Col Felix Kulayigye
Position: UPDF & Ministry of Defence Spokesman
Interviewee (Media): Mr Grace Matsiko
Position: Managing Editor, The Kampala Dispatch
Interviewee (Media): Mr Andrew Mwenda
Position: Managing Editor, The Independent (Uganda)
Interviewee (Media): Mr Patrick Kamara
Position: Senior Reporter, Nation Television
Interviewee (Media): Mr Angelo Izama
Position: Senior Reporter, Daily Monitor
Interviewee (Political): Hon Okello Oryem
Position: Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Interviewee (Political): Hon Justice PKK Onega
Position: Chairman, Amnesty Commission
Interviewee (Political): Col Walter Ochora
Position: Resident District Commissioner, Gulu
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Interviewee (Academic): Dr Phillip Kasaija
Position: Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Diplomatic Studies,
Makerere University Kampala
Interviewee (LRA): Dr James Obita
Position: Member of LRA Peace Team (Juba Peace Talks)
Interviewee (LRA): Brig Michael Acellam
Position: Senior Commander, LRA
Interviewee (LRA): Lt Col Charles Otim
Position: Senior Commander, LRA
Interviewee (LRA): Lt Col Francis Okwangalero
Position: Head of Training, LRA
Interviewee (LRA): Capt Ray Apiire
Position: Chaplain, LRA
Interviewee (LRA): Capt Sande Otto
Position: Commander, LRA
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Appendix 4: Interview Schedule (Experts)
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
(Experts)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------INTERVIEWER PARTICULARS:
 Interviewer Identification: Herman Butime
 Institution: University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia
INTERVIEWEE PARTICULARS:
 Interviewee Identification (Optional):
 Interviewee Identification Number:
 Interviewee Occupation:
INTERVIEW:
 Date:
 Time:
 Environment:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------INTERVIEW
 INTERVIEWER INTRODUCTION
 BUILDING RAPPORT
 Question: Was your institution affected by the global economic meltdown?
 Question: Is it recovering?
 SOLICITING INTERVIEW
 Question: Sir/Madam, in this interview, do you prefer revealing or concealing
your identity?
 Question: How would you want me to address you?
 GENESIS:
 Question: What are the root causes of the LRA insurgency in Uganda?
 Question: What have been the defining phases in the evolution of the LRA
insurgency?
 Question: How different is the LRA insurgency from other insurgencies in the
Great Lakes Region of Africa?
 ENLISTMENT
 Question: What role has forcible enlistment of children played in sustaining the
LRA insurgency?
 INDUCTION AND TRAINING
 Question: Has the use of terror and indoctrination during induction and training
turned LRA into a formidable fighting force?
 ORGANISATION OF GUERRILLA BASES
 Question: To what extent do LRA bases evolve into para-states?
 IDEOLOGY
 Question: To what extent does the discrepancy between LRA’s ideology and its
strategy generate dissent within the organization?
 STRUCTURE & TROOP STRENGTH
 Question: What role does the fusion of the political, military and ‘spiritual’ organs
play in tightening LRA’s chain of command?
 Question: What factors account for LRA’s varying troop levels?
 FINANCING
 Question: What is the structure of financing in LRA?
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TERRAIN
 Question: What is the relationship between terrain and the establishment of
temporary/permanent LRA para-state structures?
 WEAPONS & WEAPONS ACQUISITION
 Question: To what extent is LRA’s supply of weapons dependent on illicit small
arms trafficking in the Great Lakes Region?
 Question: In seeking to secure weapons, does LRA collaborate with cattle rustlers
in East Africa?
 STRATEGY & TACTICS
 Question: How does LRA organize its theatres of combat?
 SCHISMS
 Question: What impact did Joseph Kony’s feud with Otti Lagony have on
cohesion in LRA?
 Question: What impact did Joseph Kony’s feud with Vincent Otti have on
cohesion in LRA?
 ENDING THE INSURGENCY
 Question: What organizational vulnerabilities of LRA could be exploited to
militarily end its activities?
 TERMINATING INTERVIEW
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST-INTERVIEW NOTES

292

Appendix 5: Interview Schedule (Ex-LRA Combatants)
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
(Ex-LRA Combatants)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------INTERVIEWER PARTICULARS:
 Interviewer Identification: Herman Butime
 Institution: University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia
INTERVIEWEE PARTICULARS:
 Interviewee Identification (Optional):
 Interviewee Identification Number:
 Interviewee Particulars [Age, Sex, Residence]
INTERVIEW:
 Date:
 Time:
 Environment:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------INTERVIEW
 INTERVIEWER INTRODUCTION
 BUILDING RAPPORT
 Question: Sir/Madam, lately, what has the weather been like in Gulu, Northern
Uganda?
 Question: Has it affected farming in this part of the country?
 SOLICITING INTERVIEW
 Question: Sir/Madam, do you mind sharing with me certain aspects of your life
experience?
 Question: In this interview, do you prefer revealing or concealing your identity?
 Question: How would you want me to address you?
 ENLISTMENT
 Question: How long did you serve in the Lord’s Resistance Army?
 Question: How were you recruited?
 Question: What were your experiences between being recruited and starting training?
 INDUCTION AND TRAINING
 Question: What kind of training did you undertake?
 ORGANISATION OF GUERRILLA BASES
 Question: What was it like living in the place where you were taken?
 IDEOLOGY
 Question: Were you told why it was important for you to belong to LRA?
 STRUCTURE & TROOP STRENGTH
 Question: In your unit, who reported to whom?
 Question: How many of you were serving in LRA?
 FINANCING
 Question: From whom and where did you get food, medicine and clothing?
 TERRAIN
 Question: Describe the place where you trained and lived prior to deployment?
 WEAPONS & WEAPONS ACQUISITION
 Question: What weapons did you use?
 Question: From where did you get your weapons?
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STRATEGY & TACTICS
 Question: How did you go about fighting?
 SCHISMS
 Question: Did the junior commanders ever bitterly disagree with the senior
commanders?
 ESCAPE/DEFECTION/SURRENDER
 Question: How did you leave LRA?
 TERMINATING INTERVIEW
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST-INTERVIEW NOTES
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